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Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional
Self-Dealing In Seminole Tribe
Laura S. Fitzgerald 52 Vand. L. Rev. 407 (1999)
In Seminole Tribe v. Florida, the Supreme Court held that the Consti-
tution's Article III embodies a principle of state sovereign immunity which so
constrains the federal judicial power that it prohibits Congress from granting
federal courts subject matter jurisdiction over private lawsuits to enforce Arti-
cle I legislation against states. At the same time, however, and again in Idaho
v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, the Court reaffirmed its own Ex parte Young doctrine,
under which the Court itself unilaterally granted federal courts subject matter
jurisdiction over private lawsuits to coerce states to comply with federal law
despite state sovereign immunity. Neither in Seminole Tribe nor in Coeur
d'Alene Tribe did the Court explain how Article HI could so limit Congress's
power to grant subject matter jurisdiction in such lawsuits, while leaving in-
tact the Court's own power to do so under Ex parte Young. Arguing that Ex
parte Young and the Young doctrine rest on no affirmative principle of law,
Professor Fitzgerald suggests that Young's survival of Seminole Tribe reflects
the Court's claim for itself of a freestanding judicial power to regulate access
to federal courts for private lawsuits challenging state interests--a judicial
power that now outstrips both ordinary judicial review and also Congress's
constitutional authority over the federal courts.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past several terms, the Supreme Court has con-
fronted head-on the Constitution's deepest questions about power and
the institutions that compete for it. As the Court refereed this compe-
tition, however, some institutions fared better than others., Among
the institutional winners was the Court itself.
The Court ruled in its own favor each time it decided an overt
question about the federal "judicial Power" vested by Article 111,2
consistently voting to fortify the Court's status within the
Constitution's structure for the separation of powers, often at
1. The United States Congress, for one, suffered repeated, dramatic blows to its
authority at the Court's hands. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997)
(invalidating federal firearms registration legislation as violating Constitution's federalism
principle); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 511 (1997) (invalidating federal Religious
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 as exceeding Congress' legislative power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 47 (1996) (denying Congress
authority under Article I to override state sovereign immunity from suit in federal court to
enforce federal legislation); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995) (invalidating
federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1994 as exceeding Congress' legislative power under
Article I Commerce Clause). By contrast, States' interests prevailed before the Court again and
again. See, e.g., Printz, 521 U.S. at 935; Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281-88
(1997); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 551-52. See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and
Limits of Law: Printz and Principle?, 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180 (1998).
2. U.S. CONST. art. Ill, § 1. Article II's vesting clause reads, in full: "The judicial Power
of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish." Id.
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Congress' direct expense.3 Yet one of the Court's more remarkable
"judicial Power" decisions came tacitly, emerging from two cases that
did not raise any overt question about the Court's special constitu-
tional role: Seminole Tribe v. Florida4 and Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene
Tribe.5
These two cases were reasoned, announced, and received as
decisions about the Constitution's federalism principle;6 more par-
ticularly, they expanded federalism's rule of state sovereign immu-
nity, which now protects States from being sued without their consent
by private plaintiffs in federal court even if Congress has decreed
otherwise.7 But at the same time, in Seminole Tribe and Coeur
d'Alene the Court also staked its claim to a significant, freestanding
3. See generally City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 511 (holding that once the Court declares
scope of First Amendment's Religion Clauses, Congress may not by simple legislation grant
greater rights protection); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995) (holding
that once a federal court has entered final judgment in a federal securities fraud lawsuit in
reliance on a Supreme Court decision imposing short limitations period onto federal statute
supporting cause of action, Congress may not require final judgment to be reopened and the
complaint reinstated when it amends statute to restore longer limitations period); Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (invalidating environmental legislation's "citizen
standing" provision because it authorized federal court lawsuits by plaintiffs who could not meet
Court's own standing criteria under Article I "case or controversy" requirement); see also
Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 814-15 (1997) (holding that plaintiff Members of Congress lacked
statutory and constitutional standing to challenge Line Item Veto Act, notwithstanding statute's
provision authorizing suit by "any Member of Congress ... adversely affected" by the Act).
4. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
5. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261 (1997).
6. See, e.g., Herbert Hovenkamp, Judicial Restraint and Constitutional Federalism: The
Supreme Court's Lopez and Seminole Tribe Decisions, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 2213, 2213 (1996)
(criticizing Court's "judicial activism" in siding with States on states' rights challenges to federal
economic regulation); Jackson, supra note 1, at 2181 & n.1. (citing Seminole Tribe and Coeur
d'Alene, among others, as evidencing revival of "federalism-based limits on national power");
Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex
parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 495, 499 (1997) ("Seminole Tribe must be considered as part of
the broader canvass of federalism on which the Court has been working since 1990."); Henry
Paul Monaghan, Comment, The Sovereign Immunity "Exception," 110 HARV. L. REV. 102, 102
(1996) (describing Seminole Tribe as "illustration of the importance that a narrow, but solid,
five-Justice majority of the Supreme Court attaches to the constitutional underpinnings of 'Our
Federalism.'" (footnotes omitted)); Louise Weinberg, Fear and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 1295, 1295 (1997) (citing Seminole Tribe to support author's observation that "the Supreme
Court of late has been investing so heavily in the federalism business, so energetically
protecting the states from the nation"); John C. Yoo, Sounds of Sovereignty: Defining
Federalism in the 1990s, 32 IND. L. REV. 27, 27 (1998) (citing Seminole Tribe, among others, to
support assertion that "[flederalism is back, with a vengeance"). See generally Symposium, Fear
and Federalism, 23 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1179 (1997) (collecting more than a dozen articles and
comments discussing Seminole Tribe and judicial federalism).
7. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 281 (holding State constitutionally immune from
private federal lawsuit to enforce federal-law claims to real property also claimed by State);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 53, 71-74 (declaring that Congress lacks power under Article I so to
"abrogate" state sovereign immunity).
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"judicial Power":8 the power to dictate the terms on which federal
courts may assert subject-matter jurisdiction-that threshold author-
ity even to admit a claim into federal court 9-over lawsuits against
state interests; a judicial power that constitutionally outstrips
Congress' legislative power over the federal courts under Article I.
Here is where the Court stakes its claim. In Seminole Tribe,
the Court held that Article III embodies a principle of state sovereign
immunity which so constrains the available federal judicial power
that it prohibits Congress from granting federal courts subject-matter
jurisdiction over private lawsuits to enforce Article I legislation
against unconsenting States: the Court denied Congress the Article I
power to abrogate state sovereign immunity. 0 Yet at the same time,
in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene, the Court reaffirmed its own Ex
parte Young" doctrine, under which the Court has unilaterally
granted federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over private law-
suits to coerce unconsenting States to comply with federal law: 12 the
Court reaffirmed its own judicial power to abrogate state sovereign
immunity.
8. U.S. CONST. art III, § 1 (vesting "[tihe judicial Power of the United States" in "one
supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish").
9. Throughout this Article, I use the word "jurisdiction" in its most precise sense, to
describe a federal court's authority even to entertain a claim on the merits: without good
subject-matter jurisdiction, a claim may not even cross the federal court's threshold, no matter
how likely that claim's success on the merits might otherwise be. "The requirement that
jurisdiction be established as a threshhold matter 'springs from the nature and limits of the
judicial power of the United States' and is 'inflexible and without exception.'" Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998) (citation omitted). The
Supreme Court has recently emphasized the difference between this threshold constitutional
and statutory requirement of federal subject-matter jurisdiction-"i.e., the... statutory or
constitutional power to adjudicate [a] case"-from other requirements that may stand between a
federal plaintiff and a favorable judgment, like the existence of a valid cause of action under
which she can state a claim, or the court's authorization to grant the specific remedy she seeks.
See id. at 1010. Steel Co. held that plaintiffs standing to sue, a component of the threshold
jurisdiction question, must be determined before a court reaches the question of whether a cause
of action lies, thus rejecting the doctrine of "hypothetical jurisdiction," under which lower courts
had assumed 'jurisdiction for the purpose of deciding the merits." Id at 1012. I mean to
maintain the same distinction, and so concentrate my analysis here on the first question of
jurisdiction, that is, whether a federal court has the power to entertain a case at all, or must
instead simply admit its lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and dismiss the complaint
altogether. See FED. R. CIrV. P. 12(b)(1), (bX3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall
dismiss the action.").
10. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-72 (explicitly overruling Pennsylvania v. Union Gas,
491 U.S. 1 (1989)).
11. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); see infra Part HI (discussing Exparte Young and
the Supreme Court decisions now comprising the Young doctrine).
12. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (reaffirming Ex parte Young); Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 71 n.14, 72 n.16.
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But how could Ex parte Young survive Seminole Tribe? If state
sovereign immunity indeed imposes a constitutional outer limit on
federal courts' subject-matter jurisdiction, as Seminole Tribe held,
then one would expect that limit to apply to Court-crafted jurisdic-
tional rules, like Young's, just as it applies to jurisdictional grants
from Congress, like the one ruled unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe.
That is, if Article III slams federal court doors shut when Congress is
knocking, how can those same doors swing open at the Court's com-
mand?13
Yet Young survives. Nothing from inside the Court's sovereign
immunity doctrine explains why. While it is true that Ex parte Young
jurisdiction reaches lawsuits that are different from the lawsuit de-
clared unconstitutional in Seminole Tribe-Young plaintiffs may
name as defendants only state officials and not the State itself, while
Congress had authorized plaintiffs to sue States by name' 4-- that
difference is immaterial, both practically and constitutionally. As a
practical matter, when private plaintiffs win Ex parte Young lawsuits,
the federal judgments they obtain judicially coerce state action to
comply with federal law, notwithstanding the State's privilege of
sovereign immunity. 15  The enforcement actions invalidated in
Seminole Tribe sought just that result. 16
More significantly, there is no constitutional difference be-
tween Ex parte Young jurisdiction and the jurisdiction that Seminole
Tribe placed beyond Congress' power to grant. While state sovereign
immunity holds the status of an affirmative constitutional privilege, 7
13. See Steel Co., 118 S. Ct. at 1012 (" Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all
in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.'"
(quoting Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869))).
14. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48-50.
15. See, e.g., Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S. at 270 (agreeing with Ex parte Young dissenter that
the "'manifest, indeed the avowed and admitted, object of... [a Young lawsuit is] to tie the
hands of the State.'") (quotingExparte Young, 209 U.S. at 174 (Harlan, J., dissenting)); see also
Erwin Chemerinsky, State Sovereignty and Federal Court Power: The Eleventh Amendment
After Pennhurst v. Halderman, 12 HASTINGs CONST. L.Q. 643, 657 (1985) ("Inevitably, suits to
stop officers from applying state law 'run against the state.' "). In fact, it tookExparte Young to
clear state sovereign immunity barriers to federal court lawsuits that produced far-reaching
injunctions to remedy racial segregation in public schools. See, e.g, Milliken v. Bradley, 433
U.S. 267, 289-90 (1977) (holding that Young authorizes federal courts to entertain private
lawsuit seeking injunction to force State to fund comprehensive education for children subjected
to racial discrimination).
16. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 57-58.
17. See id. at 53-54, 67-68; Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). The Court has
located the Constitution's state sovereign immunity principle variously in the Eleventh
Amendment, in Article III, and in certain penumbral values derived from the "Understood
background against which the Constitution was adopted." Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491
1999] 411
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this Article suggests that Ex parte Young's "exception" to the sover-
eign immunity rule rests on no affirmative principle of constitutional
law.18 Indeed, the Court has admitted that Young jurisdiction stands
entirely on the Court-crafted "fiction" that a federal lawsuit against a
State's officials-although sued only in their official capacities and
only for relief that will necessarily coerce state action-somehow
strips those officials of their official status momentarily, just long
enough for federal jurisdiction to attach despite the State's own sov-
ereign immunity.19
This fiction, I suggest, has no basis in any substantive inter-
pretation of the Constitution, nor in any other source of law that
ordinarily informs judicial review;20 indeed, the Court claims no such
law-based foundation for the Ex parte Young rule.21 Instead the
U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part), overruled by Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-72; see also Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934) ("Behind
the words of [Article III and the Eleventh Amendment] are postulates which limit and control"
extending state sovereign immunity to cases not specifically described by Amendment's text.).
See generally Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 267-68 (describing a "broader concept of immunity,
implicit in the Constitution, which we have regarded the Eleventh Amendment as evidencing
and exemplifying"). The Court now tends to use the terms "Eleventh Amendment immunity"
and "state sovereign immunity" interchangeably when referring generally to this broader
constitutional principle invoked in Seminole Tribe to invalidate Congress' jurisdictional grant,
and I do the same.
18. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
19. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst I), 465 U.S. 89, 105
(1984) (describing Ex parte Young doctrine as resting on "fiction" and "irony"); see also Coeur
d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (agreeing with Pennhurst f's "observation" that Young rests on
"fictional distinction between the official and the State"). More particularly, the "fiction" is that
state officials are deemed to forfeit their status as "state" officials when, acting in their official
capacities, they violate federal law while carrying out the State's work. See Ex parte Young, 209
U.S. at 160. Thus stripped, such officials may not claim the State's immunity from private
federal-court lawsuits complaining of those federal law violations, and so the officials may be
sued-despite the State's own constitutional immunity-for a judgment requiring the State,
through its officials, to comply with federal law. See id. ("The state has no power to impart to
[its official] any immunity from responsibility to the supreme authority of the United States.").
But the official is so "stripped" of her official status only for the purpose of establishing federal
subject-matter jurisdiction. Once jurisdiction attaches, she becomes the State's again, and her
official actions violating federal law constitute "state action" whenever showing state action is
required to state a claim on the merits, see Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of L.A., 227 U.S. 278,
286-88 (1913), as it is for virtually all claims alleging violations of constitutional rights, see Mt.
Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 280, 284 (1977); see also 42 U.S.C. §
1983 (1994) (creating private right of action against any person who deprives plaintiff of
federally-secured rights while acting "under color of state law").
20. See infra Part V.L
21. Unsatisfied with the Court's reliance on fiction alone to justify Ex parte Young
jurisdiction, some scholars have offered more substantive justifications for the rule. For
example, some emphasize a common-law tradition, predating Young, under which a sovereign's
agents could be sued individually for certain injuries they caused while carrying out their
official duties, notwithstanding the sovereign's immunity from suit arising out of the official's
harmful conduct. See, e.g., David P. Currie, Sovereign Immunity and Suits Against Government
Officers, 1984 SUP. CT. REV. 149, 150-54; David E. Engdahl, Immunity and Accountability for
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Young doctrine expresses simply the Court's own evolving, pragmatic
assessment of the need-notwithstanding the Constitution's state
sovereign immunity rule-to use federal courts to enforce state
compliance with certain federal laws.22 Thus, there is no constitu-
tional basis for preserving the Court's Ex parte Young jurisdiction
while invalidating Congress' jurisdictional grant in Seminole Tribe.
So how, then, could Ex parte Young survive Seminole Tribe?
The answer may come not from inside the Court's sovereign immunity
doctrine, but from outside it. As a "judicial Power" 23 decision-in
which the Court is elaborating its own special role within the
Constitution's separation of powers framework-Ex parte Young's
survival of Seminole Tribe may make more sense.
Return to the puzzle. If, as Seminole Tribe holds, Article III's
sovereign immunity principle denies Congress the Article I legislative
power to grant federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits
to enforce federal law against unconsenting States, how can Article III
permit such lawsuits under the Court's non-constitutional Ex parte
Young doctrine? Perhaps because Article III is being read to vest the
Court with a freestanding judicial power to regulate federal jurisdic-
tion in these cases, a judicial power that now constitutionally out-
strips Congress' legislative authority over the federal courts. 24 That
Positive Governmental Wrongs, 44 U. CoLO. L. REv. 1, 5-28 (1972); William A. Fletcher, A
Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative
Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033,
1088 & n.222 (1983); Henry Paul Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When,
82 YALE L.J. 1363, 1387 & n.153 (1973). As I argue infra Part H.C.1, that common law tradition
concerned the question whether an injured party had a cause of action against the official
individually, not the analytically prior question of whether a court could exercise subject-matter
jurisdiction over any such claim. See, e.g., Engdahl, supra, at 23-24 (asserting that post-Civil
War Court confused jurisdiction under Eleventh Amendment with traditional cause of action
against officials in holding private lawsuit barred by state sovereign immunity). But in an
Article MI court, of course, the fact that a complaint may state a cognizable cause of action, on
the merits, does not automatically confer subject-matter jurisdiction on the federal court to
adjudicate that claim: without good subject-matter jurisdiction, that claim may not even cross
the federal court's threshold. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct.
1003, 1012 (1998). Even more simply, because the Court itself has never adopted the
scholarship's common-law justification for Ex parte Young, that alternative theory cannot tell us
very much about how the Court views its own authority to preserve Young after Seminole Tribe.
For an evaluation of this and two other alternative justifications for Ex parte Young, see infra
Part II.C.
22. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text. Not all federal laws have warranted
enforcement through Ex parte Young jurisdiction. Compare Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 287
(denying Young jurisdiction to enforce federal treaty and legislation granting Tribe reservation
lands), with Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 678 (1974) (granting Young jurisdiction to enforce
federal requirements for state participation in program under Social Security legislation).
23. U.S. CONsT. art. III.
24. As noted infra Part V.B.1, there appears to be some agreement that the Constitution
grants Congress at least a substantial authority over the federal courts and their subject-matter
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is, perhaps the Court is simply claiming for itself-while denying to
Congress-a constitutional prerogative to determine independently
when to open and shut federal court doors on suits against state in-
terests; the Court is asserting an Article III "judicial Power" to dictate
federal jurisdiction in these cases, not just to exercise it. What is
more, the Young cases, including Coeur d'Alene, suggest that the
Court considers itself free to wield this power over jurisdiction for any
reason, even the purely pragmatic.
If so, then Ex parte Young-and, more to the point, Young's
survival of Seminole Tribe-represents no ordinary exercise of the
Court's traditional power of judicial review: the Court's constitutional
prerogative, claimed at least since Marbury v. Madison, "to say what
the law is."25 If Young does indeed rest entirely on a "fiction," as the
Court insists, then it says nothing about any "law," constitutional or
not, other than the Court's own say-so.2 6 In preserving Young, then,
Seminole Tribe accomplished even more for the Court than Marbury
did, for while Marbury claimed judicial review's power to declare what
the Constitution and other law-based authorities mean and thus
require, Seminole Tribe appears to have claimed the power to declare
the law on federal jurisdiction based on no legal authority at all.27
jurisdiction, despite persistent scholarly debate over how absolute that power may be. See U.S.
CoNsT. art. HI, § 1 (vesting federal judicial power in "one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish"); see also literature cited
infra notes 290-91.
25. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
26. I contrast ordinary judicial review with the reasoning behind the Court's Ex parte
Young doctrine below, in Part V.A Of course, one could agree that the Supreme Court was not
exercising its ordinary power ofjudicial review when it preserved Exparte Young after Seminole
Tribe, and then conclude, simply, that the Court therefore acted outside the scope of its
constitutional authority. But I have discovered no cases or commentary suggesting that the
Court's Article I power is necessarily limited to judicial review, defined as the power "to say
what the law is." See Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Accordingly, I have considered here
what other species of judicial power could account for the Young doctrine and for its survival of
Seminole Tribe; I offer the hypothesis I do because it might explain what the Court actually
accomplished by preserving Ex parte Young jurisdiction after Seminole Tribe. And despite the
separation of powers concerns that this novel judicial power raises, see infra Part V.B.2, its
novelty need not make it automatically unconstitutional.
27. Even so, Seminole Tribe's claim to power takes a form closely paralleling Marbury's.
In both cases, the Court declined a particular statutory grant of federal subject-matter
jurisdiction on the grounds that Congress had attempted to expand the federal judicial power
beyond the boundaries of Article Ill. And in both cases, the Supreme Court used the occasion of
declining jurisdiction over that one discrete class of lawsuits to assert a more potent
prerogative: in Marbury it was the power of judicial review itself, and in Seminole Tribe, this
Article suggests, it was the power to regulate unilaterally the terms of federal court jurisdiction
over private lawsuits against state interests.
414
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Any such claim by the Court to a unilateral, jurisdiction-set-
ting authority immediately raises separation of powers concerns. 28
Subject-matter jurisdiction29 is both a fundamental source for, and a
fundamental check on, the institutional authority of Article III
courts;30 jurisdiction is one critical way in which the separation of
powers principle expresses itself in the federal judicial branch.31
Thus, by preserving Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe-by pre-
serving its own power to grant federal jurisdiction while
constitutionally stripping Congress of the power to do the same-the
Court appears to have claimed a privilege rare in the separation of
powers world: the institutional right, where private lawsuits
challenge state interests, to have not just the last word, but the only
word on the scope of its own authority.32 The Court's claim thus
28. The Constitution's separation of powers principle concerns not only the dimensions of
each branch's individual authority, but also its relationship to the other two branches.
Throughout this Article, I mean to invoke that principle in both its individual and its relational
senses: I ask what these decisions suggest about the Court's special Article M 'judicial Power"
and also about the Court's constitutional relationship to Congress.
29. Again, I use the term "jurisdiction" in its most precise sense, to describe a federal
court's threshold authorization even to entertain a controversy, quite apart from that court's
power to recognize a plaintiff's cause of action or to fashion appropriate relief. See supra note 9.
30. Just as the Congress may not legislate on matters beyond its Article I
"jurisdiction--the constitutionally bounded field in which Congress is entitled to exercise
federal power, see generally United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995)-so federal courts,
including the Supreme Court, may not exercise the federal judicial power in cases that lie
beyond their subject-matter jurisdiction. This, of course, is axiomatic: federal courts are courts
of limited jurisdiction and thus "are empowered to hear only those matters explicitly provided
for both in the Constitution and federal law." Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 649 & n.35
(explaining that principle of limited federal court jurisdiction "can be traced back... to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803)").
31. The Court itself has recently reaffirmed this link: "The statutory and (especially)
constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation and
equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting at certain times, and even
restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain subjects." Steel Co. v. Citizens for
a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998).
There are other constitutional checks on the federal judicial power as well, including the
political process by which federal judges and Justices are appointed, the possibility of
impeachment, and the historical specter of court-packing. Likewise, other constitutional
provisions seek to preserve the federal judiciary against the encroachments of the federal
political branches, including Article Ilrs life tenure and salary requirements. See U.S. CONST.
art. III. While these other checks on, and safeguards for, federal courts are obviously important
to the separation of powers balance overall, they are, perhaps arbitrarily, beyond the scope of
this Article.
32. Other claims to judicial independence much less unilateral in nature have sparked
considerable controversy. Compare, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers,
and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 71-75 (1984) (arguing that federal
courts violate Article I and separation of powers when they decline, for policy-based reasons,
to exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a controversy within a constitutional statutory
grant), with David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 547, 550
(1985) (arguing, in response to Professor Redish, that federal courts may constitutionally use
discretion, even on pure policy grounds, to decline jurisdiction "despite the existence of statutory
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collides with core values-like institutional accountability and inter-
branch review-that the separation of powers principle seeks to
preserve. 33
Moreover, the Court's claim to a jurisdiction-setting power that
it denies Congress clashes with the Constitution's allocation to
Congress of substantial, if not primary, authority to regulate the
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.3 To be sure,
Seminole Tribe declared that Congress could also invoke Ex parte
Young jurisdiction if it wished to open federal court doors to private
enforcement of Article I legislation against States.35 Likewise, the
Court will honor Congress' choice, express or implied, to deny Ex
parte Young jurisdiction to enforce particular legislation, and so
legislatively shut federal court doors on private lawsuits that would
otherwise satisfy Young; indeed, Congress was deemed to have
intended that result in Seminole Tribe, and so Young jurisdiction was
withheld.36  But if Ex parte Young can claim no affirmative
constitutional foundation-if the Young doctrine represents, at
bottom, simply the Court's pragmatic views about when judicial
enforcement of federal law is desirable despite state sovereign
immunity-then it only aggravates separation of powers concerns for
the Court so to impose its own policy-based jurisdictional rules on
Congress. 7 That Congress may also embrace the Court's "fiction"
solves nothing.
It is thus not enough after Seminole Tribe to tag the surviving
Ex parte Young jurisdiction as "fictional" and then move immediately
authority to adjudicate"). Seminole Tribe's jurisdictional claim would also appear to dwarf the
literature's persistent controversy over whether Congress may, in the exercise of its own
constitutional authority over federal subject-matter jurisdiction, strip federal courts altogether
of the power to hear any or all federal claims, like those based on federal constitutional rights.
Here, by contrast, the Court is stripping Congress of a power over jurisdiction that the Court
preserves for itself. Compare Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Power of Congress to Limit the
Jurisdiction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1362, 1362-63 (1953)
(noting that the Constitution grants Congress primary authority to grant or withhold subject-
matter jurisdiction from inferior federal courts), with Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue:
The Supreme Court, Congress and Federal Jurisdiction, 85 Nw. U. L. REV. 1, 1-3 (1990) (stating
that the Court and Congress share constitutional authority over contours of federal subject-
matter jurisdiction, together working out rules through inter-branch dialogue over time). See
generally infra notes 290-91 (citing additional scholarship addressing the debate over Congress'
control over federal courts).
33. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing these separation of powers concerns).
34. While the scope of Congress' authority over federal court jurisdiction is the subject of
considerable scholarly controversy, see infra notes 290-92 and accompanying text, there is a
consensus that Congress' power over jurisdiction is, at least, significant. See infra note 290.
35. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 n.17 (1996).
36. Id. at 75-76.
37. See infra Part V.B.2 (discussing separation of powers implications of Young after
Seminole Tribe).
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on to discuss when and why federal courts should exercise that ficti-
tious subject-matter jurisdiction, as Court and commentators have
tended to do. 8 If the Court is indeed claiming a freestanding "judicial
Power" to dictate the terms of federal jurisdiction over lawsuits chal-
lenging state interests, then that claim warrants a careful re-exami-
nation, under the separation of powers principle, of the Court's rea-
soning in Young itself and in other cases developing the full-blown
Young doctrine reaffirmed in Coeur d'Alene.39 This Article attempts
the task.
Part H1 sets the foundation. It shows how Seminole Tribe fits
into the Court's century-long process of heightening the constitutional
status of state sovereign immunity begun in Hans v. Louisiana.40
Noting Seminole Tribe's preservation of Ex parte Young, it considers
and critiques three alternative justifications for Young-none of
which the Court itself embraces-offered to explain how the Court-
crafted Young rule could survive where Congress has been constitu-
tionally barred. Part II then argues that by treating sovereign im-
munity as a firm jurisdictional limitation, Seminole Tribe necessarily
raised the stakes on Ex parte Young: judicial abrogation of States'
immunity under a Court-created "fiction" became a far more serious
matter once congressional abrogation was declared unconstitutional.
Thus, Seminole Tribe intensified the need to review the foundations
on which Ex parte Young jurisdiction rests.
Part III then offers my core observation. A close reading of Ex
parte Young demonstrates that the Supreme Court based its juris-
dictional exception to state sovereign immunity on no affirmative
legal principle-constitutional, statutory, common-law, or otherwise.
Indeed, the Young rule makes best sense not as a rule of law but as a
38. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270-71 (1997); see also David P.
Currie, Ex parte YoungAfter Seminole Tribe, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 547, 550 (1997) (concluding that
Young remains available after Seminole Tribe for the "most important cases," those "involving
constitutional claims against state officers"); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 132 ("If the reality is
that state officials can still be held accountable under Young... then being unable to sue the
state eo nomine in federal court will prevent a federal forum only in rare situations .. ."); id. at
127 n.168 (identifying "narrow domain" in which Young would not provide jurisdictional
exception to state sovereign immunity).
39. The fully-developed Young doctrine grants federal subject-matter jurisdiction over a
private lawsuit challenging state interests so long as the plaintiff sues only state officials and
not the State itself, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); and seeks only prospective relief,
see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 663, 668 (1974); to compel future compliance with federal and
not state law, see Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1), 465 U.S. 89, 105-
06 (1984). See Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (reciting criteria for
Young jurisdiction); see also Breard v. Green, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (holding Ex parte Young
jurisdiction unavailable where plaintiff alleged no continuing violation of federal law).
40. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
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rule of policy; a rule depending not on the law-based reasoning that
characterizes ordinary judicial review, but on purely pragmatic con-
siderations. Part IV then argues that the principal Supreme Court
decisions that develop Young into the full-blown Ex parte Young doc-
trine affirmed in Coeur d'Alene further erode any legal basis for
Young jurisdiction, while expanding that rule's dependence on
straightforward judicial policymaking.
Based on these observations, Part V suggests that the Court's
preservation of Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe cannot be
accounted for as an ordinary exercise of the Court's traditional judi-
cial review authority. Instead, I propose, Young's survival reflects the
exercise of a different species of "judicial Power": a freestanding
prerogative to regulate federal court access for claims challenging
state interests. Part V then considers some separation of powers
implications of the Court's claim to such unilateral control over the
scope of its own subject-matter jurisdiction.
H. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RULE AND ITS NON-CONSTITUTIONAL
EXCEPTION
A. Immunity Gets Jurisdictional: From Hans to Seminole Tribe
In Seminole Tribe, a five-Justice majority held that Congress
has no power under Article I to override, or to "abrogate," state
sovereign immunity, 41 overruling in the process a 1989 Supreme Court
decision that held to the contrary.42 Seminole Tribe thus finally
41. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72. The Court invalidated the jurisdictional
provisions of 1988's Indian Gaming Regulatory Act ("IGRA"). 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX3XA) (1994).
IGRA was enacted pursuant to Congress' plenary Article I power "to regulate
Commerce... with the Indian Tribes," U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, and it gave States the right
to participate in the regulation of gambling activities on Indian reservations within state lines.
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48. With this right, however, Congress imposed on States an
obligation to negotiate with the Indian Tribes in good faith towards an agreement, or compact,
to set the terms on which reservation gambling could proceed. See 25 U.S.C. § 2710(dX3XA)
(1994); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48. And to enforce this obligation to negotiate, Congress
gave Tribes a right of action against States in federal court to seek a court order requiring the
States to conclude negotiations for a gambling compact within 60 days. See 25 U.S.C. §
2710(d)(7)(B)(iii). The Supreme Court invalidated this jurisdictional provision, but left the rest
of IGRA intact. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 48. Although IGRA itself raised only the
question of Congress' abrogation power under the Indian Commerce Clause, the Seminole Tribe
majority declared that no provision in Article I gives Congress that power, not even the
Interstate Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id.
42. In Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), overruled by Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 71-72, a five-Justice majority voted that Article I authorized Congress to abrogate state
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quelled a notion that had developed alongside the Court's sovereign
immunity doctrine itself: the idea that Article I empowered Congress
to authorize federal court enforcement of particular federal
legislation, even if sovereign immunity would otherwise bar federal
courts from hearing those same lawsuits against unconsenting
States.43  Rejecting this notion, the Seminole Tribe Court declared
that the entire "judicial Power" available under Article III is
constrained by a broad immunity principle that places an absolute
limit on the reach of federal subject-matter jurisdiction, at least so far
as Article I legislation is concerned.44 Since it is "fundamental that
Congress [may] not [under Article I] expand the jurisdiction of the
federal courts beyond the bounds of Article III,"4s and since the
abrogation power would permit Congress to do just that by granting
sovereign immunity in order to permit private enforcement actions in federal court against
unconsenting States that failed to comply with federal environmental legislation enacted pursu-
ant to the Interstate Commerce Clause, found in Article I, section 8. See Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 59-60 (describing Union Gas holding); id. at 66 (announcing that Union Gas "was
wrongly decided and... it should be, and now is, overruled").
43. Analytically, abrogation depended on an interpretation of Article I that treated its
grants of legislative power to Congress as, in effect, a consent by every ratifying State to the
jurisdiction of federal courts in private actions to enforce legislation enacted under those power
grants, like the power to regulate interstate commerce. Every such grant of legislative power to
Congress by a ratifying State carried with it, in effect, a waiver of that State's pre-constitutional
sovereign immunity. As Justice Brennan observed, writing for a plurality in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co.:
[Tihe States surrendered a portion of their sovereignty when they granted Congress the
power to regulate commerce .... [B]y empowering Congress to regulate commerce...
the States necessarily surrendered any portion of their sovereignty that would stand in
the way of such regulation.... [Accordingly,] the power to regulate commerce includes
the power to override States' immunity from suit.
Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14-15 (citations omitted).
44. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 52 (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)). The
Court reaffirmed its former ruling, see Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448 (1976), that
Congress does enjoy the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity to authorize subject-
matter jurisdiction over private, federal-court lawsuits to enforce legislation enacted under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (reiterating
Fitzpatrick's reasoning that "the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the
Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing
balance between state and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment,"
thus constitutionally distinguishing Fourteenth Amendment abrogation from Article I
abrogation (citing Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 454)). At the time this Article went to print, the
Supreme Court had recently granted certiorari to hear several cases raising questions about the
extent of Congress' power to insulate its abrogation efforts by claiming to legislate under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 139 F.3d 1426
(11th Cir. 1998), cert. granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3468 (U.S. Jan. 25, 1999) (No. 98-791); College Say.
Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 148 F.3d 1343 (Fed. Cir. 1998), cert.
granted, 67 U.S.L.W. 3424 (U.S. Jan. 12, 1999) (No. 98-149) (consolidating two cases questioning
Congress' abrogation power to enforce Lanham Act and patent legislation).
45. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65 (citing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137
(1803)).
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subject-matter jurisdiction against States notwithstanding their
sovereign immunity,46  then abrogation represented an un-
constitutional expansion of the "judicial Power" beyond the bounds of
Article III and hence exceeded Congress' authority under Article j.47
In this, Seminole Tribe continued the Court's century-long
process of constitutionalizing the idea of state sovereign immunity,
begun in earnest in Hans v. Louisiana.48 To be sure, a common-law
tradition of sovereign immunity, protecting monarchs from lawsuits
brought against them in their own courts, long predated the
Constitution.49 But the question whether American States within the
Constitution's federal system could claim a "sovereign's" immunity
from suit in federal court-in the court of a different and, in many
respects, superior sovereign 50-was not explicitly addressed in the
46. In the Court's view, abrogation meant "that Congress could under Article I expand the
scope of the federal courts' jurisdiction under Article III[, which] 'contradicted our unvarying
approach to Article HI as setting forth the exclusive catalog of permissible federal court juris-
diction.'" Id. (quoting Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 39 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
47. Id.
48. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
49. See Fletcher, supra note 21, at 1064-69 (providing detailed account of how the experi-
ence of America's colonial and framing eras would have contradicted English and European
political philosophers' concept of sovereignty "as a centralized, indivisible power"); see also
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 101-04, 13041 (Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that principle has
roots merely in English common law, which was viewed with selective skepticism by American
Framers). But see id. at 68-69 (retorting that principle sinks its roots "in the much more
fundamental jurisprudence in all civilized nations"). Traditionally, sovereign immunity
preserved not only this jurisdictional privilege, but a substantive privilege as well, for the "King
or the Crown, as the font of law, [was] not bound by the law's provisions." Id. at 101-04 (Souter,
J., dissenting). As translated into the American constitutional system, sovereign immunity is
ordinarily discussed only in its jurisdictional sense, and I limit myself to that sense as well. See
id. at 103 & n.2 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that substantive immunity, the idea that the
"King can do no wrong" and was thus above the law, was never adopted in America). But see
Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683, 1730
(1997) (suggesting that Court's sovereign immunity caselaw may reflect principle that States
should be immune from substantive regulation by Congress, not just from subject-matter
jurisdiction of federal courts).
50. See, for example, the Constitution's Supremacy Clause, which declares:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the
United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby, anything in the Constitution or laws of any State to the
Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; see also id. art. I, at § 10 (denying States certain traditional attributes
of sovereignty, including power to make treaties, to coin money, and to keep troops); Engdahl,
supra note 21, at 2-3 (explaining that, in hierarchical English feudal system, each petty lord
enjoyed only "sovereign immunity" against unconsented suit in his own court and in courts
beneath him in the hierarchy; "if there existed any other court with power, according to the
feudal hierarchy, over him, he remained subject to coercive suit there"). Justice Stevens has
observed that the two-tiered nature of the federal system should make the common law's
sovereign immunity principle irrelevant to federal jurisdiction over States. He noted:
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body of the Constitution, nor in the first ten amendments ratified in
1791 as the Bill of Rights. When the Court first considered that ques-
tion, in Chisholm v. Georgia,51 it ruled that Article III extended no
special privilege to States immunizing them from federal-court juris-
diction in cases to which Article III explicitly extended the federal
"judicial Power," thus denying States immunity from private federal
lawsuits that fell within an otherwise valid jurisdictional grant from
Congress.52 Negative political reaction to Chisholm, of course, led to
the Eleventh Amendment, which provides, in full: "The Judicial
power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
In this country, the sovereignty of the individual States is subordinate both to the
citizenry of each State and to the supreme law of the federal sovereign. For that reason,
[the common-law]... explanation for a rule that allows a State to avoid suit in its own
courts does not even speak to the question whether Congress should be able to authorize
a federal court to provide a private remedy for a State's violation of federal law.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 98 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
A lively scholarly literature, and an equally lively Supreme Court caselaw, are devoted to
detailing which attributes of sovereignty other than jurisdictional immunity the States retained
under the Constitution's federalism principles. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 98
(1997) (invoking principles of state sovereignty to invalidate provisions of federal Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act of 1993, which required state law enforcement officials to
conduct background checks on those wishing to purchase handguns); New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress from
"commandeering" sovereign state legislature into enacting federal regulatory scheme). See
generally Jackson, supra note 1 (exploring arguments for federalism-based limits on national
power); Yoo, supra note 6 (examining original understanding of federalism to establish "the
normative purposes of federalism"). The Court has tended to treat federalism's Tenth
Amendment issues separately from federalism's Eleventh Amendment issues. See Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61 n.10 (refusing to reach question whether IGRA provisions violated the
Tenth Amendment because issue not considered in lower federal courts); see also Jackson, supra
note 6, at 499 (observing that Court's recent decisions adjusting federal-state balance of power,
based on various constitutional provisions, offer "no coherent principle... [to] ti[e] together the
Court's emerging federalism jurisprudence, other than [an] intuition in favor of more limits on
federal power"); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 119 (observing that "[the] Tenth Amendment may
have provided a more secure foundation for the Court's federalism concerns" in Seminole Tribe
than did the Eleventh Amendment).
51. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
52. Article Il explicitly authorizes the federal judicial power to reach three categories of
cases in which States are parties, if not unconsenting defendants: cases (1) "between two or
more States"; (2) "between a State and Citizens of another State"; and (3) "between a State, or
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects." U.S. CONST. art. HI, § 2, cl. 1.
The cause of action in Chisholm, a private assumpsit claim brought by the executor of a South
Carolina merchant to recover for supplies furnished under a contract with the State of Georgia,
fell within the scope of section 13 of the First Judiciary Act of 1789, in which Congress granted
the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over civil actions between a State and citizens of an-
other State. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73
(1789); see also Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 431 (Iredell, J., dissenting) (citing section 13). But
see id. at 434-37 (arguing that neither section 13 nor any other provision of the First Judiciary
Act created a compulsory action for the recovery of money from a state; instead, it only grantedjurisdiction for those claims recognized by principles and usages of the common law, which did
not permit a private lawsuit against an unconsenting sovereign).
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United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects
of any Foreign State."53
But not until Hans v. Louisiana, decided a century after the
Eleventh Amendment's ratification, did the Court begin to develop the
constitutional principle of state sovereign immunity-far broader
than that Amendment's literal terms-invoked in Seminole Tribe to
deny Congress an Article I abrogation power. Hans held that sover-
eign immunity protected States from federal-court lawsuits brought
by their own citizens claiming state violations of the federal
Constitution55 and not just lawsuits by out-of-state plaintiffs as the
Amendment specifies.56 Following Hans, the Court steadily broad-
53. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
54. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). One reason for the long gap between the
Eleventh Amendment's ratification and Hans was the Court's 1824 ruling that the Eleventh
Amendment prohibited federal jurisdiction in private lawsuits only where the State was itself
named as a defendant, thus permitting plaintiffs to elude sovereign immunity simply by naming
a state official in place of the State. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
738, 846, 857 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.); see also Jackson, supra note 6, at 496-97; infra notes 133-
36 and accompanying text (discussing Osborn and its significance to Exparte Young).
55. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10. InHans, a private Louisiana citizen holding a State-issued bond
filed suit against Louisiana in federal court, alleging that Louisiana's efforts to disclaim its
obligations under its Reconstruction-era public bonds amounted to a "Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts," and thus violated the United States Constitution. See id. at 3, 21; see
also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 (familiarly known as the Contract Clause). The Court found that
sovereign immunity barred federal subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiff's claim. See Hans,
134 U.S. at 21.
56. Criticism of Hans, and criticism of that criticism, has produced a voluminous
literature, of which the following citations represent barely a drop in the bucket. Compare
Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1476 (1987) (arguing that
Hans contradicted the text of the Eleventh Amendment and resulted in an "inexplicable
throwback to the jurisdictional regime of the Articles of Confederation"), and Fletcher, supra
note 21, at 1087-91 (developing view that Hans erred in extending Eleventh Amendment beyond
cases invoking federal courts' diversity jurisdiction), and John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh
Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REv. 1889, 1998-
2002 (1983) (same), and Vicki C. Jackson, The Supreme Court, the Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity, 90 YALE L.J. 1, 60 (1988) (same), with William E. Fletcher, The
Diversity Explanation of the Eleventh Amendment: A Reply to Critics, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1261,
1261-64 (1989) (offering a general discussion of the diversity theory of the Eleventh
Amendment), and Lawrence C. Marshall, Fighting the Words of the Eleventh Amendment, 102
HARv. L. REv. 1342, 1343 (1989) (arguing that diversity theory of Eleventh Amendment is
"thoroughly unfaithful" to text, which refers to "any" suit), and William P. Marshall, The
Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A Critical Evaluation, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1372,
1372-75 (1989) (same).
Supreme Court justices have weighed in on all sides of the controversy. Compare Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 108-19 (Souter, J., dissenting) (canvassing pre-Hans history of Eleventh
Amendment to support conclusion "that federal question cases are not touched by the Eleventh
Amendment"), and Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 483 U.S. 468, 496
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (concluding that Eleventh Amendment did not reach federal
question cases), with Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health and Welfare v. Department of Pub.
Health and Welfare (Government Employees Case), 411 U.S. 279, 291-92 (1973) (Marshall, J.,
concurring) (endorsing Hans' view that Eleventh Amendment denies federal jurisdiction in all
private lawsuits against states, even federal questions).
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ened the practical sweep of States' constitutional immunity,
eventually prohibiting federal-court jurisdiction over lawsuits against
States by foreign States,57 and over lawsuits against States pled in
admiralty.58
In this same line of cases, the Court steadily heightened the
constitutional status of the idea of state sovereign immunity.
Building on Hans' relatively modest Eleventh Amendment interpre-
tation, which stressed that the Amendment's ratifiers would have
wished to avoid the "anomaly" of having a State's exposure to federal
jurisdiction depend on the fortuity of a plaintiffs citizenship,59 the
Supreme Court developed a more virulent principle of state sovereign
immunity and rooted it more deeply in the Constitution. In the
Court's view, far from being the Constitution's last word on state
sovereign immunity, the narrowly-drawn Eleventh Amendment was
not even a primary constitutional source for giving that principle
meaning. Instead, the "root of the constitutional impediment" to
federal jurisdiction over an unconsenting State "is not the Eleventh
Amendment but Art[icle] III."o As for the Eleventh Amendment
itself, the Court minimized it as "but an exemplification" of the
"fundamental rule" privileging States from federal jurisdiction, a
privilege already rooted in Article 111.61 Indeed, long before Seminole
Tribe, the Court declared, "the entire judicial power granted by the
Constitution does not embrace authority to entertain a suit brought
by private parties against a State without consent given."62
57. See Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313,330-32 (1934).
58. See Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497-500 (1921); see also California and State
Lands Comm'n v. Deep Sea Research, Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998) (holding that Eleventh
Amendment does not bar federal court jurisdiction over in rem admiralty action where res is not
within State's possession).
59. Hans, 134 U.S. at 10-15.
60. Government Employees Case, 411 U.S. at 291-92 (Marshall, J., concurring).
61. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497; see Martha A. Field, The Eleventh Amendment
and Other Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515, 523 n.35 (1978)
(citing this statement, but noting that "[on the next page... the Court talks as though the
Eleventh Amendment, standing alone, supports all state sovereign immunity rules," and
concluding that "Courts view of the precise source of immunity is thus somewhat confused")
(citing Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 497-98); see also Blatchford v. Native Village of Noatak,
501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991) ("M[We have understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand not so much
for what it says, but for the presupposition.., which it confirms.").
62. Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. at 297; see also Pennhurst H, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1989) ("In
short, the principle of sovereign immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial
power established in Art. II.). As the Court asserted in Monaco v. Mississippi:
Manifestly, we cannot rest with a mere literal application of the words of section 2 of
Article HI, or assume that the letter of the Eleventh Amendment exhausts the
restrictions upon suits against non-consenting States. Behind the words of the
constitutional provisions are postulates which limit and control... [including] the
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So, in Seminole Tribe, by denying Congress the Article I abro-
gation power, the Court denied Congress the power to carve legisla-
tive exceptions out of what the Court had declared to be a firm consti-
tutional rule:63 the judicial power available under Article III is inher-
ently bounded by the principle of state sovereign immunity, and
Congress may not grant federal jurisdiction exceeding that limit any
more than Congress may exceed the Constitution's limits on the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court."
B. EX PARTE YOUNG: PRESERVING THE FICTION
But having denied Congress the Article I power to abrogate
state sovereign immunity, Seminole Tribe then declared that federal
courts may still exercise subject-matter jurisdiction, through Ex parte
Young, over private lawsuits seeking to coerce state action in
compliance with federal law-even Article I legislation-so long as a
plaintiff names not the State but only the state officials responsible
for carrying out that state action.65 That is, Seminole Tribe held,
while Article III absolutely prohibits Congress, under Article I, from
creating legislative exceptions to States' constitutional immunity, the
Court-crafted "exception" to that same Article III privilege, under Ex
postulate that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be
immune from suits, without their consent, save where there has been "a surrender of
this immunity in the plan of the convention."
Monaco, 292 U.S. at 322-23 (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 81 (Alexander Hamilton)); see also
Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993) (holding
that sovereign immunity protects States from "indignity" of federal court lawsuits by private
plaintiffs); cf Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 96 (1996) (reaffirming that Constitution so
protects States' dignity).
63. See Monaghan, supra note 6, at 118 ('[Sitate sovereign immunity is largely a body of
judge-made law.").
64. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803). State sovereign
immunity does differ in some respects from other limits on federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
For example, a State may waive its immunity, or otherwise consent to suit in federal court, even
though parties ordinarily may not waive defects in a federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction.
See Wisconsin Dep't of Corrections v. Schacht, 118 S. Ct. 2047, 2052 (1998) (citing Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 472 U.S. 234, 241 (1985)). Likewise, unlike other jurisdictional defects,
a federal court apparently need not raise the sovereign immunity problem sua sponte, but can
ignore the defect if no party raises the question. See id. (citing Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496, 515 n.19 (1982)). Neither of these anomalies affects the question this Article
considers: how Young's judicial abrogation of state sovereign immunity, where the State has
not waived the privilege and where the jurisdictional problem has been raised, can operate
where Congress' Article I abrogation may not.
65. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14, 73 n.16 (affirmingExparte Young); supra note 19
(more fully describing Young's distinction between a state and its officials); infra Part HLI.C
(detailing Ex parte Young's reasoning behind distinction).
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parte Young,66 remains intact. Indeed, the Seminole Tribe majority
cited Ex parte Young jurisdiction to counter dissenters' protests that
denying Congress an Article I abrogation power left States free to
flout federal law with impunity, at least from federal-court
enforcement through private lawsuits.67 What is more, the Court
suggested, Congress' own jurisdictional grant might have passed
constitutional muster if only Congress had followed the Court's lead
and drafted its legislation to conform to the Ex parte Young model.68
And why is the Ex parte Young exception constitutionally valid
while Congress' Article I exceptions are absolutely barred? The
Seminole Tribe Court did not say. Nor did the Court address that
question the following Term, when, in Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe,
all nine Justices reaffirmed Ex parte Young's central jurisdictional
rule: despite Article IIrs state sovereign immunity principle, federal
courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over private lawsuits
against state officials seeking to coerce States' compliance with
66. See, e.g., Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261,269 (1997) ("The Young exception
to sovereign immunity was an important part of our jurisprudence" when the Court held in
Seminole Tribe that "Congress, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce... may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity."). Commentators also commonly refer to Young as creating
an "exception" to the Constitution's state sovereign immunity rule. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra
note 6, at 102.
67. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. In addition to Exparte Young, the Court lists two
other "methods of ensuring the States' compliance with federal law": first, the federal
government may itself, through the Executive branch, bring enforcement actions against States
in federal court; and, second, the Supreme Court may exercise federal appellate jurisdiction to
review state court decisions, even in cases where a state citizen alleges that a State violated
federal law. Id.
68. See id at 75 n.17. The Court refused to permit the Tribe's claim to go forward against
the Governor of Florida using Ex parte Young jurisdiction because, the Court concluded,
Congress had intended for federal courts to have only limited remedial options-namely, an
injunction to require the State to negotiate in good faith towards a gaming compact-when
exercising their statutory jurisdiction to enforce IGRA's state obligations. See id. at 73-74.
Declaring that Ex parte Young jurisdiction necessarily invested the federal court exercising that
jurisdiction with "the full remedial powers of a federal court, including, presumably, contempt
sanctions," id. at 75, the Court reasoned that IGRA's more limited remedial options meant that
Congress must have intended to preclude Ex parte Young jurisdiction to supplement or to
substitute for IGRA's actual jurisdictional grant. See id. That is, having struck down IGRA's
grant of federal jurisdiction on sovereign immunity grounds, the Court relied on the congres-
sional intent behind that stricken jurisdictional package to deny Ex parte Young jurisdiction for
the Tribe's claim. See id. For a thorough critique of the Court's reasoning on this question, see
Jackson, supra note 6, at 512-30, where the author refutes what she describes as the "flawed"
and "unconvincing" analysis of congressional intent in IGRA as the reason the Court denied Ex
parte Young jurisdiction over the Tribe's claim; see also Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 298 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (noting that "[wlhen Congress has not so displaced the Young doctrine, a federal
court has jurisdiction in an individual's action against state officers" for prospective relief
enforcing future compliance with federal law).
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federal law.69 While the Justices disagreed sharply about when a
federal court should exercise its Young jurisdiction,70 no Justice
questioned the premise, necessarily underlying their debate, that it is
an appropriate exercise of the Article III judicial power for the Court
to set the terms on which Young jurisdiction should be available. And
no Justice offered a constitutional reason-nor, indeed, any legal
reason at all-why that jurisdiction does not violate Article III's
sovereign immunity principle, declared an absolute constitutional bar
to Congress in Seminole Tribe.7'1
Indeed, in the nine decades since Ex parte Young was decided,
the Supreme Court has never offered an affirmative, law-based justi-
fication for Young's jurisdictional distinction between a State and its
officials. In fact, the Court has admitted that, in its view, Ex parte
Young jurisdiction rests entirely on a court-crafted "fiction 72 lacking a
substantive basis in the Constitution or any other source of law
besides the Young decision itself.7 3 Moreover, this Article suggests, a
69. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 ("The Young exception to sovereign immunity was
an important part of our jurisprudence when the Court... held that Congress... may not
abrogate state sovereign immunity .... We do not, then, question the continuing validity of the
Ex parte Young doctrine." (citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14)); see also infra Part IVA
(discussing Coeur d'Alene opinions). Immediately following the decision in Seminole Tribe,
however, the status of Ex parte Young seemed less than certain. Compare Monaghan, supra
note 6, at 103 (asserting that after Seminole Tribe, "the rule of Ex parte Young remains in full
force"), with Jackson, supra note 6, at 498, 510-46 (developing argument that Seminole Tribe's
"analysis ofExparte Young... may threaten more generally the availability of federal courts as
enforcers of the supremacy of federal law as against state officials").
70. Compare Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270-78 (proposing standard for determining
whether Young action appropriate in particular case along with Chief Justice Rehnquist), with
id. at 288-96 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting
principal opinion's standard along with Justices Scalia and Thomas), and id. at 297-317 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (rejecting interpretation of Young in both principal opinion and concurrence along
with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer). See generally infra Part IVA (discussing three
Coeur d'Alene opinions).
71. Interestingly, even as the Justices in Coeur d'Alene debated when Ex parte Young
jurisdiction ought to be available, no one actually argued that the Young rule is constitutionally
founded. Indeed, when Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that the
Constitution's federalism principles counsel a limited use of Young, see Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S.
at 274-80, the other Justices disagreed, but mentioned no affirmative constitutional counter-
principle in Young's favor. See id. at 287-89 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment); id. at 295-97 (Souter, J., dissenting). See generally Part IVA (discussing three
Coeur d'Alene opinions).
72. See supra note 19.
73. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 270 (agreeing with Pennhurst !Ts "observation" that
Young rests on a "fictional distinction between the official and the State"); Pennhurst State Sch.
& Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1), 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (describing Ex parte Young
doctrine as resting on "fiction" and "irony"); see also Ann Althouse, When to Believe a Legal
Fiction: Federal Interests and the Eleventh Amendment, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 1123, 1135-37 (1989)
(acknowledging Young's creation of legal fiction, but observing that Justice Peckham himself
does not admit to doing so); Monaghan, supra note 6, at 127 (asserting that "[e]veryone now
recognizes that nothing but a fiction is involved" in Young's stripping an official of her official
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close reading of Young shows that it depends on no source of law,
constitutional or otherwise, for its jurisdictional rule.74
C. Doing the Court's Work: Alternative Justifications for
Ex parte Young
Although the Court resolutely insists the Ex parte Young juris-
diction rests on fiction, others have proffered more substantive justifi-
cations for the rule. Here are three alternatives, none of which, I
suggest, can account for Young's survival of Seminole Tribe.
1. Young's Common-Law Roots
Some commentators observe that, by permitting federal-court
lawsuits against state officials even though lawsuits against States
are constitutionally prohibited, the Young doctrine perpetuates a
common-law tradition-long predating the Constitution's Article Il
and Eleventh Amendment-under which a sovereign's official agents
could be sued for certain injuries caused in the conduct of their official
duties, notwithstanding the sovereign's own immunity from suit for
the officials' harmful conduct.75 These scholars argue, accordingly,
that Ex parte Young imported that common-law practice into the
sovereign immunity principle incorporated in the American
Constitution. Young's common-law pedigree, under this view, gives
the doctrine an affirmative legal footing equal, or at least sufficiently
equivalent, to the constitutional status held by the sovereign immun-
ity rule that Young abrogates. 76
But this justification for Ex parte Young cannot explain
Young's survival of Seminole Tribe, and not only because the Court
status solely in order to obtain federal jurisdiction despite the Eleventh Amendment);
Monaghan, supra note 21, at 1386 (describing rationale for Young jurisdiction as "shaky"); see
also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 48, at 311 (5th ed. 1994) ("The decision
in Ex parte Young rests on purest fiction. It is illogical. It is only doubtfully in accord with the
prior decisions.").
74. See infra notes 187-90 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 21, at 150-54; Engdahl, supra note 21, at 5-28; Fletcher,
supra note 21, at 1042-45; Jackson, supra note 56, at 60.
76. See, e.g., Jackson, supra note 56, at 60 (criticizing Court in Pennhurst 11 for divorcing
Young's jurisdictional fiction from the "traditional range of remedies available at common law
against officers"); see also Carlos Manuel Vdzquez, Night and Day: Coeur d'Alene, Breard, and
the Unraveling of the Prospective-Retrospective Distinction in Eleventh Amendment Doctrine, 87
GEO. L.J. 1, 2 (1998) (asserting that Young's sovereign immunity exception "did not originate
with that case"); see generally sources cited supra note 75.
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itself ignores this view.77 The common-law tradition of officer liability
did not concern the Article III problem of subject-matter
jurisdiction-that threshold authorization for a federal court even to
entertain a claim-on which the Supreme Court has now
unequivocally focused the Constitution's state sovereign immunity
principle. 78 Instead, that tradition recognized certain common-law
causes of action that were permitted to proceed against public officials
because those substantive claims, on the merits, were deemed to lie
against an official as an individual, and not merely against him as
representative of the sovereign, which stood immune from such
substantive claims. 79
But outside the common law, and inside Article III courts, the
fact that a complaint states a recognized cause of action, on the mer-
its, does not automatically confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a
77. See infra Part lI.C (discussing Young's departure from common-law tradition permit-
ting lawsuits against officials despite sovereign immunity).
78. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54, 65 (1996). The Court's jurisdictional
view of state sovereign immunity is by no means the only way to interpret the Eleventh
Amendment, as abundant scholarship demonstrates. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 645,
648, 653 (criticizing Pennhurst U Court for adopting theory of Eleventh Amendment as
imposing "constitutional restriction on [the] subject matter jurisdiction" of the federal courts,
where alternative non-jurisdictional immunity theories were equally supported by
constitutional text, structure, and history and, most importantly, where alternatives would
permit more federal court enforcement of federal law); see also Field, supra note 61, at 538-49
(offering alternative theory under which state sovereign immunity enjoys only common-law
status, and thus is subject to legislative displacement by Congress); Fletcher, supra note 21, at
1045-63, 1091 (offering alternative theory under which state sovereign immunity only removes
diversity jurisdiction between a State and citizens of another State from Article ils available
heads of jurisdiction, thus limiting the principle to the literal words of the Eleventh
Amendment; criticizing Courts jurisdictional view of sovereign immunity as "based on a false
premise"). But after Seminole Tribe, if not well before, see Pennhurst ., 465 U.S. at 120, it
would appear clear that the Supreme Court has definitively rejected these alternative theories
of state sovereign immunity, in favor of the view that it constitutes an inherent Article M
constraint on all exercises of federal subject-matter jurisdiction. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at
54, 64-65.
79. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 656 n.70 (citing common law agency cases,
and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY, for principle that "an agent may not claim immunities
of a principal"); Currie, supra note 21, at 153-55 (arguing that Ex parte Young was consistent
with common law agency rules holding agent personally liable for his own torts, but not for
breach of contract between his principal and a third party); Engdahl, supra note 21, at 14-21
(describing pre-Young tradition distinguishing those actions-namely, in tort-that could be
maintained against a private or public agent, from actions-in contract-that could not be
maintained against a public or private agent; explaining that public agents sued on a cause of
action allowed to lie against them personally could not invoke the sovereign immunity of the
state-principal, even if the principal had authorized the tortious act). See generally Fletcher,
supra note 21 (developing theory of sovereign immunity that begins with question whether
substantive cause of action can be created by federal government, and only then asks whether
sovereign immunity values are served by permitting such actions against a State, or only
against that State's officials, in federal court).
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federal court to adjudicate that claim.8°  Quite the contrary. As
Seminole Tribe itself makes clear, sovereign immunity denies federal
courts subject-matter jurisdiction to entertain lawsuits against States
no matter how well-founded a plaintiffs claim might be: without good
subject-matter jurisdiction, that claim may not even cross the federal
court's threshold.al Thus, now that the Court has unequivocally de-
clared state sovereign immunity to be jurisdictional, the Court has
rendered obsolete any defense of Ex parte Young that depends on the
traditional availability of common-law causes of action against public
officials: while that tradition might well reinforce the federal courts'
authority to create private rights of action under the Constitution or
other federal laws, the tradition cannot supply the jurisdiction to
enforce those claims in federal court that Seminole Tribe's sovereign
80. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1012 (1998)
("Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of
announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.'" (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
506, 514 (1869))); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1994 & Supp. 1996) (granting federal jurisdiction to
hear state claims only if brought between diverse parties and if the "amount in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs").
81. The Seminole Tribe Court did not question whether Congress had the authority to
impose on States the obligation to negotiate in good faith towards compacts with Indian Tribes
to govern their in-state gaming activities. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61 n.10 (refusing to reach
question whether IGRA's substantive obligation on States to negotiate with Tribes over gaming
activities exceeded Congress' authority as limited by Tenth Amendment). But see Monaghan,
supra note 6, at 119 (observing that Tenth Amendment "may have provided a more secure
foundation for the Court's federalism concerns" in Seminole Tribe than did Eleventh
Amendment). Indeed, the Court acknowledged that Article I vests Congress with the
"exclusive" authority to regulate commerce-apparently, including gaming activities-with the
Indian Tribes. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71-74; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3;
California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians, 480 U.S. 202, 221-22 (1987) (holding that, absent
federal legislative authorization, States may not regulate commercial activities of Indian
Tribes). Notwithstanding Congress' legislative authority to impose that obligation on States,
the federal court still lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to hear the Tribe's claim to enforce that
obligation on the merits. In the Court's words:
Even when the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority over a
particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authorization of suits
by private parties against unconsenting States. The Eleventh Amendment restricts the
judicial power under Article I, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the
constitutional limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction.
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73 (concluding that Tribe's suit "must be dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction'). But see Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 818-19
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.) ("[Tihe legislative, executive, and judicial powers, of every well-con-
structed government [must be] potentially coextensive .... All governments which are not
extremely defective in their organization, must possess, within themselves, the means of
expounding, as well as enforcing, their own laws.") (emphasis added); THE FEDERALIST No. 80,
at 516 (Alexander Hamilton) (Edward M. Earle ed., 1941) ("If there are such things as political
axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a government being coextensive with the
legislative may be ranked among the number.").
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immunity principle has taken away.82 On its own terms, then, the
traditional pedigree attributed to Ex parte Young fails to explain
Young's survival of Seminole Tribe.
Even more simply, the Court itself has never adopted the
scholarship's common-law justification for Young jurisdiction.
Starting with Ex parte Young itself and continuing through Coeur
d'Alene, the Court has treated Young as a parentless rule, a sui gene-
ris exception to state sovereign immunity whose precise contours are
for the Court to decide, without serious fidelity to Young's putative
common-law forebears.83 Moreover, while the Court, in the century
between the Eleventh Amendment's ratification and Ex parte Young,
borrowed from the common law tradition to fashion a constitutional
party-of-record rule to determine when a federal lawsuit against a
state official was "in effect" an improper suit against the State itself,
these pre-Young cases never adopted the common-law tradition
wholesale: in this era, the Court prohibited federal lawsuits that the
common law would have permitted, and permitted some that the
common law would not have done.84 What is more, in Ex parte Young
the Court departed sharply even from this nineteenth-century
precedent, leaving farther behind whatever remnants of the common
law tradition the old party-of-record rule had preserved.3
In fact, scholars who emphasize Young's common-law founda-
tions have criticized the Court for ignoring that pedigree,6 and for
82. So, for example, then-Professor Fletcher argued that, contrary to the Court's view that
sovereign immunity is jurisdictional, where the Constitution otherwise authorizes Congress or
the Court to create private rights of action to enforce federal law, no theory of state sovereign
immunity should be adopted that would deny federal subject-matter jurisdiction to enforce those
claims in federal court. See Fletcher, supra note 21, at 1108-31 (advocating an approach to
sovereign immunity that would find federal judicial power to enforce any cause of action within
the federal government's power to create); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 76 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) ("This case is about power-the power of the Congress of the United States to create
a private federal cause of action against a State, or its Governor, for the violation of a federal
right.").
83. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663-71(1974).
84. See Currie, supra note 21, at 153. See generally The Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S.
269 (1885) (permitting private federal lawsuit against state officials who had seized or threat-
ened to seize personal property to satisfy state taxes already paid with state bond interest cou-
pons, even though complaint alleged that bond repudiation amounted to an unconstitutional
state impairment of contract, and even though common law did not recognize action against
agent to enforce contract made by principal).
85. See infra Part III.C.
86. Commentators convinced that Young jurisdiction was "indispensable" for enforcing
federal law against recalcitrant States have roundly criticized the Court for admitting the
fiction to be fiction and have proposed alternative, non-fictional justifications for the Ex parte
Young rule. See, e.g., WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 292 ("[In perspective the doctrine of Ex parte
Young seems indispensable to the establishment of Constitutional government and the rule of
law."); Jackson, supra note 56, at 60 (criticizing Pennhurst I Court for not justifying Young
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thus relegating so venerable a tradition to the vulnerable status of
"legal fiction."87 Accordingly, if Young's survival of Seminole Tribe
does, as I suggest, raise questions about how the Court perceives its
own freestanding power-apart from Congress-to regulate federal
jurisdiction over lawsuits challenging state interests, then those ques-
tions cannot be answered by an account of Young that the Court itself
ignores, no matter how compelling that alternative might otherwise
be.
2. Where There is a Federal Right, a Federal Judicial
Remedy Follows
Some commentators offer another justification for Ex parte
Young jurisdiction, one also not embraced by the Court.m This alter-
native makes no attempt to provide a law-based foundation for
Young's particular distinction between the State and its officials;
instead, this argument emphasizes, more generally, how important
federal courts are, within the Constitution's institutional framework,
in maintaining the rule of law against errant States. 89 Starting from
fiction "by reference to the traditional range of remedies available at common law against
officers"). But the Court adopted none of these alternatives, and in Coeur dAlene it reaffirmed
its view that Young rests on a fiction and nothing more. Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261, 270 (1997) (agreeing that Young rests on a "fictional distinction between the official and the
State"); see also Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[A] suit against a
state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit
against the official's office.... As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.").
But see id. at 71 n.10 (stating that "[o]f course" a suit against an official in an official capacity for
injunctive relief is not treated as an action against the State because of the Ex parte Young
doctrine).
87. Not only did Young's fiction stand out as unprincipled even among the Court's
labyrinthine sovereign immunity cases, see Vicki C. Jackson, One Hundred Years of Folly: The
Eleventh Amendment and the 1988 Term, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 51, 58-59 (1990) (describing Court's
case law on Constitution's principle of state sovereign immunity as replete with "[niumerous
unconvincing doctrinal formulations," of which Ex parte Young is only one), but it also looked
vulnerable to being abandoned by the Court as spontaneously as it had been embraced. See id.
at 99-100 n.196 (observing that, "[1]ogically, the recognition of the fiction of Young might lead a
court... to abandonment of that fiction if it concludes, in light of state remedies and Congress's
power to create causes of action, that it is no longer necessary to vindicate supreme federal
law"); see also Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 657-58 (arguing that Pennhurst ITs
characterization of Young as a fiction leaves the rule unprincipled and therefore Young "will
survive only so long as the Supreme Court believes that the fiction produces the desirable
result").
88. I am particularly grateful to Barry Friedman and Lawrence Lessig for raising this
argument to me.
89. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 21, at 1386 ('[Slince Ex parte Young it has been
understood that sovereign immunity does not prohibit enjoining official action which threatens
individual rights in violation of the Constitution."); id. (describing Young jurisdiction as
"indispensable to our understanding of 'the rule of law' ").
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the traditional view that the Supreme Court enjoys a special role in
identifying which rights the Constitution accords individuals,90 the
argument posits that federal courts must therefore also have a special
role in vindicating those individual rights-that is, of enforcing the
Constitution-when they are violated by government action, whether
state or federal.91 That means, in turn, that federal courts must have
subject-matter jurisdiction, despite state sovereign immunity, to en-
tertain private plaintiffs' claims that States are violating the
Constitution, because otherwise federal courts could not fulfill their
special role of remedying constitutional violations. In short, jurisdic-
tion must follow automatically from the courts' authority to decide
individuals' constitutional claims on the merits: Young's distinction
between a State and its officials may not derive from any particular
source of law, but, overall, it reflects an acceptable, statesmanlike
compromise between Article III's sovereign immunity value and the
value of state accountability 92-- a compromise, again, that the Court is
uniquely equipped to strike because of its special role in identifying
constitutional rights.
This justification for Ex parte Young jurisdiction, like the
common-law view, fails to explain Young's survival of Seminole Tribe.
Again, now that the Court has declared sovereign immunity to be an
anterior limitation on the Article III judicial power-now that
sovereign immunity is emphatically jurisdictional-the constitutional
merits of any plaintiffs claim of harm lie beside the point: without
good subject-matter jurisdiction, that claim may not even cross the
federal court's threshold.93 Indeed, even in Marbury v. Madison itself
90. See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958) (stating that Marbury declared the
federal judiciary "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution"); see also Washington
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (holding that the Court defines which "fundamental
rights" are protected by Constitution's due process guarantees); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521
U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that once the Court defines the scope of the First Amendment's
Religion Clauses, Congress may not contradict it; thus the federal Religious Freedom
Restoration Act was invalidated as exceeding Congress' legislative power under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment).
91. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-Executing Constitution, 68 S.
CAL. L. REV. 289, 293-94 (1995) (stating Article's thesis that Constitution should be judicially
enforceable without congressional authorization and that "separation of powers principle
demands judicial enforcement"); Walter E. Dellinger, OfRights and Remedies: The Constitution
as a Sword, 85 HARV. L. REv. 1532, 1534 (1972) ("Once substantive legal norms have been
declared to be in the Constitution, there is much to be said for a judicial prerogative to fashion
remedies that give flesh to the word and fulfilment to the promise those norms embody.").
92. See Pennhurst//1, 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("Ex parte Young was the culmination of
efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh Amendment with the effective
supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the Constitution.").
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) (authorizing federal district court to dismiss complaint,
prior to defendant's answer, for "lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter"); supra notes 77-82
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(which enshrined the maxim that where there is a right, the law will
provide a remedy)94 the Court refused to enforce Marbury's legal
entitlement because the Court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
hear that claim.95
Moreover, even taken on its own terms, this alternative justifi-
cation for Young is unconvincing. First, the linkage between constitu-
tional rights and judicial remedies, on which the argument depends,
is neither so tight nor so hallowed as the argument suggests. Even
and accompanying text (discussing relationship between jurisdiction over claim and claim's
merits). Or, as Professor Wechsler stated in another context more than a generation ago:
Federal courts, including the Supreme Court, do not pass on constitutional questions
because there is a special function vested in them to enforce the Constitution or police
the other agencies of the government. They do so rather for the reason that they must
decide a litigated issue that is otherwise within their jurisdiction and in doing so they
must give effect to the supreme law of the land. That is, at least, what Marbury v.
Madison was all about.
Herbert Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 COLUM. L. REv. 1001, 1006 (1965).
Again, the Court has never adopted the view that the existence of a good claim on the merits
somehow automatically confers federal subject-matter jurisdiction. Remember, the Seminole
Tribe Court found nothing invalid about Congress' decision, under Article I, to impose an
obligation on States to negotiate with Indian Tribes over in-state gaming-, but for sovereign
immunity's bar to federal subject-matter jurisdiction, the Tribe's effort to enforce that statutory
obligation-to state a good claim on the merits under IGRA-would apparently have survived at
least a motion to dismiss. Indeed, the only instance in which the substance of a claim, on the
merits, would appear to affect the sovereign immunity bar, under Seminole Tribe's reasoning,
would be where the claim arose out of a constitutional provision ratified after the Eleventh
Amendment, as from the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection or due process guarantees,
since "the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment
and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state
and federal power achieved by Article I and the Eleventh Amendment." Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 65-66 (citing Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 454 (1976)).
94. Asking, "If [Marbury] has a right, and that right has been violated, do the laws of his
country afford him a remedy?" Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 154 (1803), Justice
Marshall declared:
The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to
claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury. One of the first duties
of government is to afford that protection.... The government of the United States has
been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of men. It will certainly cease
to deserve this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a
vested legal right.
Id. at 163.
95. Id. at 137 (invalidating Congress' jurisdictional grant over Marbury's case because it
exceeded bounds of Article III). Likewise, when the Court first addressed the question whether
the Constitution authorized private rights of action for damages caused by federal officials'
violations of constitutional rights, the Court assumed the subject-matter jurisdiction for any
such claim derived not from any inherent judicial power to remedy constitutional wrongs, but
from Congress' statutory grant of jurisdiction over any civil action that "arises under the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 680 (1946) (holding that
lower court erred in dismissing, for want of subject-matter jurisdiction, private claims under the
Fourth and Fifth Amendments; citing predecessor to 28 U.S.C. § 1331); see also Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971) (recognizing
implied private right of action for damages against federal officials for violations of the Fourth
Amendment).
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when federal courts do have good subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims of constitutional harm, not every injured right receives a rem-
edy: sometimes, federal courts identify constitutional rights but then
leave them unremedied and unenforced.96 Likewise, federal constitu-
tional claims may be pursued in state courts, thus further undermin-
ing the suggestion that a federal constitutional right so necessarily
entails a remedy from a federal forum that its presence in a lawsuit
automatically overcomes Article III's sovereign immunity bar to
subject-matter jurisdiction.9 7
In addition, while this alternative view springs from federal
courts' special status as defenders of federal constitutional rights, the
Court has also made Ex parte Young jurisdiction available for claims
that States, through their officials, are violating federal statutory
requirements,9 which do not trigger the courts' special role. Thus,
even if this alternative could provide a law-based foundation for Ex
parte Young jurisdiction, it could only do so for some of the claims
that Young authorizes.
96. See Barry Friedman, When Rights Encounter Reality: Enforcing Federal Remedies, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 735 (1992) (conducting full analysis of this observation). Professor Friedman
describes the phenomenon in this way:
If Marbury's fundamental tenet were correct, we would expect to find a tight congruence
in constitutional law between right and remedy. What emerges from a study of the law
of remedy and enforcement, however, is the picture of a system in which there is
tremendous flexibility in the fit between right and remedy and therefore a system in
which rights receive far less respect than the rhetoric would suggest.
Id. at 738; see also id. at 741-67 (detailing the slippage between constitutional rights and their
remedies when infringed).
97. In another context, some commentators argue that federal courts' special prerogative
to identify constitutional rights means that Congress must grant them subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear claims arising from those rights, on the theory that such claims fall within
an Article rI-driven, constitutionally mandated core of federal subject-matter jurisdiction that
Congress must authorize courts to exercise. See, e.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 599-601
(1988) (discussing cases where Congress did or did not express a statutory intent to prohibit
judicial review). Compare Akhil Reed Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating
the Two Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 206 (1985) (purporting to establish
that the Framers did not intend to require the creation of lower federal courts; but did intend
instead that some federal court be open to hear and resolve finally any given federal question),
with Hart, supra note 32, at 1372 (arguing that Congress has plenary power to dictate
jurisdiction of inferior federal courts). But not even these "mandatory jurisdiction" advocates
suggest that the Court may-where Congress is constitutionally barred-grant itself subject-
matter jurisdiction over cases outside of Article III, as the Court has done by preserving Young
after Seminole Tribe.
98. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 663, 664-68 (1974) (holding that Young
jurisdiction is available for private claim seeking injunction requiring state officials to comply
with requirements of federal Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled program operating under the
federal Social Security Act); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 270 (1997)
(noting obligation of Article I courts to ensure the supremacy of Federal statutory law);
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 73-76 (suggesting that Congress could use Young jurisdiction to
enforce provisions of ordinary legislation enacted pursuant to Commerce Clause).
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The Supreme Court itself has never said that Young derives
any legal support from the Court's special authority to define consti-
tutional rights. But the Court does share one view with those who do:
that Young jurisdiction, however fictional its roots, fills a critical need
for federal-court enforcement of some federal laws against recalcitrant
States,9 a need created when Hans v. Louisiana extended state
sovereign immunity to bar federal jurisdiction even over claims
arising under the Constitution or federal statute. 100
But the need to guarantee state compliance with federal
law-to enforce the Constitution's Supremacy Clause-does not
transform the Ex parte Young fiction into a rule of constitutional law.
The Supremacy Clause, which declares that "[t]his Constitution, and
the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof... shall be the supreme Law of the Land,"'0' says nothing at
all about federal court jurisdiction to enforce that supremacy on the
merits in lawsuits against non-complying States, whether on Young's
terms or any other.0 2 Indeed, the Supremacy Clause makes only one
reference to any court at all, and that is to state courts, declaring that
"the Judges in every State shall be bound" by federal law.03
99. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269 (stating that the Young doctrine serves the
"need to prevent violations of federal law"); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman
(Pennhurst ff), 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984) (emphasizing that the Young doctrine "rests on the
need to promote the vindication of federal rights"); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 174
(Souter, J., dissenting) (-'he doctrine we call Ex parte Young is nothing short of indispensable
to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law. [It] marks the frontier of
the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing state policies.") (internal
quotations omitted).
100. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890); supra notes 54-62 and accompanying
text (discussing Hans and Seminole Tribe).
101. U.S. CONST. art. VI. In the Court's words, "the availability of prospective relief of the
sort awarded in Exparte Young gives life to the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a
continuing violation of federal law are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the
supremacy of that law." Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1986) (citing Pennhurst H, 465 U.S.
at 102). But see Jackson, supra note 56, at 60 (criticizing Pennhurst I Court for justifying Ex
parte Young remedy "solely by reference to the superior demands of the Constitution in the face
of prohibited state conduct").
102. While the Supremacy Clause thus establishes a choice of law rule to govern a court
having jurisdiction over the merits of a controversy, it is silent on the source of that jurisdiction
itself. See U.S. CONST. art. VI.
103. Id.; see Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 275-76 (stating that the Supremacy Clause creates
"'one system of jurisprudence'" binding together state and federal law; this means that States
have "proprietary concern" to interpret federal law and to integrate those sources into state law
(quoting Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 137 (1876))). While some commentators have cited
the Supremacy Clause in arguing that Congress may not, by simple legislation, strip federal
courts altogether of the jurisdiction to hear certain kinds of constitutional claims, I have found
none who make the further argument that the Supremacy Clause independently grants federal
courts the jurisdiction to hear private lawsuits that would otherwise be barred by state
sovereign immunity principles.
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What is more, even if the Supremacy Clause could give a
constitutional status to Young's jurisdictional rule, then it is unclear
why it would not also save Congress' jurisdictional grant rejected in
Seminole Tribe. That is, if the need to use federal courts to enforce
federal law against States were enough to constitutionalize the Young
model, then that same need would seem to be enough to constitution-
alize Congress' Seminole Tribe model as well. But the Seminole Tribe
Court rejected that view: Congress' view of the necessity of having
federal courts enforce the statutory obligations at issue conferred no
constitutional authority on Congress to grant that jurisdiction despite
sovereign immunit. 104 The Supremacy Clause thus appears to
provide no particular law-based foundation for any exception to
Article III's state sovereign immunity privilege. And the Supreme
Court has never claimed otherwise.
3. A Structural Foundation
A third alternative justification for Ex parte Young resembles
the second. Not only does the Court hold the power to define constitu-
tional rights, but it also plays a special role in "say[ing] what the law
is" on the Constitution's structural principles, like federalism'05 and
the separation of powers. 1°6 If Young's jurisdictional distinction be-
tween States and their officials rested on a substantive tenet of feder-
alism-like the Tenth Amendment rule that the federal government
may not "commandeer" state officials to carry out federal
104. Compare Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 61-66 (overruling Union Gas's reasoning that
Congress' Article I power to regulate interstate commerce must include the abrogation power
because "in many situations, it is only money damages that will carry out Congress' legitimate
objectives" in exercising commerce power), with Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 19-
20 (1989) (plurality opinion) (stating that Article rs grant of commerce power to Congress
"would be incomplete without the authority to render States liable in damages" when they
violate Commerce Clause legislation). Yet, Congress might have used the federal courts to
enforce States' IGRA obligations if it had chosen the Court's Ex parte Young jurisdictional
model. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17.
105. Compare National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) (holding that the
Court should exercise aggressive judicial review to enforce Constitution's federalism principles
against congressional legislation that violates them), with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities for too aggressively regulating
federalism's balance of power between federal and state government; declaring that "principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system" lies in
States' political representation in Congress). See generally Larry Kramer, Understanding
Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REv. 1485 (1994) (discussing Court's shift in attitude between National
League of Cities and Garcia-and controversy among commentators-about the proper judicial
role in enforcing substantive federalism principles).
106. See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 240 (1995); Youngstown Sheet
& Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 584-89 (1952).
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policy' 07-then Young jurisdiction would not be "fictitious" at all.
Indeed, like the sovereign immunity bar itself, Young's exception to
that rule would express an affirmative constitutional command:
although Article III and the Eleventh Amendment prohibit direct
federal lawsuits against States to enforce federal law, some other
substantive federalism principle authorizes indirect lawsuits to do the
same thing.
But there is no such other federalism principle, and the Court,
again, has pointed to none. While Ex parte Young furthers the goals
of constitutional federalism-while Young, as a practical matter,
helps maintain a balance between federal supremacy and state
autonomy-the Young rule itself is not compelled or even suggested
by any law-based source of constitutional meaning about federalism.
Unless the Court's power to interpret the Constitution's structural
principles also conveys the power to make them up-"to say what the
law is" based on no legal authority at all-then this alternative justi-
fication must also fail to explain how Young could survive Seminole
Tribe.
This Article proposes, however, that Ex parte Young jurisdic-
tion does reflect an exercise of the Court's special power to define the
Constitution's other structural principle: the separation of powers
among the federal branches of government. If it is true that Young's
sovereign immunity exception rests on no substantive legal standard
outside the Court's say-so, then the next question is inevitable. What
Article III "judicial Power" authorizes the Court-where Congress is
constitutionally barred-unilaterally to grant federal courts jurisdic-
tion over private lawsuits challenging state interests?
D. Seminole Tribe Raises the Ex parte Young Stakes
Before Seminole Tribe, the question of whether Young jurisdic-
tion could claim any affirmative constitutional foundation was less
pressing; any one of these three or other alternative grounds for the
Young fiction might well have sufficed.108 So long as the Court
107. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invoking Constitution's
substantive federalism principles to invalidate federal legislation concerning firearms
registration). See generally Jackson, supra note 1, at 2183-205 (detailing Court's development of
anticommandeering rule).
108. The question raised in this Article-whether Ex parte Young's fiction can claim a law-
based foundation-has received very little attention in legal scholarship outside the work
analyzing the tradition of official liability predating Young. See supra Part I.C.1. This is not to
say that Ex parte Young jurisdiction has been uncontroversial: the decision sparked a public
outcry in its day. See WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 311 (describing harsh public criticism of
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suggested that Congress might abrogate state sovereign immunity in
the exercise of its Article I powers-thus legislatively granting federal
courts subject-matter jurisdiction over private lawsuits to enforce
federal law against unconsenting States-the Court's judicial abro-
gation through Ex parte Young simply closed the doctrinal circle. The
principle of state sovereign immunity could be understood, with at
least internal consistency, as a State's presumptive constitutional
privilege, subject to withdrawal when one of the Constitution's federal
branches'0 9 decided that the federal interest in having federal courts
enforce federal law overcame the background presumption of stateimmnunty from such lawsuits."01 Before Seminole Tribe, that is, abro-
gation could make sense as a power belonging generally to the federal
government because of its constitutional supremacy, and available for
use by any one of the Constitution's three institutional decisionmak-
ers acting within its own sphere.",
decision and citing literature observing that outcry was "reminiscent" of public response to
Chisholm v. Georgia). But Congress focused its anxiety on the remedial aspect of Young's
ruling-that lower federal court judges could enjoin the enforcement of state law-and
responded not with legislation denying federal courts that subject-matter jurisdiction
altogether, but instead, with legislation requiringEx parte Young claims to be heard in the first
instance by three-judge courts, with direct appeal to the Supreme Court, a requirement that
remained in place, in some form, until 1976. See id. at 315-16.
109. Before Seminole Tribe, in some sense, the doctrinal circle connected all three points of
the Constitution's federal framework, since even before Ex parte Young the Court had already
announced that "the Federal Government"-embodied, of course, in the Executive branch--"can
bring suit in federal court against a State" to enforce compliance with federal law, notwith-
standing the Eleventh Amendment. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14 (citing United States
v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 644-45 (1892), and noting that rule's justification was its "necess[ity] to
the 'permanence of the Union!"). Seminole Tribe preserved this rule along with Ex parte
Young's. Id.
110. The potential for federal abrogation either by Congress, by the Executive, or by the
Court could thus be folded into the core definition of state sovereign immunity itself, much like
the fact that States may waive sovereign immunity, thereby removing the jurisdictional bar,
even though ordinary parties may not by consent confer subject-matter jurisdiction on a federal
court which lacks it. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985).
111. Cf In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895) (holding that the President's power to invoke
federal courts' equity jurisdiction to enforce federal law against individual is coextensive with
entire federal government's power to enforce federal law). To the extent that commentators
before Seminole Tribe discussed abrogation not only from within sovereign immunity doctrine
but from a separation of powers perspective, they suggested that Congress' claim to the
abrogation power should outrank the Court's because the States' political representation in
Congress meant that Congress could best protect the States' interests as against the federal
government, including their interest in immunity from federal jurisdiction. See Laurence H.
Tribe, Intergovernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation and Regulation: Separation of
Powers Issues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARV. L. REV. 682, 695 (1976); see also
John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create Causes* of Action Against State
Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV.
1413, 1413-14 (1975) (arguing that Eleventh Amendment meant particularly to target federal
courts' power over States and so should not limit Congress' legislative power to regulate federal
jurisdiction or to create substantive federal causes of action).
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Moreover, so long as Congress was thought empowered to
grant federal courts formal subject-matter jurisdiction over States
qua States, despite sovereign immunity, Young's fictitious jurisdiction
over state officials manifested no remarkable judicial independence:
however much Young authorized federal courts to drive without a
license, it was at least no more than what Congress might license the
Courts to do.112
But when Seminole Tribe constitutionally disabled Congress
from abrogating state sovereign immunity under Article I, while pre-
serving the Court's own abrogation power in Ex parte Young, it broke
the old doctrinal circle. It is something else again for Article III
courts to exercise fictitious subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits
that are, both in practice and in principle, indistinguishable from
lawsuits that Seminole Tribe has now constitutionally barred
Congress from admitting to the federal courts. In this light, the stan-
dard "fiction" invoked by the Court to justify Ex parte Young jurisdic-
tion will not suffice. Young's survival of Seminole Tribe requires a
closer reading of Ex parte Young itself, and of Supreme Court deci-
sions developing Young into the full-blown jurisdictional doctrine
reaffirmed in Coeur d'Alene.
III. JUDICIAL ABROGATION OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
EXPARTE YOUNG
In Hans v. Louisiana, recall, the Court held that the
Constitution's state sovereign immunity principle denied federal
subject-matter jurisdiction over private lawsuits against unconsenting
States, even when plaintiffs alleged state violations of the federal
112. Indeed, Young reached fewer lawsuits than Congress might have authorized through
legislative abrogation. For example, Congress could have granted federal subject-matter juris-
diction over private lawsuits seeking retrospective relief in the form of damages, in addition to
prospective equitable remedies like injunctions. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 448
(1976). By contrast, Ex parte Young jurisdiction extends only to lawsuits seeking prospective
injunctive and declaratory relief; Young does not confer subject-matter jurisdiction over retro-
spective damage claims. Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 675-78 (1974) (denying
Young jurisdiction to lawsuits seeking damages for past violations of federal law), with Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 58 (stating that "the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a State [itselfl is
irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment"). See also
infra Part M.D.3 (arguing that Edelman's jurisdictional distinction between prospective and
retrospective remedies itself rests only on policy grounds, and not on law-based authority).
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Constitution."3 Eighteen years later, the Court cracked back open
federal court doors in Ex parte Young."4
A. Ex parte Young: The Dispute and the Rule
Between 1906 and 1907, the Minnesota legislature enacted a
series of laws fixing the maximum railroad rates that could be
charged for freight and passengers transported between stations in-
state, setting the rates at levels well below what the railroads had
been charging." 5 The penalties for disobedience were very high: any
railroad officer or employee who caused a railroad to charge more
than the fixed rates could be prosecuted criminally and jailed for
ninety days.116
On the day before the rate schedules were to take effect, rail-
road shareholders filed suit in federal court on behalf of the regulated
railroads.117 Invoking the court's original subject-matter jurisdiction
over questions arising under federal law," 8 plaintiffs claimed that the
Minnesota rate legislation violated the United States Constitution in
two ways. First, the low rates were themselves "unjust,
unreasonable, and confiscatory" and would therefore deprive the
railroads and their shareholders of their property "without due
process of law.""m Second, the legislation's severe criminal penalties
for violating the rate schedules were "so drastic that no owner or
operator of a railway property could invoke the jurisdiction of any
court to test the [schedules'] validity" without risking loss of property
and long imprisonment; in this way, too, plaintiffs contended the
Minnesota rate legislation violated due process. 20
Plaintiffs asked the federal court to declare the Minnesota
rates unconstitutional. Citing threats by defendant Edward Young,
the state attorney general, to prosecute criminally any railroad official
who violated the rate schedules, plaintiffs requested an injunction
prohibiting Young and the other named Minnesota officials from tak-
ing steps to enforce the rate legislation, and, particularly, prohibiting
113. See supra notes 55-56 and accompanying text.
114. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
115. See id. at 127-28.
116. See id. at 128-29. Such violation was a misdemeanor. See id. at 129.
117. The shareholders brought their lawsuit as a derivative action. See id.
118. See id. at 143-44 (citing an 1875 statute granting general federal question jurisdiction
to inferior federal courts, consistent with Article In, § 2).
119. Id. at 130 (framing claim also as violation of Constitution's equal protection guaran-
tee).
120. Id. at 131 (framing claim also as violation of Constitution's equal protection guaran-
tee).
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them from instituting any proceedings against the railroad companies
or their officers and directors for exceeding the fixed rates.121  In
response, the federal court entered a temporary restraining order
prohibiting Young "from taking any steps against the railroads to
enforce the remedies or penalties specified" in the rate legislation,
including criminal penalties against railroad managers. 22
On the next day, despite this federal injunction, Young went to
Minnesota state court, bringing an action "for and in behalf of the
state,"23 and obtained an order commanding one of the railroads to
adopt the freight rates fixed by Minnesota law.124 The federal court
promptly found Young in contempt and had him arrested.125
Seeking habeas corpus relief from the United States Supreme
Court, Young argued that the federal trial court lacked subject-matter
jurisdiction to hear the injunction action against him in the first place
because the shareholders' federal lawsuit challenging the Minnesota
rate legislation was, "in effect, [a suit]... against one of the states of the
Union." 26 Consequently, Young insisted, the Eleventh Amendment barred
the lawsuit and made the injunction against him unenforceable, by
contempt or otherwise.27
The Supreme Court disagreed: Attorney General Young could
not claim for himself the protection of Minnesota's immunity from
federal jurisdiction so to avoid a lawsuit challenging his enforcement
of a state law allegedly violating the United States Constitution.1'
The Court, through Justice Peckham, announced:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer, in proceeding under such enactment,
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is
in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no
121. See id. at 129-30. Plaintiffs also sought injunctions prohibiting defendant railroad
companies from adopting and complying with the rate schedules. See id. at 129.
122. Id. at 132.
123. Id. at 134.
124. See id. at 133-34.
125. See id. at 126, 134. The federal court first offered Young an alternative: a $100 fine
and Young's dismissal of his state court action. Upon Young's refusal, he was "committed to the
custody of the marshal until [the federal injunction] was obeyed." Id. at 126-27 (Peckham, J.,
separate statement).
126. See id. at 142, 149-51; see also id. at 134 (noting that Young resisted contempt in trial
court on same Eleventh Amendment grounds).
127. See id. at 149-51.
128. See id. at 159.
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power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.
1 29
Once the state official is so "stripped" of his official character,
the Court concluded, the federal lawsuit against him cannot be char-
acterized as an action against the State; thus the Eleventh
Amendment simply does not apply, and the lawsuit may proceed in
federal court.130 Ex parte Young thus carved out a substantial excep-
tion to the broad constitutional rule of state sovereign immunity that
the Court had adopted in Hans v. Louisiana,3 1 and launched the
Court on a new jurisdictional path.
B. Young's Ancestors
Well before Hans or Young-well before Article III, for that
matter-traditional sovereign immunity doctrines had incorporated
an exception that resembled Ex parte Young's. While the monarch
was not subject to suit in its own courts, the Crown's officers enjoyed
no such immunity and could themselves be sued without implicating
the Crown's privilege. 3 2  Indeed, in post-Eleventh Amendment
America, it first appeared that the Supreme Court might adopt this
traditi~nal sovereign immunity exception wholesale. In Osborn v.
Bank of the United States, written by Chief Justice Marshall in 1824,
the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment only applied to private
lawsuits in which a State was itself formally named as a party defen-
dant, and not where a state official was named instead.33
129. Id. at 159-60 (emphasis added) (citingIn re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507 (1887)).
130. See id.
131. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1890).
132. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 171 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(citing authorities supporting the assertion that since the Middle Ages "it has been settled
doctrine that suit against an officer of the Crown permitted relief against the government
despite the Crown's immunity from suit in its own courts"). As I have indicated, some
commentators consider the resemblance close enough to provide Ex parte Young with the law-
based justification that the Court has not. See Jackson, supra note 56, at 60; see also sources
cited supra note 21.
133. See Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 857-58 (1824). Chief
Justice Marshall reasoned:
It may, we think, be laid down as a rule which admits of no exception, that, in all cases
where jurisdiction depends on the party, it is the party named in the record....
... The state not being a party on the record, and the Court having jurisdiction
over those who are parties on the record, the true question is, not one ofjurisdiction, but
whether, in the exercise of this jurisdiction, the Court ought to make a decree against
the defendants; whether they are to be considered as having a real interest, or as being
only nominal parties.
Id. Chief Justice Marshall concluded, "Consequently, the Eleventh Amendment, which
restrains the jurisdiction granted by the constitution over suits against States, is, of necessity,
442
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Four years later, in Governor of Georgia v. Madrazo,134 Chief
Justice Marshall refined Osborn's broad exception and substituted a
subtler standard, still in place when the Court heard Ex parte Young:
even where a plaintiff names as party defendant only a state official,
and not a State itself, the Eleventh Amendment bars federal subject-
matter jurisdiction if the relief sought would, as a practical matter,
run directly against the State, and not just against that official as an
individual. 135 In such a case, Madrazo held, the lawsuit must be
recognized as an action against the State despite plaintiffs artful
pleading, and therefore beyond the court's subject-matter
jurisdiction. 136
So, in Madrazo, the federal court lacked subject-matter juris-
diction over a Spanish slave trader's lawsuit against the Governor of
Georgia, seeking to recover certain slaves and proceeds from the sale
of other slaves held by the State, because only the State-and not the
Governor acting on his own'37-could return the slaves if plaintiff
prevailed. 13
Likewise, under the Madrazo principle, 13 a plaintiff could sue
the Richmond city Treasurer in federal court to recover an office desk
limited to those suits in which a State is a party on the record." Id. at 857. Accordingly, in that
case the federal court could exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over a claim by the National
Bank against the Ohio state Treasurer seeking to recover specie and bank notes in the
Treasurer's possession, which the Treasurer had caused to be seized "by violence" from the
bank's Ohio branch to pay state banking taxes declared unconstitutional in McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Osborn, 26 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 857. While Ohio itself
could not be "[brought] before the [federal] court," id, at 869, Ohio's officials could not claim the
State's Eleventh Amendment immunity from federal court jurisdiction. See id. at 870-71.
134. Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110 (1828).
135. See id. at 124.
136. Id.
137. The unsold slaves were "in [the] possession of the [Georgia] government." Id. at 123.
Further, the cash proceeds had been "paid into the treasury, where they [had] become a part of
the funds of the state, not subject to [the Governor's] control." Id. at 120.
138. The Supreme Court also found Madrazo's lawsuit to be an improper suit against the
State because the Governor had been sued in his official capacity only:
The claim upon the governor, is as a governor; he is sued, not by his name, but by his
title. The demand made upon him, is not made personally, but officially....
... The decree is pronounced not against the person, but the officer, and appeared
to have been pronounced against the successor of the original defendant; as the appeal
bond was executed by a different governor from him who filed the information. In such
a case, where the chief magistrate of a state is sued, not by his name, but by his style of
office, and the claim made upon him is entirely in his official character, we think the
state itself may be considered as a party on the record.
Id. at 123-34 (emphasis added). The Court noted that if the State were not deemed the real
party in interest, given the fact that the Governor was not sued in his individual capacity, there
would be "no party against whom a decree [could] be made." Id. at 124.
139. Some commentators describe this pre-Young practice of officer liability by emphasizing
not the relief a plaintiff could seek-as Madrazo does-but instead the causes of action that
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(valued at $30) that the Treasurer had wrongfully seized and held in
his possession as payment for plaintiffs allegedly delinquent taxes,
even though the plaintiff had tendered Virginia bond coupons which
state law had declared to be receivable in payment for those taxes. 40
Since the Treasurer, acting on his own, could return that desk to the
plaintiff, the lawsuit was not deemed a suit against the State itself
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.14
plaintiff was allowed to maintain against an official individually, despite the State or Crown's
immunity. See Jackson, supra note 56, at 60; see also sources cited supra note 21. Described
from either angle-relief or cause of action-the principle of officer liability in this era worked
the same way. If an officer's action caused plaintiff what was recognized as a private harm that
could be remedied by the officer acting individually, then sovereign immunity worked no bar.
By contrast, if the plaintiff's lawsuit sought relief that only the State could give, for a harm that
only the State could cause, then the lawsuit could not proceed. As I argue above, under
doctrinal rules in place now and when Seminole Tribe was decided, the existence of a cognizable
cause of action does not automatically confer subject-matter jurisdiction on an Article m court
to hear that claim, where state sovereign immunity imposes its jurisdictional bar. See supra
notes 77-82 and accompanying text.
140. See generally Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270 (1884) (reported, along with seven
other Supreme Court decisions issued on the same day, as one of the Virginia Coupon Cases,
114 U.S. at 269 (1885)). Rejecting the Treasurer's defense on the merits that a subsequent
Virginia law had, in effect, made the coupons unacceptable as payment for state taxes, the
Court determined that the later legislation was an unconstitutional law impairing the obligation
of contracts. See id. at 280, 282; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1 (Contracts Clause). Once
the plaintiff had paid his taxes with bond coupons, deemed lawful tender under the prior
Virginia legislation:
The defendant had no authority of law thereafter to attempt to enforce other payment
by seizing his property. In doing so, he ceased to be an officer of the law, and became a
private wrongdoer. It is the simple case in which the defendant, a natural private
person, has unlawfully, with force and arms, seized, taken and detained the personal
property of another.
Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 282-83; see also Engdahl, supra note 21, at 14-20 (noting that common
law recognized a cause of action in tort against official individually for wrongful detainer of
property).
141. See Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 287-88. Similarly, in Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick
Railroad Co., 109 U.S. 446, 452 (1883), the Court noted that the Eleventh Amendment posed no
bar to federal jurisdiction in that:
class of cases.., where an individual is sued in tort for some act injurious to another in
regard to person or property, to which his defence is that he has acted under the orders
of the government....
... In these cases he is not sued as, or because he is, the officer of the government,
but as an individual, and the court is not ousted of jurisdiction because he asserts
authority as such officer.
Id. But see Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 290 (asserting as a general principle that "[tlhat which ... is
unlawful because made so by the supreme law, the Constitution of the United States, is not the
word or deed of the State, but is the mere wrong and trespass of those individual persons who
falsely speak and act in its name"). See generally Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 18
(1890) (private plaintiff permitted to sue Oregon officials comprising state Board of Land
Commissioners to enjoin them from selling parcel of land to which plaintiff claimed title under a
state-law grant; Court reasoned that lawsuit, charging sale would unconstitutionally impair
State's contract with plaintiff, was not suit against State because plaintiff sought only negative
injunction against defendants individually).
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By contrast, the Supreme Court invoked the Eleventh
Amendment to bar private federal actions against state officials,
named only in their official capacity, where the relief sought could
only be performed by the State itself, as where federal plaintiffs
sought an order compelling defendant officials to perform the State's
contracts. 1
42
[Where the contract is between the individual and the State, no action will lie
against the State, and any action founded upon it against defendants who are
officers of the state, the object of which is to enforce its specific performance by
compelling those things to be done by the defendants which, when done, would
constitute performance by the State, or to forbid the doing of those things which,
if done, would be merely breaches of the contract by the State, is in substance
a suit against the State itself, and equally within the prohibition of the
Constitution.14 3
Similarly, the Court dismissed a federal lawsuit on Eleventh
Amendment grounds where plaintiff sought an injunction ordering
the defendant state officials to honor the State's obligation to redeem
state bonds, because such federal relief would "require the appropria-
tion of money from the treasury of the State in accordance with the
contract," again, an act beyond the individual capacity of the named
official defendant. 144
142. See, e.g., In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 507-08 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52,
69-71 (1886).
143. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 504 (emphasis added). The Court also emphasized Hagood's
reasoning that suit against state officials seeking an order that they cause the State to perform
its contract should be deemed a suit against the State, and so should be barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, because the State was the:
[Aictual party to the alleged contract, the performance of which is decreed; the one
required to perform the decree; and the only party by whom it can be performed.
Though not nominally a party to the record, [the State] is the real and only party in
interest, the nominal defendants being the officers and agents of the State, having no
personal interest in the subject matter of the suit, and defending only as representing
the State.
Id. at 491. Similarly, in Poindexter, 114 U.S. at 293, the Court contrasted the detinue action
permitted there against the Richmond Treasurer, in his individual capacity for the return of his
office desk, to those actions that would be barred as actions against a State:
[Tihis cannot be considered to be a suit against the State. The State is not named as a
party in the record; the action is not directly upon the contract; it is not for the purpose
of controlling the discretion of executive officers, or administering funds actually in the
public treasury... ; it is not an attempt to compel officers of the State to do the acts
which constitute a performance of its contract by the State ....
Id.
144. Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 727-28 (1883) (refusing, absent State consent, "to set
up [courts'] jurisdiction over the officers in charge of the public moneys, so as to control them as
against the political power in their administration of the finances of the State"); see also
Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-34 (1828) (holding that a private federal
action to recover proceeds from the sale of seized slaves was barred by the Eleventh Amendment
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
In these pre-Young decisions, thus, the Court approached the
constitutional question of whether sovereign immunity barred a pri-
vate federal-court lawsuit against a state official by asking the more
straightforward question of whether that lawsuit was, in fact, an
action "against the State" itself.145 And the Court, in turn, answered
that question with a practical, enforcement-oriented test: if a defen-
dant had the capacity, as an individual acting alone and without the
State's official participation, to comply with the relief plaintiff sought,
then the plaintiffs claim was not an action against the State and so
faced no sovereign immunity bar.146
C. Young's Leap: The Internal Logic
Ex parte Young, however, took a distinctly different tack.4 7
The Court declared that the Minnesota Attorney General could be
sued in federal court despite the Eleventh Amendment, even though
the relief sought-an injunction against enforcement of Minnesota's
rail rate legislation-could not be performed by Edward Young as an
individual, but only in his official role as an agent of the State,
authorized by state law to enforce that legislation. 48 In fact, Ex parte
Young's jurisdictional rule-that a state official enforcing an uncon-
stitutional state action is automatically "stripped" of his official char-
acter and therefore subject to federal-court jurisdiction despite the
State's sovereign immunity'4-sounds more like the blanket excep-
tion denying officials the Crown's immunity privilege, attributed to
where proceeds had been paid into the State's general treasury funds and were no longer under
the particular control of the defendant Governor). For a post-Young decision reverting to this
pre-Young principle, see Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Department of the Treasury, 323 U.S. 459
(1945), which invoked sovereign immunity to deny federal jurisdiction over a lawsuit against
state tax officials seeking to recover taxes paid under protest, because that remedy could only be
satisfied by the State, from the State's treasury, and not by officials individually.
145. See, e.g., Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) at 123-24.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 13941.
147. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 152 (1908) (admitting, after canvassing case law on
when a federal lawsuit against a state official should be deemed an improper action against the
State, that "Ithe cases above cited do not include one exactly like this under discussion").
148. What is more, the Attorney General was sued in his official capacity only. See id. at
159. The Court did not contradict Young's assertion that:
[Tihe only proceeding which the Attorney General could take to enforce the statute, so
far as his office is concerned, was one by mandamus, which would be commenced by the
State, in its sovereign and governmental character .... [Tihe complainants do not
complain and they care nothing about any action which Mr. Young might take or bring
as an ordinary individual, but that he was complained of as an officer, to whose
discretion is confided the use of the name of the State of Minnesota so far as litigation is
concerned ....
149. Id. at 159-60.
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the English tradition, and not the more subtle American rule devel-
oped from Madrazo forward.150 Because Ex parte Young thus departs
from the Court's own precedents, 151 the logic that drives Justice
Peckham's opinion for the Court deserves particular attention, to
determine what legal principle-constitutional or otherwise-can
explain Young's jurisdictional rule.
1. Step One: A Jurisdictional Question Gets a Remedial Response
Justice Peckham took three steps of logic. Although he
acknowledged that the Eleventh Amendment issue was
jurisdictiona152-the question was whether the circuit court might
exercise the federal judicial power to entertain that lawsuit at
al'15 3-he immediately refrained that jurisdictional issue as a question
about which remedies were within a federal court's power to grant:
The question that arises is whether there is a remedy that the parties inter-
ested may resort to, by going into a Federal court of equity, in a case involving
a violation of the Federal Constitution, and obtaining a judicial investigation
150. See supra notes 134-46 and accompanying text; see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44, 171-76 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) (reasoning that the Young rule "is so far inherent
in the jurisdictional limitation imposed by sovereign immunity as to have been recognized since
the Middle Ages" and concluding that Young represented the Court's restoration of a rule that
was "temporarily muddled" in nineteenth century Supreme Court cases limiting suits against
state officials to those where the wrong alleged, considered as defendant's personal act,
"'constituted a violation of right for which the plaintiff was entitled to a remedy at law or in
equity against the wrongdoer in his individual character'" (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443,
502 (1887))).
151. Some commentators argue that the Young rule is fully consistent both with the
common law sovereign immunity exception and with the Supreme Court's own case law as it
stood in 1908. See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 171-72 (Souter, J., dissenting); Jackson,
supra note 56, at 60 (criticizing the Court in Pennhurst H for divorcing Young's jurisdictional
fiction from the "traditional range of remedies available at common law against officers"). Even
among these scholars, however, there is debate over the degree to which Ex parte Young simply
imported the common law tradition into the American Constitution's sovereign immunity
principle. See, e.g., Currie, supra note 21, at 155 (arguing that Young was innovative in
adopting fiction to permit officials to be sued); Engdahl, supra note 21, at 55 (arguing that
Young was dependent on traditional rules for suits against government officials); see also supra
Part I.C.1 (discussing common law justification for Young after Seminole Tribe).
152. "[T]he most material and important objection made to the jurisdiction of the Circuit
Court... [is] that the suit is, in effect, one against the State of Minnesota .... " Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. at 149.
153. See id.; see also id. at 142 (describing the sovereign immunity issue as "the material
and most important objection to the jurisdiction of the circuit court") (emphasis added); id. at
149-50 (noting that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment prohibits the commencement or prosecution of
any suit against one of the United States by citizens" of any State, and citing the Eleventh
Amendment and Hans u. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)).
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of the problem, and pending its solution obtain freedom from suits, civil or
criminal, by a temporary [or permanent] injunction. 54
Justice Peckham thus first shifted focus away from the threshold
question-whether the federal court had subject-matter jurisdiction
over the railroads' complaint-and onto the constitutional basis, on
the merits, of the railroads' claims. 15
2. Step Two: Was This Injunction Within the Federal Court's
Remedial Power?
Next, after canvassing the Supreme Court's principal post-
Madrazo decisions, Justice Peckham acknowledged that they
developed the general proposition that the Eleventh Amendment bars
a private action where the relief sought reveals it to be, in reality, a
suit against a State, but permits a private action against a state
official for relief he can individually perform. 156 Then, considering In
re Ayers,157 one of the decisions in which the Court denied jurisdiction
on sovereign immunity grounds because the relief sought there could
only be performed by the State itself,158 Justice Peckham observed:
154. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 149 (emphasis added). Here, Justice Peckham borrowed
the analytic framework crafted by Justice Marshall in Madrazo, under which the practical
question whether the relief sought in a federal-court lawsuit would run against the defendant
official as an individual, or against the State itself, determined whether that lawsuit was
deemed to lie against the State, and thus barred by state sovereign immunity. See supra notes
134-46 and accompanying text; see also Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150.
155. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 144. By contrast, in Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall
had promoted his formalistic party-of-record test for sovereign immunity, in part, by reasoning
that any more searching an inquiry into a non-party State's actual interest in a private lawsuit
would, illogically, require a federal court to evaluate a claim's merits before that court had
established its own jurisdiction to do so. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 738, 825-53 (1824). Marshall stated:
In cases where a State is a party on the record, the question of jurisdiction is decided by
inspection. If jurisdiction depends, not on this plain fact, but on the interest of the
State, what rule has the constitution given, by which this interest is to be measured? If
no rule be given, is it to be settled by the Court? If so, the curious anomaly is presented,
of a Court examining the whole testimony of a cause, inquiring into, and deciding on,
the extent of a State's interest, without having a right to exercise any jurisdiction in the
case. Can this inquiry be made without the exercise of jurisdiction?
Id.; see also id. at 857 (concluding a string of rhetorical questions, including the one quoted
above, by stating a "rule which admits of no exception, that, in all cases where jurisdiction
depends on the party, it is the party named in the record"). For some commentators' views that
Ex parte Young not only created a new jurisdictional path into federal court but also crafted a
new, judicial cause of action on the merits for constitutional violations, see sources cited infra
note 164.
156. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 150-52 (citing, inter alia, Madrazo, Osborn,
Poindexter, Hagood v. Southern, and In re Ayers, all discussed supra Part II.B).
157. In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
158. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 152-53 (considering In re Ayers, 123 U.S. at 487).
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But the injunction asked for [there, to prohibit state officials from enforcing
state tax law claimed to impair state bond obligations, in violation of
Constitution's Contract Clause] .... was declared illegal because the suit itself
could not be entertained as it was one against the State to enforce its alleged
contract. It was said, however, that if the court had power to entertain such a
suit, it would have power to grant the restraining order preventing the com-
mencement of suits.159
Having thus de-linked the question of federal remedial power from
the question of federal jurisdiction, Justice Peckham proceeded to ask
whether-assuming good subject-matter jurisdiction-a federal court
had the power to enter an injunction to address injuries other than
those at issue in the successful post-Madrazo lawsuits.160 He noted,
"[it was not stated [in In re Ayers] that the [permissible] suit or the
injunction was necessarily confined to a case of a threatened direct
trespass upon or injury to property."161
Accordingly, Justice Peckham undertook to decide which
alleged injuries were sufficient to justify a federal injunction against a
state official; to decide, more particularly, whether the harm that the
railroads alleged in their lawsuit challenging the Minnesota rail rate
legislation justified such federal relief. In his own words, he
undertook to decide "[w]hether the commencement of a suit [to en-
force the Minnesota rail rate legislation] could ever be regarded as an
actionable injury to another equivalent in some cases, to a trespass
such as is set forth in some of the foregoing cases [including In re
Ayers]."162
Justice Peckham concluded that the threat of state
enforcement was indeed "equivalent," at least for federal remedial
purposes, to a direct trespass infringing a property interest: "It would
be an injury to complainant to harass it with a multiplicity of suits or
litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under an
unconstitutional enactment, and to prevent it ought to be within the
jurisdiction of a court of equity."63 To convert that "ought" into an
159. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 152-53 (emphasis added).
160. As noted above, supra notes 140-41, the successful complaints usually alleged either
direct violations of tangible, possessory property interests (like the seizure of personal property
in Poindexter, or, for that matter, the cash in Osborn) or violations of a more intangible property
interest in contract rights allegedly impaired by state legislation (as in Pennoyer v.
McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1 (1890)).
161. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 153; see also supra note 139 (suggesting that same pre-
Young practice of officer liability can be described by looking either at causes of action allowed
or at remedy available).
162. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 158.
163. Id. at 160 (emphasis added).
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"is," moreover, given the Court's own precedent, Justice Peckham
explained:
[T]he only difference in regard to the case of Osborn and the case in
hand... [is] that in this case the injury complained of is the threatened
commencement of suits, civil or criminal, to enforce the act, instead of, as in
the Osborn Case, an actual and direct trespass upon or interference with
tangible property... The difference between an actual and direct interference
with tangible property and the enjoining of state officers from enforcing an
unconstitutional act, is not of a radical nature .... 16
Justice Peckham rested this equation largely on a cluster of
Court cases from the 1890s deciding federal constitutional challenges
to state railroad rate regulation,165 among which Justice Peckham em-
phasized two, Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co.166 and Smyth v.
Ames. 167 In both cases, the Court rejected sovereign immunity chal-
lenges to federal jurisdiction when private railroads sued state offi-
cials to enjoin enforcement of rate restrictions alleged to violate the
federal Due Process Clause.168 Moreover, in both cases, the Court did
sanction federal injunctions to bar civil or criminal enforcement of the
allegedly offending rates, on a showing that the rate regulation was,
indeed, unconstitutional. 69
In fact, read as Justice Peckham seemed to do, the rail regula-
tion cases offered such strong authority for the sovereign immunity
exception he was about to announce, one wonders why he addressed
the Court's other post-Madrazo sovereign immunity decisions at all.
164. Id. at 167. Justice Peckham's analytic transmutation of jurisdiction into merits has
supported the view among some commentators that Young not only created a jurisdictional rule
to avoid Hans' absolute bar, but also created a new, implied federal cause of action in favor of
private citizens to enforce federal law against States. See, e.g., RIcHARD H. FALLON ET AL.,
HART AND WEcHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURrS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1065 (4th ed. 1996)
(arguing that Ex parte Young recognized an implied right of action for violation of federal law).
But see Jackson, supra note 6, at 515 (noting, more qualifiedly, that "the Ex parte Young
doctrine appears to stand... for the proposition that an implied cause of action for injunctive
relief to enforce federal law will be available when a court otherwise has jurisdiction over the
case") (emphasis added). See generally id. at 515 n.79 (citing literature suggesting that Young
created a federal right of action for equitable relief against state officials' violation of federal
law).
165. See Ex parte Young. 209 U.S. at 153-58. Justice Peckham observed that his own
principal inquiry-whether the injunctions available in cases like Osborn were "necessarily
confined to a case of a threatened direct trespass upon or injury to property" or whether,
instead, "the commencement of a suit could ever be regarded as an actionable injury to another,
equivalent, in some cases to a trespass"--had "received [some] attention in the rate cases...."
Id. at 153 (emphasis added).
166. Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362 (1894).
167. Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
168. See id. at 522,518-19; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 390, 396.
169. See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 516-17; Reagan, 154 U.S. at 399,413.
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For if Smyth v. Ames had indeed announced a general rule "that a
suit against individuals, for the purpose of preventing them, as
officers of the state, from enforcing... an unconstitutional enactment
to the injury of the rights of the plaintiff, was not a suit against a state
within the meaning of the [Eleventh] Amendment,"170 no matter what
"injury" plaintiff alleges to which "rights," and no matter what effect
such injunction would have on the State itself, then Smyth and like
rail regulation cases had, in effect, tacitly superseded the basic rule
laid down in Madrazo, which ousted federal jurisdiction whenever the
relief sought against state officials was deemed to run against the
State.171
But Smyth did not so overturn Madrazo, and neither did
Reagan. In both of those decisions, the Court did follow Madrazo's
analytic model in order to determine whether the injunction actions
were in fact actions seeking a remedy running against a State, and
thus beyond the federal court's subject-matter jurisdiction. Reagan,
in particular, painstakingly distinguished the injunction demanded
there, to prohibit Texas officials from enforcing state rate regulations,
from other remedies, like a monetary award to be paid out of the
State's general treasury, which would in the Court's view have placed
the lawsuit squarely within the Eleventh Amendment bar.172
170. Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 154 (emphasis added) (citing Smyth, 169 U.S. at 518).
171. See supra notes 134-38 and accompanying text. When Justice Peckham reached the
denouement of his jurisdictional analysis-declaring that the state official enforcing an uncon-
stitutional state law is "stripped" of his official character for sovereign immunity purposes-he
cited only In re Ayers, and not the rate regulation cases. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160.
But see Currie, supra note 21, at 154-55 (arguing that rate cases decided after Ayers "had
already allowed suits against officers who had done nothing more than threaten suit under
statutes attacked as unconstitutional" and thus offered direct authority for the Young
injunction).
172. Reagan, 154 U.S. at 390. The Court there rejected the defendants' argument that the
lawsuit could not "be maintained because the real party against which alone in fact the relief is
asked.., is the State .... " Id. The Court observed:
So far from the State being the only real party in interest, and upon whom alone the
judgment effectively operates, it has in a pecuniary sense no interest at all. Going back
of all matters of form, the only parties pecuniarily affected are the shippers and the
carriers, and the only direct pecuniary interest which the State can have arises when it
abandons its governmental character and, as an individual, employs the railroad
company to carry its property. There is a sense, doubtless, in which it may be said that
the State is interested in the question, but only a governmental sense. It is interested in
the well-being of its citizens, in the just and equal enforcement of all its laws; but such
governmental interest is not the pecuniary interest which causes it to bear the burden of
an adverse judgment. Not a dollar will be taken from the treasury of the State, no
pecuniary obligation of it will be enforced, none of its property affected by any decree
which may be rendered.
Id. (emphasis added).
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What Smyth and Reagan did do, rather than change the sover-
eign immunity rules in place since Madrazo, was to enlarge the idea
of what constituted a trespass by state officials giving rise to an action
against them individually. And to do that, in turn, the rate cases
enlarged the idea of what constituted a property right protected
against such trespass: the Court decided, in effect, that those who
invest capital in railroads have a protected property interest, al-
though intangible, in obtaining a reasonable return on their invest-
ment.173 Accordingly, state officials who enforce a confiscatory rail
rate interfere illegally with a railroad's protected property interest
just as though the officials had seized possession of a $30 office desk
in payment for taxes the owner had already paidY74 In both instances,
following the rail rate cases, the property owner could seek an
injunction preventing such trespass in a lawsuit against the indi-
vidual official; and because a trespass remedy was deemed to run only
against the individual trespasser, the Eleventh Amendment did not
apply.'75
To the extent that the rail cases decided that a state official's
enforcement of a confiscatory rate amounts to an actionable trespass
on property, 76 they might have recognized a cause of action against
the official to remedy such a trespass, but they did not grant federal
courts a general power, despite the Eleventh Amendment, to exercise
subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits seeking to enjoin violations of
federal law by state officials. The rail cases did not, on their own,
provide authority for the judicial power exercised in Young. And
Justice Peckham did not treat them as though they did.
The Young plaintiffs, at least so far as Justice Peckham was
interested in them, were not primarily threatened with the trespass
that a confiscatory rate commits-that is, a trespass on their property
173. See Ann Woolhandler, The Common Law Origins of Constitutionally Compelled
Remedies, 107 YALE L.J. 77, 129-32 (1997) (describing the rate cases' development of
constitutional protections against state regulation of private property under both due process
and takings analyses).
174. See Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 273 (1885); see also supra notes 140-41 and
accompanying text.
175. See Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10 (1891) (suggesting that the federal court
has the power to enjoin violations of vested property rights by state officials even though the
Eleventh Amendment denies the federal court power to force these same officials to take steps
constituting specific performance of the State's contract with a private plaintifi); Hans v.
Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 21 (1890) (noting, without elaborating, that the decision invoking the
Eleventh Amendment to deny jurisdiction over a private lawsuit under the Constitution's
Contract Clause seeking to force the State to perform contract to honor bonds did not mean that
the State could also invade private property rights under state contract with federal impunity).
176. See Woolhandler, supra note 173, at 130 n.268 (citing commentary that treats Reagan
as the Court's first substantive due process decision).
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interest in a reasonable return on invested capital'17 Instead, the
injury most relevant to Justice Peckham's jurisdictional analysis was
plaintiffs' having to endure the enforcement proceeding itself- "It
would be an injury to complainant to harass it with a multiplicity of
suits or litigation generally in an endeavor to enforce penalties under
an unconstitutional enactment . - .1 Justice Peckham did not
suggest that that injury implicated any property interest, tangible or
otherwise, to justify the injunction under the post-Madrazo trespass
cases; he made no argument that the enlargement of the idea of
"property" begun in the rate cases should continue there. Indeed, he
appeared to acknowledge that the injunction sought in Young was
more like the injunction denied in In re Ayers, where the Court
declined jurisdiction to prohibit state officials from "commencing
suits" to enforce allegedly unconstitutional state tax laws "in the
name of the State and brought to recover taxes for [the state's] use."'79
Notwithstanding Ayers, however, Young authorized the federal
lawsuit to proceed even though the injunction sought not to prevent
state action threatening a direct trespass to plaintiffs' property
interests,'8 but instead to prevent the more generalized harm of being
177. Of course, the Young plaintiffs had challenged the Minnesota rail rates on precisely
those grounds, and had even won that claim on the merits in the circuit court, thus obtaining
the injunction. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 130, 133 (1908). But the Supreme Court did not
even reach the question of whether the rail rates set by the Minnesota legislation were
themselves in fact so low as to be confiscatory, instead holding, on the merits,
that the provisions of the acts relating to the enforcement of the rates, either for freight
or for passengers, by imposing such enormous fines and possible imprisonment as a
result of an unsuccessful effort to test the validity of the laws themselves, are
unconstitutional on their face, without regard to the question of the insufficiency of
those rates.
Id. at 148. But see id. at 165 (suggesting in passing that investors in railroads "are entitled to
equal protection from the laws and from the courts, with the owners of all other kinds of
property, no more, no less").
178. Id. at 160. Justice Peckham elaborated:
To await proceedings against the company in a state court grounded upon a
disobedience of the act, and then, if necessary, obtain a review in this court by writ of
error to the highest state court, would place the company in peril of large loss and its
agents in great risk of fines and imprisonment if it should be finally determined that the
act was valid. This risk the company ought not to be required to take.
Id. at 165 (discussing the objection that the injunction was improper on ordinary equity stan-
dards, since the plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law by raising the Fourteenth
Amendment challenge as a defense to a state enforcement proceeding against them).
179. Id. at 152 (emphasis added). The similarity between the two injunctions was at least
strong enough to move Justice Peckham to cite Ayers for the proposition that the federal court
"would have [had] power to grant the restraining order preventing the commencement of suit"
had the Eleventh Amendment not barred federal jurisdiction over the lawsuit altogether as "one
against the state, to enforce its alleged contract." Id. at 152-53.
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subjected to state enforcement of a law alleged to violate the
Fourteenth Amendment on procedural grounds. 181
In light of this case law, there appears to have been little foun-
dation for Justice Peckham's conclusion that the threat of state en-
forcement of a law that is unconstitutional, on any grounds, confers
federal subject-matter jurisdiction to enjoin that violation despite
state sovereign immunity. Indeed, Justice Peckham offered little
more than his view that such threat of enforcement causes an injury
"equivalent" to those trespasses on property by state officials that
could be remedied through private federal actions against officials
individually from Madrazo forward.182
180. Contrast, for example, Pennoyer v. McConnaughy, 140 U.S. 1, 10-17 (1890), in which
the Court canvassed its own standards for determining when a private action against a state
official would be deemed an improper action against the State and observed:
"A broad line of demarkation separates ... cases... in which the decrees require, by
affirmative official action on the part of the defendants, the performance of an obligation
which belongs to the State in its political capacity, [from] those in which actions at law or
suits in equity are maintained against defendants who, while claiming to act as officers
of the State, violate and invade the personal and property rights of the plaintiffs, under
color of authority, unconstitutional and void."
Id. at 16-17 (emphasis added) (quoting Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52, 70 (1885)). The Court
concluded:
The vital principle in all such cases [in which private federal actions against state
officials were permitted because deemed not against the State] is that the defendants,
though professing to act as officers of the State, are threatening a violation of the
personal or property rights of the complainant, for which they are personally and
individually liable.
Id. at 17 (emphasis added) (quoting In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443, 501 (1887)).
181. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (discussing the nature of the plaintiffs'
Fourteenth Amendment claims). Upon concluding his analysis of the post-Madrazo trespass
cases and the rate cases as well, Justice Peckham declared:
The various authorities we have referred to furnish ample justification for the assertion
that individuals, who, as officers of the State, are clothed with some duty in regard to
the enforcement of laws of the State, and who threaten and are about to commence
proceedings, either of a civil or criminal nature, to enforce against parties affected an
unconstitutional act, violating the Federal Constitution, may be enjoined by a Federal
court of equity from such action.
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56. But cf Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43-46 (1971)
(concluding that federal courts should ordinarily abstain from granting equitable relief against
state officials conducting an enforcement proceeding in state court); Douglas v. City of
Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943) (citing the traditional rule of equity that a state citizen
suffers no injury entitling her to federal court injunctive relief when the State enforces even
unconstitutional state laws against her in a good faith proceeding).
182. Justice Peckham's determination to equate the Young injunction to the post-Madrazo
trespass remedies may explain, in part, his insistence that a Young plaintiff sue the state
officials who are specifically authorized to enforce the allegedly unconstitutional state law. That
requirement strengthens the parallel to ordinary trespass cases where an official is sued for a
remedy only he can actually perform, like returning a plaintiffs tangible personal property
within the official's personal possession. For quite apart from the pragmatic need to have before
the court a party who can in fact comply with any judgment, Justice Peckham insisted:
In making an officer of the State a party defendant in a suit to enjoin the enforcement of
an act alleged to be unconstitutional it is plain that such officer must have some
454
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3. Step Three: Jurisdiction Redux
Once Justice Peckham so approved the specific remedy sought
in Young-the injunction prohibiting enforcement of the rate
regulations-he turned back to the case's Eleventh Amendment
problem, the "most material and important objection made to the
jurisdiction of the Circuit Court."18 And he answered that objection
with a fairly summary conclusion: since the injunction sought in
Young fell within the federal courts' remedial powers (see step two),
then the federal court must therefore have subject-matter jurisdiction
to hear the lawsuit in which that injunction was requested.'84 And
since the court must thus have jurisdiction, then the Eleventh
Amendment must not apply.'8
This left Justice Peckham to declare, in Ex parte Young's most
familiar passage:
If the act which the state Attorney General seeks to enforce be a violation of
the Federal Constitution, the officer in proceeding under such enactment
comes into conflict with the superior authority of that Constitution, and he is
in that case stripped of his official or representative character and is subjected
in his person to the consequences of his individual conduct. The State has no
power to impart to him any immunity from responsibility to the supreme
authority of the United States.
s8 6
connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as
representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party.
Exparte Young, 209 U.S. at 157.
183. Id. at 149.
184. Id. at 156, 160. But see Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct.
1003, 1012 (1998) (" 'Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any cause.
Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining
to the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.'" (quoting Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1869))).
185. Conveyed as a proof, Justice Peckham's reasoning in Young might look something like
this:
1. The Eleventh Amendment poses a potential bar to federal court jurisdiction.
2. Jurisdiction over a lawsuit turns on the remedy sought in that lawsuit.
3. The remedy sought here is authorized because it is equivalent to remedies authorized
in other federal lawsuits.
4. Ergo, the Eleventh Amendment poses no bar to jurisdiction.
For one critique of the view that federal courts enjoy an inherent power to remedy constitu-
tional wrongs, see John Choon Yoo, Who Measures the Chancellor's Foot? The Inherent
Remedial Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1121, 1123 (1996) (stating thesis that
federal courts lack inherent remedial authority).
186. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 159-60 (emphasis added) (citing only In re Ayers, 123 U.S.
443 (1887)). Compare Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 871 (1824)
(Marshall, C.J.) (holding that Eleventh Amendment applies only where State is named a formal
party defendant), with Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828)
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It is this last step of logic that has led the contemporary
Supreme Court to conclude that Ex parte Young jurisdiction rests on a
fiction.18 7 It is difficult to read Justice Peckham's opinion otherwise:
it neither adhered to the sovereign immunity rules established in the
Court's own precedentslss nor offered a law-based reason-constitu-
tional or otherwise-for expanding those rules to authorize an in-
junction in Young's circumstances, where the state official was sued
in his official capacity for a wholly official "harm" and only for relief
that coerced not individual but state action.18 9
Far from offering a constitutional justification for the Young
doctrine's exception to Seminole Tribe's emphatic constitutional rule,
Ex parte Young makes the most sense when legal precedent and con-
stitutional rules are set aside in favor of one overriding public policy
imperative: without Young's jurisdictional fiction, Hans v. Louisiana
would have precluded all original federal jurisdiction over citizens'
lawsuits to enforce state compliance with federal law.19 ° Pragmatism,
(Marshall, C.J.) (holding that the Eleventh Amendment applies where plaintiff seeks relief
requiring action by the State).
187. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst fl), 465 U.S. 89, 104-05
(1984) (noting that Young's "fiction" created the "'well-recognized irony' that an official's
unconstitutional conduct constitutes state action under the Fourteenth Amendment but not the
Eleventh Amendment" (citing Florida Dep't of State v. Treasure Salvors, Inc., 458 U.S. 670, 685
'(1982) (Stevens, J.))); see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (agreeing
with Pennhurst !!'s "observation" that Young rests on a "fictional distinction between official
and the State"); Althouse, supra note 73, at 1135-37 (acknowledging Young's creation of legal
fiction, but observing that Justice Peckham himself did not admit to doing so); Jackson, supra
note 56, at 62 (criticizing Pennhurst II Court for admitting Young reasoning to be a fiction);
Monaghan, supra note 6, at 127 (asserting that "everyone now recognizes that nothing but a
fiction is involved" in Young's stripping an official of her official status solely in order to obtain
federal jurisdiction despite the Eleventh Amendment (citations omitted)). See generally
WRIGHT, supra note 73, at 292 ("The decision in Ex parte Young rests on purest fiction. It is
illogical. It is only doubtfully in accord with the prior decisions.").
188. Again, not everyone agrees with this reading of Young. See Currie, supra note 21, at
1154-55 (arguing that Ex parte Young rule "did not require a significant modification of the
theory that lay behind Ayers and the other Contract Clause cases"). But see Currie, supra note
38, at 547-48 (arguing that Young "squarely contradicts" Hans v. Louisiana, and observing,
about the Eleventh Amendment, that "[o]ne does not go to the trouble of amending the
Constitution in order to alter the caption on the complaint"). See generally supra notes 165-75
and accompanying text (discussing arguable similarities between Young injunction and
injunctions granted in railroad rate cases like Reagan and Smyth).
189. Compare Reagan v. Farmers' Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 390-91 (1894) (justifying
suit against state official individually as actionable trespass on personal property), and supra
notes 165-75 and accompanying text, with Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 104 (observing that "the
injunction in Young was justified, notwithstanding the obvious impact on the State itself, on the
view that sovereign immunity does not apply because an official who acts unconstitutionally is
'stripped of his official or representative character'" (emphasis added)).
190. This, of course, repeats the standard reading of Ex parts Young. See, for example,
Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 105, which notes:
[T]he Young doctrine has been accepted as necessary to permit the federal courts to
vindicate federal rights and hold state officials responsible to "the supreme authority of
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and not constitutional law, best explains Young's "exception" to state
sovereign immunity.
D. Young Becomes the Young Doctrine: Edelman v. Jordan
If the Court in Ex parte Young exercised a unilateral "judicial
Power" to dictate its own subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits
against state interests, the Court wielded that power even more freely
to develop Young into the full-fledged jurisdictional doctrine
reaffirmed in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene. In Edelman v.
Jordan,191 the Supreme Court ruled that Ex parte Young jurisdiction
extends only to federal court lawsuits seeking prospective injunctive
and declaratory relief, hence excluding claims for retrospective relief
in the nature of compensation. 192  The Court, indeed, stated this
distinction as a constitutional imperative: the Eleventh Amendment
bars all claims for retrospective compensatory relief against state
officials sued in their official capacity, and it permits all claims for
prospective relief ordering compliance with federal law, even if such
compliance requires the expenditure of funds out of a State's general
treasury.1
93
the United States." [Our] decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine
rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights.
Id. (quoting Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 160); see also supra Part 11C..2 (critiquing notion that
such need, alone, can provide Young with law-based justification).
191. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
192. Id. at 664-68. In that case, a class of plaintiffs entitled to assistance under the federal
Aid to the Aged, Blind, or Disabled ("AABD") program, a program co-fimded by the federal and
state governments pursuant to the federal Social Security Act, alleged that the Illinois
Department of Public Aid had been delaying the processing of plaintiffs' aid applications beyond
the time permitted by statute, and were thus in violation of federal law. See id. at 653-55. The
plaintiffs brought an action in federal court, suing several Illinois officials responsible for
administering the AABD program at the state and county level. See id. at 655. Contending that
the processing delays violated federal regulations promulgated under the AABD legislation as
well as the Fourteenth Amendments equal protection guarantee, see id. at 653 n.1, plaintiffs
sought two kinds of relief from the federal court. First, they sought declaratory and injunctive
relief requiring the defendant state officials to comply in the future with all federal time limits
in processing aid applications; second, they sought "a permanent injunction enjoining defen-
dants to award to the entire class of plaintiffs all AABD benefits wrongfully withheld" during
the roughly three-month period covered by the complaint. Id. at 656 & n.5. That is, plaintiffs
sought orders compelling future compliance with federal law and also requiring state officials to
make plaintiffs whole for the benefits they had been denied as a result of the improper delays.
The district court granted both. See id.
193. See id. at 665, 667-68. Even those court orders that require significant expenditures
from a State's general public funds are within federal jurisdiction so long as such "fiscal conse-
quences to the state treasury... [are] the necessary result of compliance with decree which by
their terms [are] prospective in nature.... Such an ancillary effect on the state treasury is a
permissible and often an inevitable consequence of the principle announced in Ex parte Young."
Id. at 668 (emphasis added). But see Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 281 (1997)
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Edelman thus adopted a measure of time to determine whether
a private lawsuit naming a state official is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment; this idea of time became a proxy for, and indeed took the
place of, the old sovereign immunity question of whether a private
lawsuit in fact seeks relief that will require action by the State itself.
After Edelman, hence, federal jurisdiction under the Eleventh
Amendment came to depend principally on whether the relief sought
against a named official was most fairly characterized as forward-
looking or backward-looking.'9
Yet, the reasoning behind this time-based constitutional dis-
tinction, between retrospective and prospective federal relief, makes
relatively little sense in light of the Eleventh Amendment case law
invoked to support it.195 It is more coherent, rather, as a policy-driven
exercise of a unilateral judicial power to set the scope of federal juris-
diction on the Court's own terms. Then-Justice Rehnquist, writing for
a five-vote majority, maintained that the Edelman distinction follows
inevitably from the Court's 1945 decision in Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana
Department of Treasury,196 in which the Eleventh Amendment was
held to deny federal jurisdiction over a private lawsuit to recover
corporate income taxes paid under protest that the state tax laws
violated the Constitution's dormant Commerce Clause.197 Although
the Ford Motor plaintiff had followed Ex parte Young's pleading
model, and named as defendants only those officials whom state law
made specifically responsible for enforcing its tax provisions, 198 the
(denying Ex parte Young jurisdiction even over prospective injunctive and declaratory relief
where effect on State was "functional equivalent" of an adverse quiet title judgment); Seminole
Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 76 (1996) (refusing to extend Ex parte Young jurisdiction over
claim for prospective relief where Court concluded Congress intended to supplant Young
jurisdiction in favor of statutory jurisdictional model ruled unconstitutional). See generally
Vzquez, supra note 76 (providing overview of debate over prospective/retrospective relief).
194. See, e.g., Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (noting that
the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal private lawsuit against state officials seeking
declaration that officials violated federal law in the past, since res judicata rules would cause
declaratory judgment to "have much the same effect as a full-fledged award of damages or
restitution by the federal court"); see also Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 22-40 (detailing Court's
"transformation," over a series of decisions, of Edelman rule, barring retrospective monetary
relief, into doctrine barring all retrospective relief).
195. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56 (stating that "the relief sought by a plaintiff suing a
State [itself] is irrelevant to the question whether the suit is barred by the Eleventh
Amendment").
196. Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
197. See id. at 460-61 (recounting non-resident manufacturing corporation's charge that
state income tax law based on in-state sales violated the federal Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST.
Art. I, § 8, and the Fourteenth Amendment); see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663.
198. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463 (noting that plaintiff sued State's Governor,
Treasurer, and Auditor, who together comprised State's Department of Treasury); see also Ex
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Supreme Court held that plaintiffs claim was nonetheless a claim
against the State, and was thus barred from federal court by the
Eleventh Amendment. 199
Justice Rehnquist cited Ford Motor for the principle that
"[wihen the action is in essence one for the recovery of money from the
state, the state is the real, substantial party in interest and is entitled
to invoke its sovereign immunity from suit even though individual
officials are nominal defendants." 2°° Reasoning that compliance with
a federal judgment for retrospective compensation would require the
payment of money that "must inevitably come from the general reve-
nues of the State,"2 1 Justice Rehnquist concluded that lawsuits seek-
ing such awards are, under Ford Motor, improper suits against a
State and therefore beyond federal court jurisdiction.202
So far, and at this level of generality, Justice Rehnquist's use
of Ford Motor to support the Edelman rule is not remarkable. Ford
Motor certainly did bar a private lawsuit seeking to recover money
wrongfully collected in the past by state tax authorities; the Edelman
plaintiffs certainly did seek to recover money wrongfully withheld in
the past by state public assistance authorities: both cases, so far,
seemed to hold that the Constitution's sovereign immunity principle
prohibits federal lawsuits seeking to force unconsenting States, di-
rectly or indirectly, to pay money to private plaintiffs based on past
wrongdoing.203 At the next more specific level of analysis, however,
the analogy wobbles.
parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 157 (1908) (noting that the jurisdictional fiction applies only if
defendant official has "some connection with the enforcement" of the challenged state law).
199. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 463-64.
200. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (emphasis added) (quoting Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 454).
From this observation, according to Justice Relnquist, "the rule has evolved that a suit by
private parties seeking to impose a liability which must be paid from public funds in the state
treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. (citing Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322U.S. 47 (1944)).
201. Id. at 665 (declaring that retrospective awards "thus resembl[e] the monetary award
against the State itself" prohibited in Ford Motor Co.).
202. See id.
203. In this sense, Edelman's ruling that lawsuits against state officials, in their official ca-
pacities, seeking monetary awards to compensate plaintiffs for past state wrongs does appear to
fall squarely within the Court's traditional Eleventh Amendment rules. See supra notes 134-46
and accompanying text (discussing principle, governing since Madrazo, that while compensatory
relief for past trespasses could be obtained from state officials individually, sovereign itself was
subject to traditional tort remedies only upon its consent). However traditional, Edelman's
Eleventh Amendment reading has drawn substantial scholarly criticism. See, e.g., Vdzquez,
supra note 49, at 1685-86 & n.16 (arguing that Eleventh Amendment doctrine contradicts
Constitution's rule-of-law ideal by immunizing States from accountability for even egregious
past violations of federal Constitution (citing Amar, supra note 56, at 1489)); see also Vd.zquez,
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1. Ford Motor Limits Federal Jurisdiction More Than
Edelman Admits
The Ford Motor decision actually stands on a sovereign immu-
nity reading that is substantially more restrictive of federal jurisdic-
tion than Edelman. Read in full, Ford Motor would appear to bar
federal claims against state officials even for prospective injunctive
relief if compliance with such an order would require the affirmative
expenditure of money from the States' general treasury.204
This is so largely because Ford Motor reverts to the Court's
pre-Young reasoning about state sovereign immunity: the Court
asked itself the Madrazo question-whether the lawsuit to recover
taxes paid under protest was, in fact, an improper suit against the
State of Indiana 05-and answered by asking in turn whether, as a
practical matter, the plaintiffs sought a personal judgment against
the defendant state officials, to be satisfied by the defendants
individually, based on their personal liability for personal
wrongdoing.2 6 The Court concluded that the Ford Motor plaintiff had
sued the official defendants "as representatives of the state, not as
individuals against whom a personal judgment is sought."207
Moreover, "[tihe [plaintiff] did not assert any claim to a personal
judgment against these individuals for the contested tax payments.
The [plaintiffs] claim was for a 'refund,' not for the imposition of
personal liability on individual defendants for sums illegally
exacted."208
supra note 76, at 2 (asserting that Young jurisdiction has partially "alleviated the rule-of-law
problems" caused by sovereign immunity).
204. Cf V4zquez, supra note 76, at 94-100 (proposing "return" to Edelman's "original"
holding, that only retrospective monetary relief is barred under Young doctrine).
205. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 462; see also Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.)
110, 123-24(1828).
206. The Court distinguished this claim from a lawsuit "against a tax collector to recover a
personal judgment for money wrongfully collected under color of state law." Ford Motor Co.,
323 U.S. at 462; see also id. at 463-64; Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 293 (1885)
(reported as one of the Virginia Coupon Cases, 114 U.S. 269 (1885)) (permitting a private
lawsuit against the Richmond Treasurer to recover possession of a desk wrongfully seized in
payment of taxes); supra Part III.B (discussing pre-Young case-law following same principle).
207. Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464.
208. Id. at 463-64. The Court reinforced its conclusion about the "essential nature and ef-
fect" of plaintiffs claim, id. at 464, by emphasizing that plaintiffs federal complaint had invoked
a state statute establishing a refund procedure for obtaining a refund from the State of illegally
exacted taxes, see id. at 463. Noting that the state statute unequivocally "provide[d] for an
action against the State," the Court found that plaintiff's refund action under that statute had to
be characterized that way as well for Eleventh Amendment purposes. Id. at 463-64. And
although the State had consented in that statute to suit for tax refunds in its own courts, the
Court declined to read the statute as granting consent to refund actions in federal court, too.
See id. at 464-66 ("'[W]hen we are dealing with the sovereign exemption from judicial
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Indeed, so rooted is the Ford Motor decision in the Court's pre-
Young doctrine that it did not cite Ex parte Young even once. The
Court relied instead on cases like In re Ayers, which, again, denied
federal jurisdiction to hear a private claim for an injunction prohibit-
ing state officials, in the future, from enforcing state tax laws alleged
to violate the federal Contract Clause because that lawsuit was, in
effect, a suit against the State, seeking relief that only the State could
provide.209 And the Court relied on Great Northern Life Insurance Co.
v. Read,210 in which the Court likewise invoked the Eleventh
Amendment to deny federal jurisdiction to a private plaintiff who
sought an injunction compelling Oklahoma tax officials to refund
taxes paid under protest against an allegedly unconstitutional state
law-even though the disputed taxes were, at time of suit, kept
segregated from the State's general Treasury and thus still formally
within the defendant tax collector's individual control.211 And Ford
Motor relied, too, on Smith v. Reeves,212 which, written eight years
before Young and by Young's lone dissenter,21 3 held that the Eleventh
Amendment barred federal jurisdiction over a private lawsuit against
a California tax official seeking a tax refund because:
interference in the vital field of financial administration a clear declaration of the state's
intention to submit its fiscal problems to other courts than those of its own creation must be
found.'" (quoting Great N: Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47, 54 (1944))).
209. See Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464. Edelman cited In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887),
along with Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886), as cases in which the Court denied federal
jurisdiction over actions "against state officers for specific performance of a contract to which
the State was a party." Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 666-67 (1974) (rejecting suggestion
that Eleventh Amendment permits jurisdiction over suits against state officials for any relief
that can be characterized as "equitable"). Edelman's citation of Ayers (where prospective
injunctive relief was denied because it would have had the same effect as a direct ruling against
the State) seems disingenuous, given Edelman's larger ruling that prospective relief to comply
with federal law-presumably including the Constitution's Contract Clause-falls within the
federal jurisdiction created in Exparte Young. Id. at 663-68.
210. Great N. Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944). This case was cited by Edelman
and Ford Motor Co. for the rule that "suit by private parties seeking to impose a liability which
must be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment."
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663; Ford Motor Co., 323 U.S. at 464-66.
211. Great N. Life Ins. Co., 322 U.S. at 53. For Eleventh Amendment purposes, the Court
there declared it "immaterial" that the disputed taxes were formally within the control of the
named official defendant, so that an award for plaintiff could technically be satisfied by the
official. The suit "was against the official, not the individual." Id. (relying as well on Oklahoma
refund statute invoked by plaintiff, which provided for action in state court against the State it-
self).
212. Smith v. Reeves, 178 U.S. 436, 439 (1900) (Harlan, J.).
213. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 181 (1908) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that
private action to enjoin Minnesota Attorney General from enforcing state rail rate legislation in
state courts was action against State and thus barred from federal court by Eleventh
Amendment).
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[T]he relief sought is a judgment against that officer [the state Treasurer] in
his official capacity; and that judgment would compel him to pay out of the
public funds in the treasury of the State a certain sum of money. Such a
judgment would have the same effect as if it were rendered directly against the
State for the amount specified in the complaint.214
Accordingly, these cases offer little support for Edelman's constitu-
tional rule that permits federal jurisdiction over private lawsuits
seeking to require future state expenditures, but that denies federal
jurisdiction over suits seeking to require expenditures to compensate
plaintiffs for past wrongdoing. Simply stated, under Ford Motor and
its precedents, time is irrelevant: any judgment requiring the pay-
ment of funds out of a state treasury, and not an official's private
purse, constitutes a suit against the State barred by the Eleventh
Amendment from crossing the federal court's threshold.215
2. Ex parte Young Limits Federal Jurisdiction More Than
Edelman Admits
Edelman's time-oriented jurisdictional rule also authorizes
federal jurisdiction beyond what Ex parte Young itself sanctioned. It
is true, as the Edelman Court stressed, that the injunction for which
jurisdiction was authorized in Ex parte Young was prospective in na-
ture: it prohibited Edward Young, as Minnesota Attorney General,
from taking steps in the future to enforce the state rail rate regula-
214. Smith, 178 U.S. at 439. The Court distinguished that case, for which federal
jurisdiction was deemed lacking, from 'those in which we have held that a suit would lie by one
person against another person [a state official] to recover possession of specific property," and
from those in which jurisdiction in a lawsuit against a state official was proper "to compel him
to perform a plain ministerial duty," as well as from "a suit to enjoin the defendant (official]
from doing some positive or affirmative act to the injury of the plaintiffs in their persons or
property." Id. (discussing Louisiana v. Jumel, 107 U.S. 711, 726-28 (1882)). As the Court later
explained itself, the Eleventh Amendment barred federal jurisdiction in Smith v. Reeves because
"[als the suit was against a state official as such... to compel him to carry out with the state's
funds the state's agreement to reimburse moneys illegally exacted under color of the tax
power.., it was a suit against the state. The state would be required to pay." Great N. Life Ins.
Co., 322 U.S. at 50 (emphasis added).
215. See Governor of Ga. v. Madrazo, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 110, 123-24 (1828). Consider again
Justice Rehnquisfs statement in Edelman that Ford Motor and its precedents prohibit an action
seeking to "recover[ I" money from a State. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 663 (quoting Ford Motor Co.,
323 U.S. at 464). If this Article's reading of Ford Motor Co. and its precedents is accurate, then
it is not entirely possible to read the word "recover" to mean only compensation for past harms,
as Justice Rehnquist appears to do, see id. at 665. See Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 17 (describing
other Supreme Court decisions between Ford Motor and Edelman that returned to pre-Young
sovereign immunity approach barring suits seeking relief that would coerce state action;
observing, "[t]aken literally, these standards would bar the typical Ex parte Young sui").
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tions against plaintiff railroads in state courts.216 At the same time,
however, the Young injunction was purely negative: it prohibited the
State from acting to enforce its unconstitutional laws,217 but it re-
quired no affirmative action by the Attorney General or any other
agent of the State; significantly, that injunction ordered no affirma-
tive expenditure of state resources, monetary or otherwise. 18
In Edelman, by contrast, the claim for which the Court granted
federal jurisdiction sought an injunction requiring Illinois to take
affirmative steps to change state policy in a way that would increase
state expenditures indefinitely.2 9 Nevertheless, because the injunc-
tion was formally "prospective"-it ordered state officials to conform
their future conduct to federal law-to Justice Rehnquist it was
sufficiently "analogous" to the injunction granted in Ex parte Young
that the jurisdictional rule created there should apply in full force in
Edelman as well. 220
216. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 155-56; see also Edelman, 415 U.S. at 664 (emphasizing
that "the relief awarded in Ex parte Young was prospective only; the Attorney General of
Minnesota was enjoined to conform his future conduct of that office to the requirement of the
Fourteenth Amendment").
217. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. at 154 (claiming authority for injunction under precedents
authorizing private lawsuits against state officials "for the purpose of preventing them, as
officers of a state, from enforcing an unconstitutional enactment, to the injury of the rights of
the plaintiff' (citing Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 518 (1898))); Great N. Life Ins. Co., 422 U.S.
at 51 (listing, among lawsuits permitted under Eleventh Amendment, private action naming
state official "to enjoin an affirmative act to the injury of plaintiff').
218. This is not to say that the Ex parte Young injunction did not have a direct impact on
the State of Minnesota, nor to say that that impact had no monetary component. See Pennhurst
State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst H), 465 U.S. 89, 104 (1984) (acknowledging that
Young injunction had direct impact on State qua State). At the very least, Minnesota was
forced to forego the fines and other penalties that it would have been entitled to assess against
railroads violating the state rate legislation, as Justice Rehnquist stressed. See Edelman, 415
U.S. at 667.
219. Specifically, the Edelman injunction required Illinois to abandon state regulations
that had established a schedule for processing aid requests under the federal-state AABD
assistance program. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 655-56 & n.4-5; see also supra note 192
(describing complaint in some detail). Those state regulations effectively delayed the date on
which a specific assistance award began to be paid out to its recipient; it was for this reason,
along with a pattern of more general administrative delay, that the lower federal courts found
the State to have violated federal law in the first place. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 655-56.
Accordingly, the Edelman injunction, by ordering Illinois officials to conform their AABD proc-
essing time to meet federal standards in the future, also required the State, by definition, to pay
each recipient her benefits earlier and thus for a longer period of time. Id.
220. Id. at 664. This conclusion, as the dissents point out, blunts the edge of the majority's
holding that the Eleventh Amendment denies federal jurisdiction over retrospective damage
awards against state officials for state wrongdoing because they would "to a virtual certainty be
paid from state funds, and not from the pockets of the individual state officials who were the
defendants in the action." Id. at 668; see also id. at 682 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (criticizing the
majority on this ground); Currie, supra note 21, at 160-61 (notig that majority opinion in
Edelman is written too broadly for its precedents: if the Court really meant to permit any
prospective relief against a state official, no matter how certainly compliance would require
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3. Edelman Rests on Policy, Not on Law
Justice Rehnquist did not ignore the poor fit between Edelman
and its legal precedents. Indeed, the Court frankly admitted that its
overt shift from an effects-oriented Eleventh Amendment analysis to
an exclusively time-oriented one was driven not by law but by pol-
icy.221 Justice Rehnquist acknowledged that prospective injunctions
against state officials can, and perhaps "inevitably" do, have the very
effect on a State that the Eleventh Amendment was designed to pre-
vent: the forced expenditure of money from general treasury funds at
the order of a federal court.2 2 But federal jurisdiction should extend
to lawsuits seeking even costly prospective injunctions despite the
Eleventh Amendment, because, simply stated, the Court considered it
good policy to preserve a federal judicial forum to enforce state com-
pliance with federal law: that is a good use for the federal courts.
"([The Ex parte Young] holding has permitted the Civil War
Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than
merely as a shield, for those whom they were designed to protect."223
payment of treasury funds, then the opinion would "contradict [its] own insistence that an
officer could not be ordered to take money from the treasury" under Ford Motor Co.); see also
vWzquez, supra note 76, at 94 (urging a return to the "original" Edelman holding).
221. The Edelman majority protested that the financial impact ancillary to the prospective
injunction there-to comply with accelerated federal time limits for processing aid
applications-should not be considered the same, for Eleventh Amendment purposes, as the
financial impact on a State of a retrospective order to pay benefits improperly withheld under
the State's slower schedule. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668. Equating the prospective cost with the
retrospective cost, the majority reasoned,
neglects the fact that where the State has a definable allocation to be used in the
payment of public aid benefits, and pursues a certain course of action such as the
processing of applications within certain time periods as did Illinois here, the
subsequent ordering by a federal court of retroactive payments to correct delays in such
processing will invariably mean there is less money available for payments for the
continuing obligations of the public aid system.
Id. at 666 n.11 (emphasis added) (responding to Justice Douglas' dissent). The majority did not
here elaborate why this distinction should make a constitutional difference, as it is thought to
do. See id. One explanation-that a State may somehow raise the budget to fund a future
obligation more easily, and with less overall disruption, than the budget to fund a past
obligation-may make sense as a matter of policy, but it would seem to have no compelling
constitutional basis, other than the Court's own say-so in Edelman itself. Id. at 666-67.
222. See id. at 663 (citing "rule" that private lawsuit seeking to win a judgment that "must
be paid from public funds in the state treasury is barred by the Eleventh Amendment" (citations
omitted)); id. at 667-68 (approving federal court jurisdiction over lawsuits against state officials,
alleging state violation of federal law and seeking relief having "greater impact on state treasur-
ies than did that awarded inExparte Young").
223. Id. at 664 (describing Young as a "watershed case"); see also Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at
105 ("Our decisions repeatedly have emphasized that the Young doctrine rests on the need to
promote the vindication of federal rights."). But see supra Part ll.C.2 (critiquing notion that
Young's practical utility can supply doctrine with law-based foundation after Seminole Tribe).
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So long as federal jurisdiction is exercised to compel future
compliance with federal law, particularly the federal Constitution, then
that compliance can, apparently, cost a State any amount of money,
despite sovereign inmunity.22 This policy-based jurisdictional rule,
although undoubtedly valuable,22 stands a long way off from a state
sovereign immunity principle so fundamental to Article III that it
absolutely prohibits Congress from granting federal jurisdiction over
lawsuits against States to enforce Article I legislation.226
IV. EXPARTE YOUNG IN COEUR D'ALENE
In Seminole Tribe, the Court declared, without explanation,
that even though Article III prohibits Congress from abrogating state
224. See Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668 (authorizing federal jurisdiction to grant injunction with
"ancillary effect on the state treasury"). Retrospective damage awards, by contrast, apparently
do nothing to ensure future compliance with federal law, and therefore federal jurisdiction over
such claims for relief was deemed unconstitutional. See id. at 668-69 (distinguishing compliance
goal from compensation goal). More recently, Justice Rehnquist, again writing for the Court,
offered an even more bluntly policy-driven explanation for Edelman's time-oriented
jurisdictional rule:
Both prospective and retrospective relief implicate Eleventh Amendment concerns, but
the availability of prospective relief of the sort awarded in Ex parte Young gives life to
the Supremacy Clause. Remedies designed to end a continuing violation of federal law
are necessary to vindicate the federal interest in assuring the supremacy of that law.
But compensatory or deterrence interests are insufficient to overcome the dictates of the
Eleventh Amendment.
Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985) (denying federal jurisdiction over claim against state
officials seeking relief requiring that notice be sent to members of plaintiff class announcing
that State had in past violated federal law governing computation of benefits under federal Aid
to Families With Dependent Children program). As one commentator has put it more bluntly,
'The rub is that making the state pay is hard"; but prospective remedial decrees are more likely
to involve negotiation between parties and a federal court, thus increasing the likelihood of
state compliance. Friedman, supra note 96, at 770-71.
225. There is no question but that Ex parte Young serves a critical function in holding
States accountable to federal law. See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text. Rather, the
question here is how Young avoids the sovereign immunity limit on subject-matter jurisdiction
that Seminole Tribe invoked to prohibit Congress from pursuing that same goal.
226. In the third other principal decision forming the Young doctrine, the Court displayed
the same reliance on policy that Young and Edelman did. In Pennhurst H, the Court withheld
Young jurisdiction and concluded that sovereign immunity barred a lawsuit against a state
official, seeking only prospective relief, where the plaintiff claimed that the official had violated
state law in carrying out his official duties, even though, under Young's rationale, a State may
never lend its own immunity to cloak an official's illegal act. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v.
Halderman (Pennhurst .I), 465 U.S. 89, 104-06 (1984); Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 16 & n.103
(noting that this point was made by the Pennhurst H dissenters). But because the plaintiffs
state-law claim did not implicate the policy behind the Young doctrine-that some federal-court
jurisdiction is necessary despite Hans to enforce state compliance with federal law-the Court
allowed the defendant official to claim the State's sovereign immunity from suit in federal court.
See Pennhurst 11, 465 U.S. at 105-06.
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sovereign immunity under Article I, Ex parte Young jurisdiction
would nonetheless continue to authorize federal subject-matter juris-
diction over suits to coerce state compliance with federal law.227 The
following Term, all nine Justices reaffirmed this jurisdictional rule:
the Constitution's sovereign immunity principle does not bar federal
courts from adjudicating lawsuits against state interests so long as
Young's fictional State-official distinction is maintained.28 While the
Justices disagreed sharply about when a federal court should exercise
its Young jurisdiction,229 no Justice questioned the premise,
necessarily underlying their debate, that it is an appropriate exercise
of Article III judicial power for the Court, acting unilaterally, to dic-
tate the terms on which Young jurisdiction should be available.
And no Justice addressed the central anomaly of Seminole
Tribe and Coeur d'Alene: that, even though Congress has been denied
the Article I power to grant federal jurisdiction over unconsenting
States to enforce federal law because of a sovereign immunity
principle inherently limiting the scope of the Article III judicial power,
the Court's own non-constitutional grant of jurisdiction to itself for
the same purpose survives. Although Coeur d'Alene is thus perhaps
most compelling, from a separation of powers perspective, for what it
does but does not say about a unilateral judicial power to regulate
federal jurisdiction, the several opinions do offer insight into how the
Court, and the individual Justices, perceive the judiciary's special role
within the Constitution's separation of powers framework.
A. Coeur d'Alene: The Dispute and the Ruling
The Coeur d'Alene Indian Tribe, a federally recognized tribe,
claimed the beds and banks of all the navigable waterways in Idaho's
Coeur d'Alene water system, collectively called the "submerged
lands," under an 1873 Executive Order from President Grant estab-
lishing the Coeur d'Alene Reservation within what was then the
227. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996).
228. See Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (Kennedy, J., for five-
Justice majority) ("The Young exception to sovereign immunity was an important part of our
jurisprudence when the Court... held that Congress... may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity.... We do not, then, question the continuing validity of the Exparte Young doctrine."
(citing Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14)).
229. Compare Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269-80 (proposing, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, a
standard for determining whether Young action appropriate in particular case), with id. at 291-
97 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (rejecting, with Justices
Scalia and Thomas, the principal opinion's standard), and id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(rejecting, with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, interpretation of Young in both
principal opinion and concurrence).
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Idaho territory.20 Grant's Executive Order was subsequently ratified
by Congress in 1891, soon after Idaho became a State in 1890.231
When in 1989 Idaho officials undertook to regulate the sub-'
merged lands and waters of Lake Coeur d'Alene as a recreational area
and health resort,22 the Tribe brought suit in federal court seeking to
force those state officials to comply with federal law granting the
submerged lands to the Tribe.23 Specifically, the Tribe sought federal
injunctive and declaratory relief that would, among other things,
determine that federal law granted the Tribe "exclusive use and occu-
pancy" of the submerged lands and therefore prohibited Idaho from
enforcing state regulations on the Tribe's lands.M
A majority of the Supreme Court held that the Constitution's
state sovereign immunity principle prohibited federal subject-matter
jurisdiction over the Tribe's claim, and that Ex parte Young's jurisdic-
tional exception should not be invoked to save the lawsuit. The Court
produced three separate opinions. Reduced to its essentials, the
opinion of the Court, written by Justice Kennedy and joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas,
reasoned that the Tribe's claims could not proceed under Ex parte
Young because the relief sought-a federal court order effectively
divesting Idaho of all sovereign authority over land it claimed as its
own-was too much like a lawsuit seeking relief against Idaho itself
to justify the Young fiction there.23 5 In the majority's words, the
Tribe's claims were "close to the functional equivalent of [a] quiet title
[action] in that substantially all benefits of ownership and control
would shift from the State to the Tribe."26 Beyond this essential
decision, however, there was little agreement about when Ex parte
Young jurisdiction should be meted out in this and other
controversies. The Court's three opinions each offer a distinctive
vision of Ex parte Young and the uses to which the judicial power
should be put.237
230. See id. at 264; id. at 299 (Souter, J., dissenting).
231. See id. at 299 (Souter, J., dissenting).
232. See id.
233. See id. at 264.
234. Id.
235. See id. at 281-82 (portion of Justice Kennedy's principal opinion joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist as well as Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas); id. at 289 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
236. Id. at 282; see also id. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
237. For a detailed analysis of the three Coeur d'Alene opinions and what each suggests
about the current state of Edelman's distinction between prospective and retrospective relief in
Young actions, see Vizquez, supra note 76, at 42-51.
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B. Viewing Judicial Power Under Ex parte Young
Justice Kennedy, speaking for the Court, declared that the
central aim of the sovereign immunity principle is to "protect" the
"dignity and respect afforded a State" under the Constitution.28 Since
every exercise of Ex parte Young jurisdiction represents a breach of
this critical constitutional shield,2 9 Young should be invoked only
when the private lawsuit seeking federal enforcement of federal law
does not, on balance, pose too great an "affront" to the State.240 That
is, in place of what Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice Rehnquist
characterized as the ordinary "presumption"241 that Young jurisdiction
should be exercised in every lawsuit satisfying the Young doctrine's
criteria,4 2 they proposed a multi-factored balancing test to weigh, in
each case, the interests served by opening federal court doors against
a State's interests in keeping those doors shut.m
Not every interest weighs the same. Where a plaintiff has no
effective remedy for her federal claims in state court, for example, Ex
parte Young jurisdiction should ordinarily be granted.2" Where,
238. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 268 (citing Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996);
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890)); see also Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf
& Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 146-47 (1993) (holding that a district court's denial of a state
sovereign immunity claim is subject to immediate appeal because immunity entitles a state or
state representative to avoid the indignity of trial, not just the burden of an adverse judgment).
239. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 269-70.
240. Id. at 277 (opinion of Kennedy, J., joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist only); see also
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1), 465 U.S. 89, 105 (1984) ("Ex parte
Young was the culmination of efforts by this Court to harmonize the principles of the Eleventh
Amendment with the effective supremacy of rights and powers secured elsewhere in the
Constitution." (internal quotations omitted)).
241. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 277 ("Whether the presumption in favor of federal-court
jurisdiction in this type of case is controlling will depend upon the particular context.").
242. Namely, that the lawsuit name only state officials, see Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123,
168 (1908); and seek only prospective relief, see Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974); to
compel future compliance with federal law, see Pennhurst H, 465 U.S. at 105. See also Coeur
d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 288 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
243. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 278-81.
244. See id. at 271. They explained:
Where there is no available state forum, the Young rule has special significance. In that
instance providing a federal forum for a justiciable controversy is a specific application
of the principle that the plan of the convention contemplates a regime in which federal
guarantees are enforceable so long as there is a justiciable controversy.
Id. (citing only THE FEDERALIST No. 80 (Alexander Hamilton)). In this, Justice Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist appeared to attempt an actual constitutional foundation for Ex parte
Young jurisdiction in very limited circumstances: that is, that the States actually consented, by
ratifying the Constitution, to federal jurisdiction on Young's terms where such States have
closed their own courts' doors to the federal claim pursued. Cf supra notes 43-47 and
accompanying text (discussing similar theory of state consent-by-ratification, offered to justify
the congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity under Article I, which Seminole Tribe
rejected). Justice Kennedy returned to this notion to diminish the importance of Young
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however, a state forum is available, the plaintiffs interest in Ex parte
Young jurisdiction diminishes significantly. There, nothing is at
stake other than "the desire of the litigant to choose a particular
forum"; and when that interest is weighed against the State's
"desire... to have the dispute resolved in its own courts,"245 the
plaintiffs simple forum preference should give way, and Young
jurisdiction should be denied. 6
Moreover, a plaintiff may not bolster her side of the balance by
claiming a special interest in having her federal claim adjudicated by
a federal court. 7 Discarding the standard justification for Ex parte
Young jurisdiction-that a federal forum is necessary to vindicate the
supremacy of federal law24S-these Justices rejoined:
Neither in theory nor in practice has it been shown problematic to have
federal claims resolved in state courts where Eleventh Amendment immunity
would be applicable in federal court but for an exception based on Young. For
purposes of the Supremacy Clause, it is simply irrelevant whether the claim is
brought in state or federal court.
... It would be error coupled with irony were we to bypass the Eleventh
Amendment, which enacts a scheme solicitous of the States, on the sole ration-
jurisdiction where there is an alternative state remedy, so that the only reason for federal
jurisdiction is to vindicate a federal interest in having federal courts decide federal rights. See
Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 274 ("It is difficult to say States consented to these types of suits in
the plan of the convention."). This attempt to support Young on an argument paralleling the
abrogation argument rejected in Seminole Tribe appears only half-hearted: Justice Kennedy
offered only one quote, from Alexander Hamilton, that does not directly bear on the question of
federal-court jurisdiction. Moreover, Justice Kennedy's suggestion met with instant criticism
from other Justices, even those who concurred in the judgment. See id. at 291-92 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
245. Id. at 277.
246. Under the Kennedy-Rehnquist approach, once compared to a plaintiffs now-devalued
interest in invoking federal court jurisdiction, the State's interest in demanding its own chosen
forum is weighty indeed: "States have real and vital interests in preferring their own forum in
suits brought against them, interests that ought not to be disregarded based upon a waiver
presumed in law and contrary to fact [i.e., the Ex parte Young fiction]." Id. at 274 (citing
Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673). To drive home the point that a plaintiff's interest in a federal forum
weighs little against the State's interest in its own courts, these Justices observed: "The
Eleventh Amendment's background principles of federalism and comity need not be ignored in
resolving these conflicting preferences." Id. at 277. In this lawsuit, Idaho courts were open to
hear the Tribe's complaint, so the balance should tip against the Tribe: "[Tihere [was] neither
warrant nor necessity to adopt the Young device to provide an adequate judicial forum for
resolving the dispute between the Tribe and the State." Id. at 274.
247. See id. at 274-75; see also supra Part II.C.2 (critiquing notion that federal court's
special role in defining constitutional rights on the merits automatically confers subject-matter
jurisdiction over rights-based claims despite state sovereign immunity).
248. See id. at 274 (identifying view that Ex parte Young may serve an "important
interest... when the case calls for the interpretation of federal law" (citing Green v. Mansour,
474 U.S 64, 68 (1985); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 11), 465 U.S. 89,
105 (1984))).
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ale that state courts are inadequate to enforce and interpret federal rights in
every case.24
9
By contrast, a presumption in favor of Young jurisdiction may
remain where a complaint implicates the Constitution's structural
principles, like federalism itself.250  "In some cases, it is true, the
federal courts play an indispensable role in maintaining the struc-
tural integrity of the constitutional design. A federal forum assures
the peaceful resolution of disputes between the States and suits initi-
ated by the United States against States."251
Although this interest balancing test would, at one level, re-
duce the number of federal complaints invoking Ex parte Young that
249. Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S. at 274-75. Not only is there no special interest, weighing in
favor of Ex parte Young jurisdiction, in having a federal court decide federal law claims, but in
fact States themselves have a strong and affirmative interest in having their own courts decide
federal questions alongside state law questions, in order to "integratfel those [federal] sources of
law within their own system for the proper judicial control of state officials." Id. at 276. This
state interest further tips the balance against Ex parte Young jurisdiction in any single case.
See id.
250. See supra Part II.C.3 (critiquing notion that Court's special role in defining
Constitution's structural principles automatically confers subject-matter jurisdiction over
structural claims despite state sovereign immunity).
251. Id. at 275 (citations omitted). While the Kennedy-Rehnquist faction "assume[s] there
is a special role for Article III courts in the interpretation and application of federal law in other
instances as well, we do not for that reason conclude that state courts are a less than adequate
forum for resolving federal questions," presumably meaning those federal questions that could
not be said to trigger the "special role" of Article III courts. Id. But see id. at 279 (suggesting
that federal courts may have a constitutionally 'special role" in providing remedies when States
violate the Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee against race discrimination;
discussing Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977)).
This analysis offers an interesting contrast to these Justices' views about Congress'
legislative power over federal jurisdiction. Discussing the Court's decisions, in Fitzpatrick v.
Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976), and Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), that Congress
has power to abrogate state sovereign immunity when using its special authority to enforce
Fourteenth Amendment guarantees, these two Justices reasoned that a special judicial role in
enforcing the Fourteenth Amendment must therefore also be inherent in those same
constitutional provisions, even though the Amendment grants no explicit enforcement power to
the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. That is, while the Court under Young claims a
power over federal jurisdiction that Congress lacks, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 44, these
Justices found it incoherent to read the Fourteenth Amendment to give Congress any power
over federal jurisdiction that the Court does not also have. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 279
("If Congress pursuant to its § 5 remedial powers under the Fourteenth Amendment may
abrogate sovereign immunity... it follows that the substantive provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment themselves offer a powerful reason to provide a federal forum") (citing Fitzpatrick
v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976) (emphasis added))). Under this reasoning, moreover, not only is it
inconceivable that Congress could have a constitutional authority over federal jurisdiction that
the Court lacks, but in fact Congress needs the explicit grant of such authority in Section 5, and
would lack abrogation power without it, while the Court needs no special constitutional grant of
authority but exercises at least an equivalent power over federal jurisdiction simply by virtue of
Article III's grant of 'Judicial Power." In this view, Congress requires a special constitutional
grant of power over jurisdiction just to bring it up to the level of authority that the Court enjoys
automatically under Article III.
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would survive a state sovereign immunity challenge,252 it would at the
same time dramatically increase the power of each federal court to
decide when its own doors should be opened or shut on private law-
suits challenging state interests. Justice Kennedy and Chief Justice
Rehnquist invited federal courts to extend or withhold Young jurisdic-
tion according to any cluster of policy values deemed compelling in
any particular case: "IT]he Young fiction is an exercise in line-
drawing. There is no reason why the line cannot be drawn to reflect
the real interests of States."53 This opinion thus advocates a free-form
judicial power under Ex parte Young, concentrating broad discretion
over federal subject-matter jurisdiction in the hands of individual
federal judges. Following hard on the heels of Seminole Tribe's ruling
that Article III denies Congress all Article I authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity2 no matter how weighty the federal
interests to be served by such federal judicial enforcement, this
opinion's vote for so broad a judicial discretion over subject-matter
jurisdiction is indeed noteworthy.
The two other Coeur d'Alene opinions25 both soundly reject any
suggestion that the Court should substitute a case-by-case interest-
balancing test for the Ex parte Young formula, which authorizes
federal jurisdiction over private lawsuits against state officials
seeking prospective relief compelling future compliance with federal
law.26 They differ from each other, primarily, in their two views
about whether the Court should recognize an exception to Ex parte
Young and deny federal jurisdiction where, as in Coeur d'Alene, the
prospective relief sought against the state officials would dispose
finally of a State's claim to own or to regulate land within its
boundaries.
In an opinion written by Justice O'Connor, concurring with the
Kennedy-Rehnquist faction's judgment and concurring in part of its
reasoning, she and Justices Scalia and Thomas adopted a slightly
252. Cf Jackson, supra note 6, at 498-99 (arguing that Seminole Tribe diminished judicial
power by decreasing number of cases entitled to federal jurisdiction).
253. Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added). Indeed, Young jurisdiction should be
extended or withheld based on a wide-ranging canvass of state interests: "The range of concerns
to be considered in answering this inquiry [the interest-balancing] is broad." Id.
254. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., writing for the Court).
255. See Coeur dAlene, 521 U.S. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring
in the judgment); id. at 298 (Souter, J., dissenting).
256. See Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 168 (1908) (holding that plaintiff may name only
state officials); Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 (1974) (holding that plaintiff may seek
only prospective relief); Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 1!), 465 U.S.
89, 105 (1983) (holding that plaintiff may seek to compel future compliance with federal law only
and not state law); see also Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 293-94 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
1999]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 52:407
more focused exception to Ex parte Young: Where a plaintiffs claim
implicates a State's "special sovereignty interests," as defined by the
Court, then the Young fiction should be pierced, and the State entitled
to claim its constitutional immunity from suit in federal court even
though the plaintiff names only state officials as defendants.5 7
Although rejecting the Kennedy-Rehnquist view that Ex parte Young
jurisdiction should in each case depend on the relative value of the
federal and state interests at issue,258  the O'Connor faction
nonetheless concluded that Young jurisdiction should be withheld in
that case because of what these three Justices considered the
inordinate weight of Idaho's interest in the property at stake.259
The dissent, written by Justice Souter and joined by Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer, rejected any exception to Young juris-
diction based on the relative importance to a State of the federal claim
at issue. Asserting that Ex parte Young is now a component of the
Court's mandatory jurisdiction over federal questions,260 the dissent-
ers contended that Young jurisdiction should be granted in every case
in which Congress has not acted to foreclose that path into federal
court.261 And any intrusion on state interests that a Young suit en-
tails is outweighed by the value of empowering "an individual.., to
seek any federal remedy for violation of a federal right."262 Indeed, to
257. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 296 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment). Justice O'Connnor elaborated that Young jurisdiction should be unavailable
where plaintiffs claim is not simply to possess land also claimed by another under state law, see
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 220-23 (1882), but instead is a claim:
to eliminate altogether the State's regulatory power over the submerged lands at
issue-to establish not only that the State has no right to possess the property, but also
that the property is not within Idaho's sovereign jurisdiction at all. We have repeatedly
emphasized the importance of submerged lands to state sovereignty. Control of such
lands is critical to a State's ability to regulate use of its navigable waters.
Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 289 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment)
(citation omitted); see Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 45-50 (reading O'Connor's opinion as creating
"exception" to Edelman rule permitting prospective relief where State's claims to property are at
stake).
258. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 295 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment) ("Our case law simply does not support the proposition that federal courts must
evaluate the importance of the federal right at stake before permitting an officer's suit to
proceed.")
259. See id. at 296; see also Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 48.
260. See id. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting); cf Redish, supra note 32, at 71-72 (arguing that
judge-made abstention doctrines are constitutionally suspect because they permit federal courts
on their own initiative to decline cases within their mandatory federal question jurisdiction
granted by Congress, as in 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1994 & Supp. 1996)).
261. See Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 297 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 298 (explaining that
Seminole Tribe held that where Congress has not "displaced" the Young doctrine, a federal court
has jurisdiction over a suit against an official so long as the Young requirements themselves are
met).
262. Id. at 308.
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strike the balance otherwise would be to "deplete the federal judicial
power to a point the Framers could not possibly have intended, given
a history of officer liability riding tandem with sovereign immunity
extending back to the Middle Ages."263
As these three Coeur d'Alene opinions demonstrate, the Court
considered the question of federal subject-matter jurisdiction over the
Tribe's claims as one entirely within the Court's power to decide;
indeed, the three opinions all assumed that granting or denying fed-
eral jurisdiction in that case turned on the Justices' own views about
where a policy-driven line should be drawn between a plaintiffs in-
terest in federal-court enforcement of federal-law rights and a State's
interest in avoiding federal-court enforcement of those rights. Not
one of the Justices even suggested that this assertion of unilateral
judicial power to regulate federal subject-matter jurisdiction even
theoretically conflicts with Seminole Tribe's ruling, only a year before,
that state sovereign immunity constitutionally curtails the entire
federal judicial power under Article III.264 In Coeur d'Alene, the Court
simply assumed a broad and unilateral authority to dictate the terms
upon which federal court doors will be opened or shut on claims
against state interests.
V. JUDIcIAuIZING FEDERAL JURISDICTION
A. No Ordinary Exercise of Judicial Review
If my reading of these decisions is supportable, then by pre-
serving Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe the Supreme Court has
claimed an independent judicial prerogative to decide when to open
and shut federal court doors on lawsuits challenging state interests;
the Court has claimed a judicial power to dictate federal jurisdiction
in these cases, not just to exercise it. That claim departs from the
Court's traditional power of judicial review, and it marks out a differ-
ent species of Article III "judicial Power."
The simplest definition of judicial review is also the most fa-
miliar: "It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial de-
263. Id. (citations omitted); see also supra Part I.B (discussing nineteenth-century cases
developing American version of common law exception to sovereign immunity where plaintiffs
sued officials).
264. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 267 (acknowledging that sovereign immunity rules
limit the "reach or extent" of federal judicial power under Article III).
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partment to say what the law is."265 Along with this "lawsaying"266
power comes another, even more potent authority: the power to in-
validate acts of Congress and the Executive if they violate the
"law"-constitutional, statutory, or otherwise-as declared by the
Court.2 7 And when the Court turns its "lawsaying" attention to the
Constitution, the Court's word is the last word: the political branches
can contradict it only by amending the Constitution itself.
268
But in Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene, the Court offered no
affirmative reading of Article III, of the Eleventh Amendment, nor
indeed of any constitutional provision or other law-based authority, to
explain why a private lawsuit against a state official, in his official
capacity, and for relief that can only be provided through state action,
could be heard by a federal court even though a lawsuit naming the
State itself was absolutely barred by Seminole Tribe's sovereign im-
munity ruling.269 Indeed, the Court has claimed no affirmative con-
stitutional support for Ex parte Young jurisdiction, candidly admitting
265. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
266. Ann Althouse coined this apt term for judicial review. See Ann Althouse, Standing, in
Fluffy Slippers, 77 VA. L. REV. 1177, 1182 n.22 (1991).
267. As the Court recently noted: "The judicial authority to determine the constitutionality
of laws, in cases and controversies, is based on the premise that the 'powers of the legislature
are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitu-
tion is written.'" City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (quoting Marbury, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) at 176). There is no controversy over this basic definition of the Court's power of
judicial review. Indeed, so commonplace and familiar is the idea of 'judicial review" that legal
commentators routinely introduce the term without defining it at all. See, e.g., John Harrison,
The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the Text of Article 11I, 64
U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 204 (1997) (observing, without citation, "[T]here is also, however, this
matter of judicial review, which sometimes makes Congress wish that federal judicial
competence were not quite as broad as it is"). By contrast, the Court's exercise of the traditional
judicial review power to overturn the political decisions of majoritarian institutions, like
Congress and the Executive, has in this century been so controversial as to be described as "the
central obsession of modern constitutional scholarship." See Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV.
333, 334-35 & n.1 (1998) (citing scholarship debating how to "reconcilfe]" judicial review by
unelected judiciary with principle of"popular governance in a democratic society").
268. Once the Court declares what the Constitution means, Chief Justice Marshall rea-
soned in Marbury, that meaning cannot be altered by simple legislation, else the Constitution
would no longer be "superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means." Marbury, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177. Indeed, if Congress could contradict the Court's constitutional rulings at
will, the Constitution itself would fall to the "level with ordinary legislative acts, and, like other
acts, [be] alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it." Id.; see also City of Boerne, 521
U.S. at 536 (quoting Marbury excerpt to support ruling that Congress lacks authority under
Fourteenth Amendment's Section 5 to alter Court's declaration on scope of First Amendment's
protection of religious freedom). Although the Court's claim to the last word on constitutional
meaning is challenged from time to time, that claim enjoys enough respect among courts and
commentators to include it within this Article's basic definition of the judicial review power.
See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 21, at 1363 ("[T]he Court is universally acknowledged to be the
final and authoritative expositor of the Constitution.").
269. See supra Part III.C.
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that Young depends on a judicially-crafted "fiction"270 adopted not
because the Constitution substantively embodies that sovereign im-
munity exception, but because the Court has identified a need to have
certain federal laws enforced in federal courts despite state sovereign
imm11nty. 2 7, Thus, unlike Court decisions that define the substantive
content of constitutional rights272 or constitutional structures,273 the
cases comprising the Ex parte Young doctrine say little about what
the law is-constitutional or otherwise-except to assert a judicially-
crafted, non-constitutional exception2 74 to what the Constitution would
otherwise require: dismissal of private lawsuits seeking to coerce
state action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction under Article 111.275
Ex parte Young's survival of Seminole Tribe departs from the
traditional judicial review model in a second way as well. When the
Court exercises its power "to say what the law is" concerning a consti-
tutional principle276-even one affecting federal court jurisdiction, like
270. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman (Pennhurst 11), 465 U.S. 89, 105-06 (1984)
(describing Ex parte Young doctrine as resting on "fiction" and "irony"); see also Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997) (agreeing with Pennhurst Ifs "observation" that Young
rests on a "fictional distinction between official and the State").
271. See, e.g., Coeur d'Alene, 521 U.S. at 262 (stating that the Young doctrine serves "need
to prevent violations of federal law"); Pennhurst II, 465 U.S. at 105-06 (emphasizing that the
Young doctrine "rests on the need to promote the vindication of federal rights"); Edelman v.
Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 655 (1974) (stating that the Ex parte Young "holding permitted the Civil
War Amendments to the Constitution to serve as a sword, rather than merely as a shield, for
those whom they were designed to protec"); see also Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 174
(1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The doctrine we call Ex parte Young is nothing short of
indispensable to the establishment of constitutional government and the rule of law. [It] marks
the frontier of the enforceability of federal law against sometimes competing state policies.");
supra Part II.C.2 (criticizing notion that need for Young jurisdiction can provide doctrine with
legal foundation).
272. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 719-23 (1997) (defining which
"fundamental rights" are protected by Constitution's due process guarantees); City of Boerne v.
Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (invalidating federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act as
exceeding Congress' Fourteenth Amendment legislative power, since Congress may not
contradict the Court's decision on the scope of the First Amendments Religion Clauses); supra
Part H.C.2 (discussing Court's traditional power to define individuals' constitutional rights).
273. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating federal
firearms registration legislation for violating the Constitution's principle of federalism
prohibiting the national government from commandeering state officials in order to implement
federal policy); see also supra Part H.C.3 (discussing Court's traditional power to enforce the
Constitution's structural principles).
274. Indeed, the Court has made its Young regulations overtly non-constitutional: the
Court has chosen to deny federal court access on purely pragmatic grounds, like those justifying
Edelman's bright line distinguishing prospective from retrospective relief. See supra notes 221-
26 and accompanying text. And the Court has also chosen to grant federal court access on
purely pragmatic grounds, like those justifying Ex parte Young jurisdiction in the first place.
See supra note 190 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's reliance on the "necessity" of
Young jurisdiction despite state sovereign immunity).
275. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1).
276. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174(1803).
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standing or state sovereign immunity-that law then ordinarily
applies equally to Congress and Court alike. So, neither Congress nor
the Court may authorize subject-matter jurisdiction over a contro-
versy outside the categories listed in Article 111.277 And neither
Congress nor the Court may authorize lawsuits by plaintiffs who do
not meet Article Ill's standing requirements.278
Seminole Tribe would have conformed to this tradition had it
held that neither Congress nor the Court may constitutionally author-
ize federal jurisdiction over a private lawsuit to force a State to com-
ply with federal law enacted under Article I. Indeed, had Seminole
Tribe stopped there, it would have reinforced the Court's judicial
review tradition by holding that Congress must comply with the
constitutional rule of state sovereign immunity that the Court im-
posed on itself in Hans v. Louisiana,2 19 so that all constitutional actors
would be bound by the same substantive constitutional constraint.2
Of course, the Court did not adopt so evenhanded a rule.
Instead, Seminole Tribe decided, subject-matter jurisdiction over law-
suits against state interests on Congress' terms violates the
Constitution, while on the Court's terms, it does not.281
277. Cf id. (holding that Congress may not assign original jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court in cases other than those listed in Article III).
278. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559-62 (1992) (invalidating environ-
mental legislation's "citizen standing" provision because it authorized federal court lawsuits by
plaintiffs who could not meet the Court's own standing criteria, based on Court's interpretation
of Article III); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 815, 830 (1997) (dismissing constitutional
challenge to the federal Line Item Veto Act brought by six Members of Congress because they
lacked Article II standing despite specific congressional intent that Members be permitted to
challenge that legislation).
279. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); see also supra notes 54-56 and accompanying
text (discussing Hans).
280. See Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65-67 (1996) (noting that before Union Gas,
"it had seemed fundamental that Congress could not expand the jurisdiction of the federal
courts beyond the bounds of Article III").
281. Moreover, if the Court were exercising its traditional judicial power to say "what the
law is" for all constitutional actors, one might expect the Court to limit Young jurisdiction to
those causes of action arising from the Reconstruction Amendments, see U.S. CONST. amends.
XIII-XV, since Seminole Tribe limited Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity to
legislation enacted under those Amendments. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66 (reaffirming
Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer's holding that Reconstruction Amendments altered state-federal
relationship, so state sovereign immunity principle in Article III and Eleventh Amendment does
not apply with equal force, thus permitting the abrogation of state sovereign immunity to
enforce those Amendments and legislation enacted thereunder). The Court did not so limit
Young; to the contrary, the Seminole Tribe majority suggested that Congress might provide for
federal court enforcement of Article I legislation if its jurisdictional grants conformed to the Ex
parte Young model. Id. at 75 n.17; see also Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 274-75
(1997) (opinion of Court); id. at 299-300 (Souter, J., dissenting) (observing that Tribe's cause of
action arose from Executive Order, ratified by Congress, defining boundaries of Coeur d'Alene
Reservations; neither Executive Order nor ratifying legislation enacted under Reconstruction
Amendments).
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The Court said "no" to Congress, but "yes" to itself.282
Even this asymmetry would fit the tradition of judicial review,
moreover, if the difference between Congress' jurisdictional terms and
the Court's could be explained on constitutional grounds. That is, if
Young jurisdiction rested on an affirmative principle of law-a prin-
ciple having constitutional status equal to the sovereign immunity
principle invoked against Congress' jurisdictional grant-then
Seminole Tribe could be understood as holding, simply, that Congress
must comply with Young's constitutional rule,28 3 just like the Court.
But, again, no principle of law-only the Court's own say-
so-supports Young's jurisdictional distinction between a State and
its officials. Thus, by preserving the Ex parte Young doctrine after
Seminole Tribe, the Court has effectively asserted a species of judicial
power largely unlike ordinary judicial review: a freestanding Article
III authority, outstripping Congress' power under Article I, to open
and shut federal court doors on lawsuits against state interests as the
Court sees fit.
B. Ex parte Young and the Separation of Powers
Any such claim implicates separation of powers concerns on at
least two fronts. It clashes with the Constitution's textual allocation
to Congress of substantial, if not primary, authority to regulate fed-
eral court jurisdiction. And it collides with core values-like institu-
tional accountability and inter-branch review-that the separation of
powers principle seeks to preserve.
282. But see Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 137. After Marbury, the Supreme Court
preserved for itself no more power than it had allowed Congress to authorize original Supreme
Court jurisdiction over the claims of the Midnight Judges: under Marbury, the Constitution
said "no" to jurisdiction over those lawsuits, and said "no" to the Court and to Congress alike.
By contrast, the Seminole Tribe Court, by preserving Ex parte Young, dealt itself the authority
to extend federal jurisdiction over essentially the same lawsuits that it declined to accept from
Congress' hand, thus saying "no" to Congress, but "yes" to itself.
283. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 75 n.17 (suggesting that Congress could constitutionally
grant federal jurisdiction on Ex parte Young model to coerce state compliance even with Article
I legislation).
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1. Congress and Federal Jurisdiction
By its own terms, the Constitution vests authority in Congress
to regulate the federal courts, including federal jurisdiction over
particular cases and controversies. Article III provides, "[tihe judicial
Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and
in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish."284 Article I, correspondingly, includes among Congress'
enumerated legislative powers the authority "[tlo constitute Tribunals
inferior to the supreme Court."2 Moreover, while the Constitution
specifically established the Supreme Court itself,2 6 it nonetheless
placed in Congress' hands significant control even over the subject-
matter of the Court's appellate jurisdiction.287 Indeed, so far as the
Constitution's structural text goes, Congress' power over all federal
courts and their subject-matter jurisdiction is limited principally by
Article III's heads of jurisdiction, which describe the outer reach of
the federal "judicial Power,"28 and by Article III's requirement that
federal jurisdiction always be limited to actual cases or
controversies.2 s Thus, it is ordinarily considered Congress' preroga-
tive-and not the Supreme Court's-to define the judicial power's
reach to any particular kind of lawsuit.290
This is not to say that the Constitution vests an absolute and
unchecked power in Congress to command or to deny federal jurisdic-
tion over any sort of case and on any terms it chooses, so long as
284. U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 1 (emphasis added).
285. Id. at art. I, § 8, cl. 9.
286. Id. at art. M, § 1.
287. Id. at art. III, § 2 (noting that the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
over all cases or controversies enumerated in Article III, section 2, "with such Exceptions, and
under such Regulations as the Congress shall make").
288. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (rejecting Congress' attempt to
grant the Supreme Court original jurisdiction over cases not included in Article I, section 3).
289. See generally Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003,
1017 (1998); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 559-62 (1992).
290. I here echo a widespread-though not undisputed-view that the Constitution does
appear to vest in the Congress at least a primary authority to define and regulate federal court
jurisdiction. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 1-2 (noting that commentary about federal court
jurisdiction tends to "procee[d] from [this] common starting point" of primary congressional
control based upon the Constitution; the article then proceeds to offer an alternative premise);
see also id. at I n.4 (citing to an extensive body of scholarship assuming congressional control of
federal jurisdiction). The Supreme Court has offered conflicting opinions on the question.
Compare Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868) (stating that Congress' power to
make "exceptions" to the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction carries with it the power to
deny jurisdiction not affirmatively granted by Act of Congress), with Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
592, 603 (1988) (noting that a "serious Constitutional question" would arise if Congress "den[ied]
any judicial forum for a colorable Constitutional claim").
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Article III's formal limits have been observed. There exists a serious
and durable controversy about whether and to what extent the
Constitution empowers Congress to strip federal courts altogether of
jurisdiction over certain types of controversies. 291 And, correlatively,
courts regularly refuse to hear cases that Congress has granted them
jurisdiction to decide.292
Likewise, the Court has always wielded its ordinary power of
judicial review to enforce constitutional limits-text-based and oth-
erwise-on Congress' grants of federal subject-matter jurisdiction,
just like any other legislation. After all, Marbury v. Madison itself
invoked the judicial power "to say what the law is" in order to strike
down a statute granting original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court in
a case not contemplated by Article II.293
But by preserving Ex parte Young after Seminole Tribe, the
Court accomplished something different. Here, the Court has stripped
Congress of the power to grant federal subject-matter jurisdiction over
291. For two archetypal entries in the debate over Congress' power to control the federal
courts, see generally Hart, supra note 32, wherein Professor Hart argued that Congress enjoys
broad discretion to define lower federal courts' original jurisdiction, and Wechsler, supra note
93, wherein Professor Wechsler discussed both the political and moral limits to the courts'
power of judicial review. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 97, at 208-10 (arguing that Congress enjoys
power to strip federal courts of some kinds of jurisdiction listed in Article III, but not over others
that Article I makes "mandatory"); John Harrison, Jurisdiction, Congressional Power, and
Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEo. L.J. 2513, 2513-15 (1998); Harrison, supra note 267, at 255
(arguing that Congress enjoys "substantial" power to control federal jurisdiction under Article
I); Vicki C. Jackson, Introduction: Congressional Control of Jurisdiction and the Future of the
Federal Courts-Opposition, Agreement, and Hierarchy, 86 GEO. L.J. 2445, 2448-55 (1998)
(discussing three possible relationships between Congress and the Court); James S. Leibman &
William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking
Required of Article III Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REv. 696, 773-850 (1998) (dividing Congress' power
over the Court based on the quality and quantity of federal jurisdiction); see also Friedman,
supra note 32, at 5-7 (describing "two schools of thought" in debate over extent of Congress'
power to control federal court jurisdiction and surveying the literature in both categories). For
an alternative account of the Constitution's allocation of power over federal courts, emphasizing
a practice under which Congress and the Court have an interactive relationship in defining
federal jurisdiction, see id. at 2-3.
292. Whether a federal court may legitimately decline to decide a case within its statutory
subject-matter jurisdiction-to refuse what Congress has granted-is a question debated with
an intensity approaching that of the debate over Congress' power to strip federal courts of
jurisdiction over controversies altogether. Compare Redish, supra note 32, at 71 (arguing that
congressional authority over federal courts renders judge-made abstention doctrines constitu-
tionally suspect), with Shapiro, supra note 32, at 547, 550 (arguing, in response to Professor
Redish, that federal courts may constitutionally use discretion, even on pure policy grounds, to
decline jurisdiction "despite the existence of statutory authority to adjudicate"; and citing non-
constitutional "prudential" limitations the Court has superimposed on the Constitution's
standing requirements). See generally Friedman, supra note 32, at 7-8 & nn.29-36 (surveying
cases and commentary debating whether federal courts have or have not a "virtually
unflagging obligation' to exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress" (quoting Moses H.
Cone Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 15 (1983))).
293. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177.
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lawsuits to enforce state compliance with Article I legislation, only to
retain for the Court itself the power to grant an equivalent jurisdic-
tion under Ex parte Young. The Court has asserted the authority to
do something-set terms authorizing federal jurisdiction over private
lawsuits challenging state interests-that Congress is now prohibited
from doing under Article 1.294
Moreover, by denying Congress this jurisdictional authority on
constitutional grounds, the Court has hindered Congress' participa-
tion in any further development of the rules governing federal juris-
diction to coerce state action. To be sure, after Seminole Tribe
Congress may also invoke Ex parte Young jurisdiction to enforce
Article I legislation against States;295 and the Court will honor
Congress' choice, express or implied, to deny Ex parte Young jurisdic-
tion over a particular kind of case, and so legislatively shut federal
court doors on lawsuits that would otherwise satisfy Young.296 But if
the Young doctrine rests only on the Court's pragmatic, non-law based
views about when federal judicial enforcement of federal law is desir-
able despite state sovereign immunity, then it only aggravates sepa-
ration of powers concerns for the Court to impose these policy-based
jurisdictional rules on Congress. Thus, unlike other instances where
the Court has engaged in a "dialogue" with Congress over the appro-
priate scope of federal jurisdiction,297 after Seminole Tribe there ap-
pears little room left for inter-branch collaboration: Congress may
either adopt the Ex parte Young model or else amend the
Constitution.298
Given the Constitution's textual allocation to Congress of at
least substantial control over Article III courts, the Court's assertion
of this predominant judicial power over jurisdiction raises separation
of powers concerns. 299 Not only has the Court trespassed on Congress'
294. Because in Seminole Tribe the Court is stripping Congress of authority over federal
jurisdiction, the scholarly controversy about whether Congress may return the favor is largely
beside the point here. See supra note 291 and accompanying text. Accordingly, I do not enter
that debate.
295. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 75 n.17 (1996).
296. Indeed, Congress was deemed to have intended that result in Seminole Tribe. See id.
at 75-76.
297. See Friedman, supra note 32, at 10-28, 48-49 & nn.241-43 (describing examples of
what that author describes as "dialogic" process by which Congress and the Court
together-more or less cooperatively-determine the proper scope of federal jurisdiction).
298. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74 & n.17.
299. One commentator has pursued this thinking to argue, as a separation of powers
matter, that Congress' power to abrogate state sovereign immunity should be deemed an
integral element of its Article I authority to regulate interstate commerce because, as a matter
of constitutional structure, the Congress is institutionally better suited to maintain the balance
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territory, but it appears to have ousted Congress from a field it is
entitled at least to inhabit, if not monopolize.3°0
2. Ex parte Young and Separation of Powers Values
The Ex parte Young doctrine's freestanding judicial power to
regulate federal jurisdiction over lawsuits against state interests also
collides with values lying at the core of the separation of powers.
Foremost among these is the proposition that no constitutional
decisioniaker may exercise public power unlimited by discernible
standards external to that decisionmaker's own will.3 01 For Congress,
some of those external limits have recently emerged, for example,
from Article 1302 and the Tenth Amendment. 303
And for the Court, its external standards derive from the
requirement that no judicial power may be wielded absent an affirma-
tive basis for federal subject-matter jurisdiction: Jurisdiction is both
a fundamental source for, and a fundamental check on, the
institutional authority of Article III courts.3°4 Jurisdiction is one
critical way in which the separation of powers principle expresses
between state and federal governments since the States themselves are politically represented
in the Congress, and not in the federal courts. See Tribe, supra note 111, at 693-96, 713.
300. Cf Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (noting that the separation of powers
principle provides a "safeguard against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at
the expense of the other").
301. As James Madison put it: "No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because
his interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably, corrupt his integrity." THE
FEDERALIST No. 10, at 56 (James Madison) (Edward Mead Earle ed., 1941). Addressing a
slightly different question, Professor Gwyn observed that early rationales for the separation of
powers emphasized this kind of institutional accountability: "If the same persons both made
and executed the law, government would no longer be under law since those persons in their
legislative capacity would always modify the law to excuse whatever they might do in their
executive capacity." W.B. GwYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POwERs 35-36 (1965).
302. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995) (holding that the Gun-
Free School Zones Act of 1994 exceeded Congress' Commerce Clause power).
303. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997) (invalidating federal
firearms registration legislation as violating the Constitution's federalism principle); New York
v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Tenth Amendment prohibits Congress
from "commandeering" a sovereign state legislature into enforcing a federal regulatory scheme).
304. Just as Congress may not legislate on matters beyond its Article I 'jurisdiction"-the
constitutionally bounded field in which Congress is entitled to exercise federal power, see Lopez,
514 U.S. at 567-68-so federal courts, including the Supreme Court, may not exercise the
federal judicial power in cases that lie beyond their subject-matter jurisdiction. This, of course,
is axiomatic. Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and thus "are empowered to hear
only those matters explicitly provided for both in the Constitution and federal law." See
Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 649 n.35 (explaining that principle of limited federal court
jurisdiction can be traced back to Marbury v. Madison).
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itself in the federal judicial branch.3 5 Thus, by preserving Ex parte
Young after Seminole Tribe-by preserving the power to grant itself
jurisdiction where Congress is constitutionally barred-the Court
appears to have claimed an unusual privilege: the institutional right,
where private lawsuits challenge state interests, to have not just the
last word but the only word on the scope of its own constitutional
authority. 06
Moreover, any claim by the Court to a unilateral power to
regulate federal jurisdiction would also collide with the larger separa-
tion of powers aim that no constitutional decisionmaker may exercise
public power unchecked and unreviewed by a co-equal branch.30 7
When the Court wields its ordinary power of judicial review to "say
what the law is," its accountability is enhanced by the interpretive
nature of the enterprise itself.308 If the Court adopts what is consid-
ered an erroneous reading of the "law" when deciding the merits of a
305. See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1016 (1998)
(holding that, "[t~he statutory and (especially) constitutional elements of jurisdiction are an
essential ingredient of separation and equilibration of powers, restraining the courts from acting
at certain times, and even restraining them from acting permanently regarding certain
subjects").
306. Again, other claims to judicial independence much less unilateral in nature have
sparked considerable controversy. See supra note 32 (citing examples).
307. The Court's own political question doctrine, under which otherwise justiciable federal
controversies are deemed nonjusticiable because they involve functions committed entirely to
the unreviewable discretion of one of the two political branches, is the exception that proves this
rule. See, e.g., Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
308. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 21, at 1363 & n.2 (citing "the great weight of
professional opinion" that judicial office restricts federal judges to "reasoned elaboration of
fundamental principles" (quoting ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 23-28
(1962))). By contrast, if the Ex parte Young cases set the example, the Court's freestanding
power to regulate jurisdiction over lawsuits against state interests can be used not simply to
interpret and apply legal standards to a particular case, but also to add, discard, and modify
jurisdictional rules for reasons based entirely on pragmatic policy factors, like a State's fiscal
ability to plan ahead for costly prospective but not retrospective injunctive relief. Cf Edelman
v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974). Or, according to the Kennedy-Rehnquist faction in Coeur
d'Alene, it may be used even more loosely to advance any cluster of policy values deemed
compelling to a majority of the Court in any particular lawsuit seeking to coerce state action.
Idaho v. Coeur d'Alene Tribe, 521 U.S. 261, 280-82 (1997) (Kennedy, J.). After all, "the Young
fiction is an exercise in line-drawing. There is no reason why the line cannot be drawn to reflect
the real interests of States." Id. (emphasis added). To the extent that the Ex parte Young
doctrine empowers the Court thus to grant or deny federal jurisdiction because of its case-by-
case choices among various competing public policy values, and not based on an existing law-
based standard, then that power begins to veer away from the judicial functions ordinarily
performed by Article I courts, and to take on a cast ordinarily more associated with the federal
legislative power. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585-89
(1952); see also Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 118 S. Ct. 2091, 2106 (1998) (holding
that the line-item veto legislation violated the Constitution's bicameralism and presentment
requirements in part because the President's authority to "cancel" individual appropriations
amounts to "reject[ion of] the policy judgment made by Congress and rel[iance on] his own policy
judgment," thus distinguishing this cancellation power from the ordinary Executive power to
interpret and apply laws in particular factual circumstances).
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controversy, it can be criticized by other actors-including later
Courts-who can offer an alternative view either through legislation
altering the Court's interpretation, or through more indirect political
control of the courts institutionally.309 Even the Court's interpreta-
tions on the merits of constitutional provisions, difficult as they are to
override through the amendment process, at least expose the Court to
the direct and indirect review of Congress and the President, as well
as their political constituencies.3 0 Thus, although the Court may not
be directly accountable to an electoral constituency for any particular
decision, its accountability is ordinarily assured through indirect
political limits and also through the constraints of reasoned decision-
making inherent in the interpretative enterprise itself.311
But, after Seminole Tribe, the Young doctrine empowers the
Court not simply to decide the legal merits of controversies otherwise
properly within the federal courts' statutory and constitutional
subject-matter jurisdiction, but instead to control-without Congress'
participation-the very forum in which the federal judicial power is to
be exercised at all.312 Young empowers the Court unilaterally to
determine, in lawsuits against state interests, the terms and reach of
its own constitutional authority.33 At the very least, this raises
separation of powers issues that merit close consideration.
VI. CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE JUDICIAL POWER?
Quite apart from these separation of powers concerns, Ex parte
Young's survival of Seminole Tribe poses a more general question: If
the Court is indeed claiming a freestanding power to regulate federal
309. See supra note 31 (identifying other political and structural checks on, and safeguards
for, the federal courts' exercise of Article I1Ts judicial power).
310. See Friedman, supra note 96, at 738 (discussing federal courts' sensitivity to
majoritarian politics in deciding when and how to enforce individual rights); see also Friedman,
supra note 32, at 10-20 (discussing federal courts' ordinary sensitivity to the political branches
when they make decisions affecting jurisdiction).
311. See supra note 308 (noting elaborative quality of traditional judicial review).
312. Cf INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929-31 (1983).
313. Cf Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 742-49 (1979) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that federal courts violate the separation of powers when they imply
private rights of action to enforce federal statutes based on the courts' independent evaluation of
the policy goals served by judicial involvement, in part because the implied actions necessarily
expand the courts' own subject-matter jurisdiction); see also Tribe, supra note 111, at 693-96,
713 (arguing, as a separation of powers matter, that Congress is institutionally better suited to
maintain the balance between the state and federal governments since the States themselves
are politically represented in Congress, not in federal courts).
1999]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction over lawsuits against state interests, where will that new
power lead?
One possibility is that the Court is undertaking to carve out a
special and dominant constitutional role for itself in mediating the
relationship between States and the federal political branches. While
it is not new for the Court to take on the task of elaborating the
substance of the Constitution's federalism principles,3 14 Ex parte
Young's survival of Seminole Tribe suggests that the Court is now also
assuming control over the forum and process in which those principles
are debated and resolved.
Because both Seminole Tribe and Coeur d'Alene exempted
States from having to answer in federal court for actions claimed to
violate federal law, it is tempting to predict that any new power that
the Court claims to mediate federalism questions is likely to benefit
States at the expense of federal interests and federal decisionmak-
ers.315 If that prediction comes true, it would in one respect align the
post-Coeur d'Alene Court with its pre-Ex parte Young forebears. In
Hans and afterwards,3 6 the Court's sovereign immunity rulings effec-
tively shifted power from the federal government to the States, for by
leaving States unaccountable in federal court for violations of federal
law harming private individuals, Hans augmented the States' ability
to act as they chose towards their citizens and others, notwithstand-
ing federal law to the contrary.317 Likewise, if the post-Coeur d'Alene
Court uses its power over federal jurisdiction routinely to shield
314. See, e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997); United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549, 551-52 (1995). Even this ordinary exercise of traditional judicial review to say what
the Constitution's federalism principles mean has generated controversy. See Jackson, supra
note 1, at 2213-28 (discussing value of securing Constitutional role of States). Compare
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 852 (1976) (indicating that the Court should
exercise judicial review to enforce the Constitution's federalism principles against congressional
legislation that violates them), with Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528,
546-47, 550 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities for too aggressively regulating
federalism's balance of power between federal and state government; declaring that "principal
means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal system" lies in the
States' political representation in Congress). See generally Kramer, supra note 105 (discussing
the Court's shift in attitude between National League of Cities and Garcia as well as the
controversy among commentators concerning the proper judicial role in enforcing substantive
federalism principles); Symposium, National Power and State Autonomy: Calibrating the New
Federalism, 32 IND. L. REv. 1 (1998) (exploring the balance of federalism left in the wake of
recent Court decisions).
315. See Weinberg, supra note 6, at 1295 (citing Seminole Tribe to support the author's
observation that the Supreme Court "of late has been investing.., heavily in the federalism
business.. . energetically protecting the states from the nation").
316. See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Exparte New York, 256 U.S. 490
(1921).
317. See Vdzquez, supra note 76, at 11-12 (describing Hans' "offensiveness" to rule-of-law
values).
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States from federal-court consequences of their federal-law violations,
then Seminole Tribe's jurisdictional federalism may come to mean
virtual state impunity for federal violations, except when the United
States itself brings an enforcement action318 or the Court hears an
appeal from state court raising a federal claim against state action. 319
If so, then the Court may be signaling a shift in how it views
its core "constituency," the group or interest it has a special
institutional role in protecting.32 0 Six decades ago, in United States v.
Carolene Products, the Court appeared to propose for itself the task of
reviewing majoritarian legislation that demonstrated "prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities" defined by religion, race, or
national origin.321 This proposal suggested that the Court meant to
carve out for itself a judicial constituency comprised of those who, for
318. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 71 n.14 (1996) (reaffirming decision in United
States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892), that state sovereign immunity does not bar an action by
the United States against a State in federal court).
319. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. The Court made this point in a slightly
ambiguous way, citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821), for the proposition that
"this Court is empowered to review a question of federal law arising from a state court decision
where a State has consented to suit." Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14. But in a much more
recent case, the Court observed that state sovereign immunity posed no bar to the Supreme
Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court decisions involving state parties not because of
any sovereign immunity waiver by such States, but because of Cohens' conclusion that an
"appeal" is not a "suit" within the language of the Eleventh Amendment. See McKesson Corp. v.
Division of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 27, 31 (1990) ("The Eleventh
Amendment does not constrain the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over cases
arising from the state courts."); see also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241
(1985) (holding that State's consent to waive sovereign immunity to suit in its own courts does
not constitute consent to suit in federal court). See generally Jackson, supra note 56, at 13-29
(discussing the Supreme Court's tradition of exercising appellate jurisdiction over claims
against States, notwithstanding state sovereign immunity); V~zquez, supra note 76, at 11 n.71
(noting current split among state supreme courts about whether Supremacy Clause requires
state courts to hear unconsented federal law suits against States even though sovereign
immunity would bar same lawsuit from federal court).
320. To suggest that the federal Judiciary has a constituency is not to suggest that that
constituency is necessarily political, defined in terms of outright electoral politics. See generally
Laura S. Fitzgerald, Cadenced Power: The Kinetic Constitution, 46 DuKE L.J. 679, 681-85
(1997) (discussing how the Constitution organizes "the People" as a whole into series of nested
constituencies corresponding with the federal political branches). Prominent Framers did
appear to consider "every branch of the constitution and government to be popular and regarded
the president, Senate, and even the judiciary as well as the House of Representatives as
somehow all equal agents of the people's will." GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE
AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 549 (1969) (emphasis added); Friedman, supra note 96, at
738 (stating thesis that the "idealized notion of countermajoritarian courts must give way to a
vision of courts as bodies different from, but nonetheless responsive to, popular will"). Yet,
while the Constitution ties the judiciary to electoral politics by making judges and Justices
political appointees, at the same time Article III insulates the judiciary from politics by granting
judges life tenure and guaranteed salary. See U.S. CONsT. art. III; see also Northern Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 58-60 (1982) (describing how Article I
provisions ensure the judiciary's independence from the federal political branches).
321. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
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one reason or another, are unable to compete fairly within their own
political constituent groups.31 2
But if the Court uses its post-Seminole Tribe power over juris-
diction to shield States from private federal-law claims, then that may
suggest that the Court now considers States-and not those who claim
individual rights against state violations-its new core constitu-
ency.323 Whereas the Carolene Products model envisioned the Court
policing what political winners do to political losers, that is, the Court
may now see itself policing what one group of political winners-the
Congress-does to another-those who run state governments. 324
But even if the Court's view of its own constituency is shifting
in this way, the upshot is not clear. Now that Young has survived
Seminole Tribe, the Court holds the power not just to shut but also to
open federal court doors to lawsuits seeking to coerce state compliance
with federal law. This puts the Court in a stronger position than it
occupied immediately after Hans, for no State can afford to ignore the
Court's views-nor any group of Justices' views, for that
matter-about when state action implicates federal concerns seriously
322. See generally BICKEL, supra note 308, at 181 (developing the view that
countermajoritarian judicial review is appropriate where it protects those chronically disfavored
in the majoritarian political processes); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980)
(developing the view that countermajoritarian judicial review is appropriate where the.
majoritarian process is distorted by a defect, like the systematic exclusion of racial minorities
from political participation).
323. See Chemerinsky, supra note 15, at 663-64 (1985) (criticizing the Pennhurst . Court's
denial of Ex parte Young jurisdiction to claims under state law because ruling undermined "one
core role of the federal courts [which] is to uphold the United States Constitution by hearing
complaints of unconstitutional actions by governments and government officers at all levels").
324. Cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 550-51 (1985) (declaring
that the "principal means chosen by the Framers to ensure the role of the States in the federal
system" lies in the States' political representation in Congress). There is one striking parallel
between the Court's apparent current solicitude for States' interests and any post-Carolene
Products solicitude for individual rights. With both, the Court selected a constituency that not
only helps define the Court's own role within the Constitution's separation of powers structure,
but that makes that judicial role-and the decisions made about the chosen
constituency-essentially unassailable, because constitutionally founded, through ordinary
political processes. Moreover, to the extent the Court has substituted States' rights for
individual rights in choosing its preferred judicial constituency, it has freed itself substantially
from the need to ensure cooperation from the Executive to enforce judicial decisions made in
that constitutency's interests: so long as protecting States means prohibiting enforcement of
federal regulations against them, there will be no need to call out the National Guard. Cf
Friedman, supra note 96, at 738 (discussing the reality that courts may not always achieve
enforcement of individual rights that they declare because of resistance from the political
entities necessary for enforcement).
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enough to justify federal jurisdiction over a lawsuit challenging that
action.3
25
Even if the future of the federal judicial power is opaque, how-
ever, the more immediate implications of Ex parte Young's survival of
Seminole Tribe are not. By asserting a freestanding prerogative to
control its own subject-matter jurisdiction over lawsuits against state
interests, this Supreme Court has dealt itself a remarkable constitu-
tional power, moving it a step beyond Marbury.
325. See supra Part 1V.B and accompanying text (describing Coeur d'Alene's three opinions
and their varying views on when federal jurisdiction under Ex parte Young is warranted
notwithstanding state sovereign immunity).
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